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Editors

**Dr. Pranati Devi
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From the Editorial's Desk

Philosophy is about exploring what is true. It aims primarily at knowledge of unity. In the journey of philosophical exploration, philosophers provide analytic thoughts from their own view points supported by deep logical arguments. They examine, interpret, analyze and make attempt to give solutions of the problems arise in the realm of epistemology, metaphysics, religion, ethics, humanities and social sciences from their own perspectives. Philosophical endeavour is never wind up with a definite conclusion. Since the dawn of human thought the process of philosophical exploration started and it continues till date. In this way, philosophy grows, develops, expands and as such it sharpens our thinking process.

Under the influence of science, many of us sometimes incline to doubt that philosophy as a subject does not possess any practical utility. But it shows its value by differentiating knowledge from wisdom. Its utility lies specially in the removal of arrogant dogmatism. It closes off the feeling of prejudices through the greatness of speculative, insightful and penetrative thoughts.

The Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (JSSH) is a modest effort where philosophers and scholars contribute their

analytic and critical thoughts to the philosophical journey of truth. This issue of JSSH comprises of eleven scholarly research papers. Here we want to convey that the style of research papers of the scholars is honoured and as such in many cases we have tried to keep the original style as far as possible. We owe a special word of gratitude to all the contributors who have made the publication possible with their write ups. We will remain grateful to the reviewers for their cooperation and support. We offer our regards and heartfelt thanks to the advisors of this issue of JSSH for their valuable suggestions and constant guidance. We shall be amply satisfied if the present issue renders service to the researchers in the realm of philosophy in future in any way. Let us not forget to beg apology for any kind of mistakes made in the process of editing this Journal.

Editors

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Neo-Expressivist Perspectives on Self-Knowledge: Bar-On, Finkelstein and Rodriguez

Kishor Dere

Abstract

The members of philosophical community, at least since the days of Descartes, have asserted that there exists a critical difference between knowledge of one's own mental states and knowledge of the outside world including the thoughts of others. Descriptivism, expressivism, fictionalism and prescriptivism are crucial concepts in the study of linguistics, ethics and psychology among many other disciplines. This paper attempts to highlight the contributions of contemporary expressivist philosophers like Bar-On, Long and Bar -On, Finkelstein and Rodriguez to thought-provoking and engaging debates on self-knowledge, especially 'neo-expressivism' about avowals.

Keywords: Neo- Expressivism, Avowal, Self-knowledge

Unlike science that constantly moves ahead jettisoning its past, the academic discipline of philosophy in all civilisations relentlessly pursues almost the same problems for centuries and

even millennia. History of Western philosophy suggests that "Know Thyself"; it was inscribed on the ancient temple at Delphi and quoted by Socrates in the *First Alcibiades*. The perennial question haunting minds of philosophers is 'What is it to know oneself?' or 'to have self-knowledge?'. Although the Delphic command had the spiritual and metaphysical connotations, the mainstream philosophy looks at the phrase differently. For philosophers, it simply means knowledge of one's own mental states: knowledge of what one is thinking, of what one wants, desires, intends and knowledge of one's sensations.

Thus, the age-old philosophical discourse on self-knowledge invariably refers to knowledge of one's own mental states, including sensations, thoughts and beliefs. The members of philosophical community, at least since the days of Descartes, have asserted that there exists a critical difference between knowledge of one's own mental states and knowledge of the outside world, including the thoughts of others. It is, however, noteworthy that there is little agreement among philosophers on the exact differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of other domains. Philosophers have adopted divergent perspectives on the methods of acquisition of self-knowledge by human beings. There is a profound impact of these scholarly differences on issues concerning epistemology and philosophy of mind.

This paper is a modest attempt to analyse non-Cartesian, non-epistemic, non-deflationary, inter-subjective and expressive perspectives on an intellectually fascinating as well as challenging philosophical concept of 'self-knowledge'. It specifically highlights the contributions of contemporary expressivist philosophers

especially, Bar-On (2004), Long and Bar-On (2001), Finkelstein (2003) and Rodriguez (2012) to thought-provoking and engaging debates on self-knowledge, especially 'neo-expressivism' about avowals. The term 'self-knowledge' alludes to contents of one's peculiar mental states which include one's particular beliefs, hopes, desires and sensations. Frequent reference to 'first-person authority' in the context of self-knowledge connotes the presumption that whenever any speaker claims to have a belief, hope, desire or intention, he or she cannot be wrong, nor can be mistaken in associating these mental states with himself or herself. Among a variety of epistemological issues dealing with the problem of self-knowledge are mind-body dualism and privileged access theory of Rene Descartes, Gilbert Ryle's repudiation of what he called Cartesian official doctrine and his enunciation of category mistake, Hilary Putnam's theory of meaning and semantic externalism based on a famous thought experiment called 'Twin Earth', Tyler Burge's anti-individualism with respect to mental content known as externalism (physical and social), Donald Davidson's denial of existence of strict psycho-physical laws, Ludwig Wittgenstein's expressivism and Crispin Wright's analysis of Wittgensteinian legacy, especially what he calls anti-explanatory motif in *Philosophical Investigations*.

An overview of philosophical literature on self-knowledge suggests that conventionally it is understood as a purely internal, private and secret matter. It is accessible exclusively to the subject through some kind of privileged access to happenings in his or her own mind. Such a view could be roughly characterised as an Internalist account of self-knowledge. Externalism or externalist

approach in contrast fervently contends that knowledge of the contents of one's mental states and processes is, at least, partially determined by external factors i. e. outside the mind. Such external factors include social and physical environment, linguistic and cultural practices, contexts and history of which the subject might not be even aware of. A logical fallout of the externalist argument is that the internalist theory's emphasis upon privileged access and first-person authority is diluted. In other words, the externalist philosophers disregard the so-called compatibility between the first-person authority and self-knowledge.

Expressivism

Descriptivism, expressivism, fictionalism, and prescriptivism are crucial concepts in the study of linguistics, philosophy, ethics and psychology among many other disciplines. Descriptivists hold that the exclusive linguistic function of a particular discourse is to describe the world as thus-and-so. Logical consequence of such a descriptive discourse is that its judgments are apt for truth. They are true if the world actually is the way as represented by the judgement, otherwise false. Realists essentially tend to be descriptivists who believe that the judgments are capable of effectively expressing an independent reality that exists there. Descriptivism is contrasted with expressivism, prescriptivism and fictionalism. Fictionalism states that the target judgments pretend to describe (Joyce 2001; Calderon 2005) while prescriptivism holds that they prescribe (Hare 1952). When the linguistic function of the target discourse is to express mental states, that position is called expressivist. This apparently and seemingly clear-cut classification turns confusing by the claim that judgments

appearing to express mental states actually describe belief-like mental states (Gibbard 1990; 2003). In order to retain distinctiveness, the expressivists need to hold that the target judgments express non-belief-like mental states or attitudes. This is how the debate gradually but critically shifts from a 'contrast in pure semantics' between 'describing' and 'expressing' to a 'contrast in semantics-cum-psychology' between 'expressing beliefs' and 'expressing attitudes'. In either of these two instances, the expressivist is enjoined upon to do two things. Firstly, communicate the non-belief like states of mind which are expressed by the target judgments; secondly, offer an explanation as to why such states are expressed in the discourse displaying the distinctive features of the target discourse, or if this is not feasible, then get rid of these attributes as understandable errors made by users of the discourse (Sinclair 2009: 136).

During the twentieth century, expressivism blossomed as an account of moral discourse. Metaethical expressivists opine that the special function of moral judgments is to express affective attitudes for ensuring mutual coordination of action (Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 1998).

Expressivism states that the meaning of any particular area of discourse happens to be a matter of expressing an attitude, not simply a description of a state of affairs. Since it is an expression of attitude, it is not truth-evaluable. It has been widely used in ethics to comprehend meaning of ethical statements or propositions. It basically comes under the rubric of deflationary theory of truth according to which " ... truth has no nature beyond what is captured in ordinary claims such as that 'snow is white' is

true just in case snow is white" (Stoljar and Damjanovic 2014). There is a widespread sense of disillusionment among philosophers in search of the nature of truth because they are chasing a mirage. Quasi-realist scholars like Simon Blackburn argued that truth-talk in ethics is metaphysically harmless because for a deflationist, truth is not a substantive or explanatory notion. That is how, he endorsed the view that [a] ethical propositions express some commitment, do not describe anything; and [b] truth-talk in ethics is acceptable (Blackburn 1984, chapter 6; 2010, chapters 2, 9 and II).

The expressivist accounts of self-knowledge point out resemblances between utterances such as "I am in pain" and direct expressions of one's mental states like "ouch!". The traditionally dominant type of expressivism, termed as 'Simple Expressivism' by Dorit Bar-On, also credited to Wittgenstein (Bar-On 2004:228), criticises the latter. The simple expressivism accounts for the unique status of avowals by aligning them with natural expressions. It wonders whether the utterances like "I am in pain" are even true, let alone capable of reflecting knowledge of the subject's mental states. There are two core elements of simple expressivism. One, avowals should be precisely contrasted with "ordinary descriptive reports". Two, character of avowals is to be comprehended through close comparison with natural expressions. My sincere utterance "I am in pain" qualitatively differs from your statement "He is in pain". While my avowal is like a mere cry or grimace, your ascription is an effort to objectively report my current mental state. As I am simply expressing my painful mental state, it could have been done by employing facial

expressions or other vocalisations as well. The avowal "I am in pain" significantly differs from other utterances like "My finger is bleeding". The latter utterance is a perceptual report narrating the currently perceived state of reports whereas the former is not. According to Simple Expressivism, an utterance like "I am in pain" merely articulates pain, not the actual belief or knowledge that the person is in pain. Such an utterance is incapable of expressing anything that is either true or false. Thus, simple expressivism does not convey an account of self-knowledge, argues Bar-On and therefore, proceeds to enunciate her own neo-expressivism.

Neo- Expressivism

Of late, expressivist theories have emerged in domains other than ethical ones too. For example, for the self-ascription of mental states (Bar-On and Long 2001; Bar-On 2004; Finkelstein 2003; 2008; Rodriguez 2012), indicative conditionals (Blackburn 2006), probability (Logue 1995; Barker 2006), mathematics (Lindstrom 2000), epistemology (Gibbard 2003: Chapter 11; Ridge 2007; Chrisman) and aesthetics (Todd 2004). This paper concentrates on the self-ascription of mental states, popularly referred to as neo-expressivism. Before studying the details of neo-expressivism, it may be useful to remind oneself of a hard fact that neo-expressivism is not necessarily a twenty-first century innovation or a brand new idea. It was first formulated by Carnap in 1930s (Carnap 1935: 28).

Neo-expressivist views were developed by Bar-On (2004), Bar-On and Long (2001) as well as Finkelstein (2003; 2008) and Rodriguez (2012). They argue that the utterances like "I am in pain" which are avowals obviously express the mental state they

ascribe. The neo- expressivist approach stresses directness or obviousness of the mental state seen in an avowal. It holds that there is no intervening judgment between the pain or desire of the subject and his or her utterance "I am in pain" or "I want water". Thus, avowals are spontaneous, not mediated by any judgment. Avowals cannot be false because they emanate from the direct experiences of the subjects. The principal argument advanced by the neo- expressivist philosophers is that the first-person authority is intact and unassailable with few exceptions. The subject is not required to cite any evidence of being in pain or feeling-thirsty. By the way, the unique role of avowals is not confined to public statements. The neo- expressivist scholars hold that "in-thought" avowals can be as authentic and authoritative as the spontaneous verbal expressions (Bar-On, 2004: 9; Finkelstein, 2003: 1 03). First-person authority is embedded right in the subject who directly expresses his or her thoughts through an avowal.

Finkelstein's Neo- Expressivism

The neo-expressivists such as Bar-On (2004) and Finkelstein (2003), however, disagree on the methods of understanding the first-person authority and the unique characteristics of avowals in respect of self-knowledge. For instance, Finkelstein, on the one hand, concedes that the avowal "I am so happy!" may be caused by happiness of the concerned person. He, on the other hand, refuses to accept that this is indeed a matter of causation, akin to hard hitting someone's knee with a hammer mercilessly causes his or her leg to be removed. Like McDowell, Finkelstein too warns against accepting the 'Myth of the Given' in our

understanding of sensations as self-ascriptions. Unlike McDowell, he, however, adopts a different method to reject this myth. While the former understands our pains to have propositional content, the latter trashes the very notion that avowals or self-ascriptions of pain eternally enjoy an epistemic corroboration (Finkelstein 2003: 148). In his analysis, the difference between these two cases namely "my happiness" and "my spontaneous avowal" is that there is a "particular kind of intelligibility". He opines that there is a "distinctive logical space" wherein one locates mental states and their articulations by the subject on the one hand, and the situations against the backdrop of which they have the importance they do on the other (Finkelstein 2003:126). Initially, he terms this as "the logical space of persons" to differentiate the human mental states hanging together with their circumstances and movements from those of clouds, which do not hang together. Subsequently, he rechristens it as the "logical space of animate life" (Finkelstein 2003:126-7). In order to appreciate this move, it may be worth one's while to pay attention to the following three critical questions raised by him.

- [1] What has our sentience to do with our sapience?
- [2] What does the mental life of a non-linguistic animal have in common with our sort of mental life?
- [3] How are unconscious mental states related to conscious ones? (Finkelstein 2003: 143,145).

Holistically understanding these three questions enable one to appreciate what is called mental. This can be approached by acknowledging that the attribution of either a pain or a desire - whether to a human being (*homo sapiens*) or a wild animal - is

nothing more than an exercise in tracking down an item in the "logical space of animate life" (Finkelstein 2003: 144). An author's conscious desire to write and complete a book, an unconscious fear of somebody over the likely problems the success or prosperity may bring in the life, the pain felt by the typist in the wrist, current desire of a dog to move outside, and the pain felt by a dog, thanks to the inefficient clipping of its nails by someone - all these instances have a common factor namely intelligibility which can never be present in cyclones, floods and earthquakes. These mental states can be expressed through one or the other kind of behaviour. Irrespective of it being sentience or sapience, humans or wild creatures, conscious or unconscious mental states - the inner and outer collectively make sense. In his disagreement with McDowellian interpretation of Wittgenstein that mental life is lived in a logical space of *reasons*, and McDowell's space of *concepts*, Finkelstein argues that the manner in which pain and whimper hang together in human beings or beasts is not at all rational. There is hardly any rationally consistent conceptual linkage in such mental states. Of course, our mental states and their behavioural expressions are not always devoid of rational conceptual linkages, agrees Finkelstein. Human actions are expressed rationally.

There is a desperate need to liberate our thinking of sensations as self-ascriptions. This can help one avoid the Myth of the Given. Following in the footsteps of Wittgenstein, this can be done without being required to claim that sensations comprise operations of conceptual capacities. Such a claim jeopardises not only relations of human beings with their own

sensations, but also their ties with animal kingdom. Rather than imposing a burden of such an argument upon Wittgenstein, it is better to argue that for him "mental life" lives in the "logical space of animate life" (Finkelstein 2003: 144). Such an approach of Wittgenstein forbids "over-rationalising" inner life of the subjects (Finkelstein 2003: 144-5). What propels people towards the Myth of the Given is the assumption that as and when someone happens to sincerely avow a mental state, he or she is reporting that would be epistemically justified in its affirmation. Jettisoning such an assumption can be much easier for those who accept expressive nature of avowals (Finkelstein 2003: 145).

Bar-On's Neo-Expressivism

Neo-expressivist view developed by Bar-On argues that an avowal is an act through which the subject straightaway expresses (not merely reports) that same mental condition that ascribes the avowal. She advises differentiation between semantics of avowals and their pragmatics and epistemology. Her argument is that the unique status of avowals is better explained by combing her idea of expressivism and proper definition of expression besides separating semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology. This kind of expressivist understanding aligns with non-deflationary perspective on self-knowledge and fool-proof realism in respect of mental states. Bar-On's neo-expressivism postulates a similarity between avowals and natural expressions without ever suggesting that expression of the states of subjects by avowals is at par with the ones done by natural expressions (Bar-On 2004:228). Unlike Finkelstein, Bar-On divorces the issue of first-person authority from that of explicating the epistemic

facet of self-knowledge. It is noteworthy that she is not wedded to the cause of offering a fixed account of the manner in which avowals make up knowledge. Instead, she accommodates multiple approaches compatible with her neo-expressivism. For example, she argues that the "true" avowal "I am so happy!" represents "genuine and privileged" (Bar-On 2004:405) self-knowledge irrespective of the fact that the avowing subject may not have even formed the judgment that he or she is happy and is unable to provide proof of his or her happiness. In fact, the neo-expressivist perspective denies that avowals represent beliefs in this "opining sense" (Bar-On 2004:363).

The Neo-Expressivist account maintains that if avowals are distinctively secure, this is because they give voice to subject's first-order conditions, and not because they articulate their higher-order judgments conditions, which they formed in an epistemically secure way (Bar-On 2004:363).

She asserts that the neo-expressivist account of avowals is not limited to a deflationary view of avowable self-knowledge and delineates three alternative non-deflationary views of avowable self-knowledge. The accurate view of privileged self-knowledge must take into account all those three perspectives as it is not possible to adjudicate among them. (2004:388) In order to integrate these diverse outlooks, one needs to undertake an in-depth study of similarities and differences between avowable self-knowledge and cases ill-suited to justified true belief (JTB) framework such as apriori knowledge, knowledge by testimony, knowledge through memory, knowledge of one's present actions

and perceptual knowledge. In absence of that, a "synthetic" view is offered by Bar-On (Bar-On 2004:389).

Due to a variety of reasons, Bar-On refrains from committing herself to 'self-intimation thesis', based on the Cartesian idea that our mental states are transparent to us i. e. a subject who is in a mental state, somehow knows for sure that he or she indeed is in such a mental state. For example, in the post-Freudian era, it is commonplace to know that subconscious emotions, feelings and propositional attitudes borne by subjects are concealed from them. Such subconscious states, however, have a direct bearing upon the conduct and mental lives of the subjects. Research on cognitive science too indicates that even though our actions are guided by certain mental states, perceptual states, and reasoning processes, there is no guarantee that the subjects are aware of them. It is an advantage that neo-expressivism does not rule out such possibilities of self-ignorance. Proponents of the 'self-intimation thesis' have to deny that wild animals or conceptually challenged creatures ('unknowing selves') are capable of having mental states. Otherwise, they may have to qualify that the self-intimation thesis applies only to subjects competent to make self-judgement. Bar-On's neo-expressivism avoids both these alternatives (Bar-On 2004:406).

It is against the spirit of neo-expressivism to harp on the point that avowable self-knowledge is the product of distinctive method employed by the subject to learn how subjects arrive at basic, privileged self-knowledge (Bar-On 2004:410). Besides avoiding commitment to Cartesian dualism, the neo-expressivism is also relatively neutral on the issue of the nature of mental states.

Moreover, neo-expressivist account is independent of the idea that the very existence of avowable mental states necessitates judgment-making by the subject to that effect. It is understood that being in a mental state is different from making a judgment that one is in that particular mental state. This resembles the realist view that in case of basic mental states shared by adult human subjects with pre-cognitive children and non-human animals, being of the subject in a given mental state does not depend on the subject taking or not taking himself or herself into that state. Neo-expressivism also concedes that somebody may judge that he or she is in a mental state without actually being in that mental state (Bar-On 2004:412). In contrast with grammatical and expressivist views, the neo-expressivist view does not attach to avowals a logical or conceptual guarantee of truth. Nor does neo-expressivism recognise an interesting sense in which mental states are generally of subjects' own making (Bar-On 2004:413).

Common sense understating suggests that mental states are not Cartesian, nor materialist introspectionist nor are they behaviourist. The neo-expressivist view postulates that mental states can be and are shown as well as made perceptible through the behaviour of the subjects. This deviates from the conventional thinking on asymmetries between first- and third-person. It argues that expressive behaviour is transparent to mental conditions of the subject. Expressive behaviour enables others to see, hear, feel embarrassment, anger and fear of the subject. Others actually perceive the subject being in the pertinent mental state (Bar-On 2004:423). Mental states are not to be understood as internal states in the bodies of subjects, totally separated from the normal ways

of recognising mental conditions like desires, hunger and pain among others. These methods entail different types of expressive behaviour. Expressive behaviour is not simply indicative of real and hidden mental conditions. It also includes the fact that observers can perceive the conditions themselves in the behaviour of the subject (Bar-On 2004:423-4). Separate the semantics of avowals from their epistemology and use is the resounding message of neo-expressivism. While avowing in speech, the subject may want to let others know about his or her present condition, and the subject indeed produces a genuine self-ascription. But merely because of that, the utterance of the subject does not deserve to be counted as an act of reporting that enjoys epistemic security thanks to the special privileged access to its inner Self. The real source of security of avowals and that of privileged self-knowledge are the linguistic and conceptual capacities of the agent who basically is a subject involved in the mental state. Such a subject is exclusively capable of offering self-ascriptive expressions to his or her present states of mind. It is only the states of mind that I can express or give voice to. I can speak my mind but not my body. Bodily conditions such as having high blood pressure, a raised arm, or a weak heart are not conditions that I can speak from (Bar-On 2004:428).

Thus, neo-expressivist explanation of security of avowals is in consonance with diverse views of self-knowledge. To be precise, it is consistent with deflationary view of self-knowledge, which holds that apparently privileged status of self-knowledge is worn out by the non-epistemic understanding of special security of avowals. Deflationary view, despite being consistent with neo-

expressivism, it may be cautioned that the latter does not imply the former (Bar-On 2004:24).

The neo-expressivist account of avowals, on its own, does not explain the special claim to knowledge enjoyed by the subjects to their present states of mind (Bar-On 2004:23) nor does it explain the special status of self-knowledge (Bar-On 2004:24). For instance second and third questions of the three questions raised by Bar-On in the context of distinctive security of avowals and self-knowledge merit attention:

- [i] What accounts for the *unparalleled security of avowals*?
- [ii] Do avowals serve to articulate *privileged self-knowledge*?
- [iii] Avowals aside, what allows us to possess *privileged self-knowledge*?

Bar-On's answer to the first question is non-epistemic. That is to say, it does not trace special security of avowals to the security of a special epistemic method or a privileged epistemic access. This is done by having neutral observations about the status of avowals and understanding that status. Methodological deviation from Cartesian approach paves the way for non-epistemic accounts. In other words, do not assume that avowals reflect a special kind of knowledge. It is essential to resist the temptation to adopt the Cartesian way of thinking of avowals as the ones reflecting the special knowledge which needs a secure method of making judgements about current mental states by the subject. This enables one to analyse the problems of self-knowledge without falling into the double trap of Cartesianism and epistemic approach. A satisfactory answer to the first question on

unparalleled security of avowal calls for respecting epistemic asymmetry by not equating avowals with other pronouncements, including non-mental self-ascriptions.

Second question on the possibility of articulation of privileged self-knowledge by avowals can be meaningfully answered by refraining from considering avowals to be indicating true judgements originating from safe epistemic mechanisms. The risk otherwise is that avowals would appear to be too close to non-mental self-judgments and thereby violate the principle of epistemic asymmetry. It is quite possible to explain the privileged nature of self-knowledge even without regarding distinctive security of avowals to be part of their epistemic pedigree. The privileged status of self-knowledge can also be explained, at least in part, by adopting the non-epistemic understanding of security of avowals. This is a reverse Cartesian approach.

Unlike other non-epistemic account Bar-On's neo-expressivism acknowledges the reality that avowals epistemically differ from other ascriptions, and yet they have a remarkable epistemic continuity with other pronouncements. Avowals too, like other pronouncements, can represent genuine knowledge the subjects have of themselves. The neo-expressivism offers positive, non-deflationary account of ordinary self-knowledge to be represented by avowals (Bar-On 2004: 11).

Rodriguez's Neo-Expressivism

Rodriguez disagrees not only with traditional (simple) expressivists' claim but also with the contemporary neo-expressivists. He contends that unlike the simple expressivist claim, avowals are truth-evaluable; and unlike the neo-expressivist claim,

truth-evaluability of avowals is not separate from assessing their genuineness. He hails Bar-On, Long and Finkelstein for assailing the thesis that avowals are not truth-evaluable, but criticises them for leaving untouched another equally questionable thesis that truth and genuineness are two separate properties of avowals. Thus, the majority of neo-expressivists endeavoured to clarify the expressive nature of avowals within the rubric of divorce between truth-evaluability of avowals and genuineness of avowals. Rodriguez interrogates the rationale behind such an exercise and advocates an expressivist view of avowals under which truth-evaluability is not distinct from genuineness (sincerity, truthfulness). The neo-expressivists like Bar-On and Finkelstein are on the horns of a dilemma. Bar-On appreciates the distinction between cases of wincing and linguistic utterances, but commits a blunder by treating human acts, including avowals, as expressive no matter the vehicle involved. Finkelstein avoids this trap of human expression, but he fails to explain the disagreement including the distinctions between instances of linguistic avowals and those of non-linguistic wincing. In spite of succinctly pointing out these significant weaknesses in the neo-expressivisms of Bar-On and Finkelstein, the point driven home by Rodriguez is that discarding neo-expressivism and embracing simple expressivism is not at all a reasonable solution. The next right move, he says, is to frankly accept that the recent discourse is silent on full characterisation of expressivism about avowals. So, neo-expressivists are justified in stating that avowals are expressions and truth-evaluable, but they are yet to clarify the meaning of truth-evaluability in this context. The solution is to contend that

truth and truthfulness of avowals are not two separate properties of avowals (Rodriguez 2012:90-91). Such a characterisation naturally follows from the expressive nature of avowals. It is not advisable to separate truth from truthfulness to account for differences between linguistic and non-linguistic expressions. In fact, explaining the disagreement comprises clarifying that in cases of disagreement related to avowals, and disagreement related to wincing there is a contention over authenticity of expression and the latter necessitates that genuine expression is what truth amounts to in the case of avowals (Rodriguez 2012:92). Paramount concern of Rodriguez is not justification of expressivism about avowals *per se*. He mainly highlights the conspicuous absence of the claim in the contemporary philosophical discourse that avowals are expressions which are truth-evaluable too. This is in sharp contrast with the prevalent understanding among simple expressivists as well as neo-expressivists that avowals are expressions first, and truth-evaluable later. Interestingly, this claim, however, is visible in the work of Wittgenstein who is considered to be one of the pioneers of expressivism.

Drawbacks of Neo-Expressivism

Objections to neo-expressivism revolve around the question as to whether it really spells out knowledge of our mental states. An epistemic internalist might wonder whether avowals, that emanate from the states they ascribe directly, can elucidate the kind of epistemic accomplishment always identified with sturdy self-knowledge. Critics of neo-expressivism, however, may remind themselves that the main aim of neo-expressivism *vis à vis* self-

knowledge is its non-epistemic explanation of an intrinsically linked phenomena to self-knowledge called first-person authority. For instance, primary goal of a neo-expressivist like Finkelstein is not to account for knowledge. Likewise, for Bar-On too elaborating the reasons behind attitudes of subjects towards the mental states they self-ascribe epistemically qualifies as knowledge is a secondary concern. Her primary objective is to identify possible sources of epistemic warrant for avowals.

Neo-expressive approach is criticised for committing us to the idea that it is possible for subjects to gain self-knowledge only by "actually engaging in self-ascriptive behaviour". In other words, without expressive behaviour, the subject would lack immediate, first-person method of knowing his or her states of mind. Bar-On refutes this criticism by saying that it is a misrepresentation of what the neo-expressivist method constitutes. The neo-expressivist account does not claim that one reaches or achieves self-knowledge by producing avowals either in speech or in thought. It needs to be amply clarified that the subject does not .express present state necessarily to obtain self-knowledge. This, of course, does not tantamount to denial of the possibility that one can gain more self-knowledge by becoming better at speaking one's mind. The neo-expressivist method does not object to those methods of obtaining self-knowledge which seek to minimise expressive failures. For example, therapies such as hypnosis assist the subject get in touch with oneself. Thus, there are certain things the subject can do to enable himself or herself to speak directly and correctly to speak from the present mental states (Bar-On 2004:409).

Neo-expressivism is also accused of neglecting the likelihood of self-deception. Rodriguez stands by the neo-expressivists who suggest that one should view expression through avowal as prior to self-deception. The neo-expressivists make conceptual as well as ontogenetic point by elevating the expression through sincere avowal and relegating the self-deception. Such a stance of neo-expressivists is conceptual as it promotes an unconventional perspective on the very issue of self-deception, and its relationship with expression through sincere avowal. It is also ontogenetic because it perceives self-deception as dependent upon sincere expression (Rodriguez 2012: 99-100).

The passionate and yet scholarly debate on expressivism and its kindred variants alluded to in this paper in the context of self-knowledge is a clear reminder to sceptics that expressivism is far from having had become redundant. Rigorous criticism and vigorous development of the neo-expressivist thought, by Baron and Long, Finkelstein and Rodriguez, specifically about avowals has enriched the understanding of differences not only between simple expressivism and neo-expressivism but also among different versions of neo-expressivism. It has also highlighted, as suggested by Rodriguez, the need to revisit the artificial distinction between avowals being genuine and avowals being truth-evaluable. Rodriguez's fervent appeal to raise this missing point in the contemporary discussions on expressivism of avowals is an invitation for all interested and willing scholars to pursue this valid goal in the study of self-knowledge.

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Institutional Practices and Constitutive Rules

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Abstract

This paper concerns the constitutive rules of social reality. The process of creating a full fledged activity having societal meaning includes a matrix of components largely discussed by John R. Searle. The most pivotal component amongst them is the constitutive rule. Searle asserts that constitutive rules give rise to new forms of behaviour. Hubert Schwyzer and Giuseppe Lorini argue that mere constitutive rules cannot give the sense of an activity. In the first part of the paper, we will explain how the constructed institutional facts in Searle's social reality depend on the constitutive rules. In the second part, we explain the views of Lorini and Schwyzer. In the final section we have discussed how their understanding of Searle turns out to be wrong, if we holistically analyse Searle's understanding of social reality.

Keywords : Social reality, Institutional facts, Constitutive rules, Assignment of function, Collective intentionality.

There are brute physical facts like the sun, moon, planet earth etc. On the other hand, there are constructed institutional facts like money, marriage, property so on and so forth. But discussion of social reality demands special attention to be put on the institutional facts. Social reality, along with the brute facts there are, is a constructed reality. In Searle's analysis of social reality, prime focus is adhered to the constructed institutional facts. The constructed institutional facts are the results of a cluster of rules, the constitutive rules, which constitute those facts.

Constitutive Rules v/s Regulative Rules

Certain rules are necessary, the presence of which makes the institutional facts possible. These are known as constitutive rules. These are the bedrock for creating institutions in society. As the name goes these are rules that constitute the institutions which by practicing become institutional facts. In Searle's words constitutive rules "...create the very possibility of certain activities"¹. For example, the rules of chess constitute chess; the rules of cricket constitute cricket. If you move the bishop, for example, straight to front or back, instead of diagonally, then, you are playing some game other than chess; if you are not batting but kicking the ball bowled to you, you are playing some game other than cricket. Is chess something other than its constitutive rules? Searle as well as Wittgenstein deny it. Wittgenstein says that 'chess is the game it is in virtue of all its rules' (PI: 197); Searle says that 'the activities of playing football or chess are constituted by acting in accordance with ... the appropriate rules'

(*Speech Acts*, p. 34) There is another type of rules which merely regulate the activities. For example, the rule of walking on the left hand side of the road dictates that one needs to walk on the left hand side of the road. Breaking this rule, one can walk on the right hand side; it does not amount to saying that the subject is not walking on the road. Similarly, the act of dining can be carried out even if one violates some etiquette rules in dining. The regulative rules have the form "Do X". On the other hand, constitutive rules have the form "X counts as Y in context C"². Here X represents the sheer physical object (paper) and Y represents the status (money) imposed on the X. These rules are necessary for the formation of an institution. The necessity of rules for any object or concept say Y implies that the Y cannot exist unless there are these rules. For example, two persons' living together as wife and husband becomes impossible unless there are rules which constitute marriage. Likewise, pieces moved at a board will merely be random moving if there is no existence of the rules of chess or ludo or checkers. This thesis is widely seen in Searle's philosophy of social reality and there is as such no dispute amongst the philosophers about the necessity of rules for the existence of an institution. The dispute arises when something over and above the rules is assumed as part of the practice of these institutions in different societies. Each institutional fact is an activity. Now rules are necessary for the retention of an activity. But for some thinkers there are some factors to an activity which rules cannot define. These thinkers consider that constitutive rules do not and cannot exhaust the activity in practice. So, either there needs to be something more

to these constitutive rules or there are some factors which are over and above the constitutive rules surfacing in many other types of institutional facts. According to them there are various other factors involved along with these constitutive rules.

The Contrasted Views

There are two papers under focus here. They are Hubert Schwyzer's "Rules and Practices" and Giuseppe Lorini's "Can Constitutive Rules Create a Practice?" Every activity³ performed in societal terms, presupposes a language. Thus playing a game, paying someone, marrying etc. are some such activities which are based on a contract wherein language is involved. While performing these activities the underlying contract is being explicitly or implicitly expressed. Even under illocutionary acts like promise, when the words "I promise" are uttered we are bound under an obligation to keep that promise. Thus the process from uttering the words "I promise" to keeping the promise there are certain constitutive rules under play. This is not to say that the saying of "I promise to do A" is taking place in the process of doing the promise so as to separate the saying from doing; the successful saying constitutes the doing. If and when the promise is not kept, the constitutive rules are violated. Similarly, while playing a game of chess, everything from the situation created to the victory or loss is within the constitution of the game. However, Lorini and Schwyzer depart from Searle on the point that games create certain forms of behaviour. While talking about the activity, a demarcation has been created between the activity and the nature of the activity which Searle does not duly recognize. They claim that until the activity is restricted to the portrayal in the board of

chess, that only the constitutive rules play a part but there are other factors which build up the sense of the activity that those rules cannot determine. The practice of a game cannot be merely by virtue of the created constitutive rules. This is because the sense of the game is absent from the constitutive rules. Schwyzer considers that the nature of the activity is something else. Lorini coined a term for the nature of the activity which is *meta-institutional concepts*. While speaking of these he asserts that there are concepts such as winning or losing the game which could not be found in the Searlean elaboration. This notion can be backed by Schwyzer's example of the people of Ruritania wherein chess is being played for many years as a sacred ritual which determines the fate of that society (good if white checkmates black) and not as a game⁴. Each move of chess is being carried out by the priests who are allowed to play the game in Ruritania. But there is no concept of victory or loss. Lorini has used the phrase *the sense of a practice*⁵ to express the same. One difference between the meta-institutional concept like winning or losing and the activity in question is that the meta-institutional concept surpasses that particular activity. For instance, victory or loss can be applied to any other competitive games. However, checkmate cannot be applied to soccer. Both Schwyzer and Lorini postulate that Searle is wrong to consider that every aspect of an activity is determined by those constitutive rules which construct that activity. From the given elucidations it can be deduced that for some philosophers mere constitutive rules of an activity cannot exhaust that activity. Also, there is something over and above the constitutive rules which becomes part of the sense of the game. This can be seen in

Schwytzer's example of the people of Ruritania wherein, chess is played not as a game but as a sacred rite. This can be considered to be the form of the behaviour of the game. We believe that their understanding of Searle's institutional practice is misleading.

From Institutions to Institutional Facts

Creating *institutions* in society has an immense amount of complexity which we hardly notice because of the simplicity with which it occurs to us. We are born into a world of such complexities which gradually seems simple. This might be the reason why it takes time for us to be accustomed in an abrupt new situation. In Albert Camus' "The Plague" one can see the utter restlessness. Everyone in the otherwise routine and busy town of Oran went through with the arrival of a fatal plague.

So Oran took on an unusual appearance. The number of pedestrians rose and, at slack times, many people who had been reduced to inactivity by the closing of shops and some offices, filled the streets and cafes. For the time being they were not yet unemployed, just on leave.⁶

This unusual appearance was due to the change on the otherwise routine day which everyone goes through. The town was locked and people were exiled in their own homes. However, there comes a time when we get used to the changed state of affairs. This is because we become habituated with the new events. We understand the function involved in the new events. As humans we have the tendency to either impose function on created objects or see the already existing function on objects around us. This is what Searle calls the *assignment of function*. We create an institution because we consider it helpful to society. So every institution

created has a specific function. However, not every type of activity has a set of codified institutional rules which are constitutive of the activity. For instance, money has a myriad of constitutive rules but not friendship. This is because the notion of money has a common use in the society which Searle classifies as types as opposed to tokens⁷. In the creation of these codified institutions a certain specific set of constitutive rules has the apex role. For codified institutions there are even specific books to back the institutions at all times. For instance the activity of chess has a book of rules of chess namely "The FIDE Laws of Chess". However, these institutions do not come to us in compartmentalised form. As Searle would say it will not come to us in *isolated units*⁸, it has two other notions involved namely *Network* and *Background*. This becomes a crucial part of the defense of Searle's thesis.

Everything from the creation of an institution to practicing it as a fact can be holistically seen in Searle's theory of institutional facts. We have used the term *holistic* because institutional facts do not come in isolated scraps. Searle claims that institutional practices are not simple; those are complicated networks which needs to be thoroughly analysed. Institutions are created with constitutive rules keeping in mind the usefulness of the institution. Without the usefulness factor, be it efficiency or leisure, no activity would be created. Furthermore there is a train of network and background involved in the creation of these facts. Any intentional state, be it the use of money (buying, selling, loaning etc.) or playing chess or marrying, will have within it a network of intentional states. Furthermore without the *Background* of intentional states

it will be difficult for doing any kind of intentional activity, 'the Background consists of the set of capacities, dispositions, tendencies, practices, and so on that enable the intentionality to function'.⁹

This would include various neurophysiological activities like the capacity to walk or to talk a certain language and so on. It enables the linguistic interpretation to take place and also discern familiarity of surroundings. It enables intentional states by enabling these capacities. Now both the network and background find a special place in the making of constitutive rules. Do all these factors come together to form a game as senseless as both Lorini and Schwyzer considered? Absolutely not. Sense of a practice would be the first thing to be considered while creating a game. If the sense of a game is a network of reasons like victory or loss or having a particular air of the situation while the games are played, then it most certainly is inculcated in these many factors already put forward by Searle. Thus, both Lorini and Schwyzer are wrong in maintaining that the sense of the game is something apart from the game. Searle's institutions cannot be senseless because the rules of these games are precisely created to maintain the sense of the game. These rules come in a network of practice which includes things like victory or loss which keeps the air of competitive games alive. Therefore, in coming from the background capabilities to the network to the constitutive rules the sense of the activity will be included in the activity itself. This can be explained by a simple example. When a football player is given a red card, it means s/he has violated the constitutive rules of that game and this in turn will affect the nature of the activity

as well. This might in turn lead to the loss of the game. So, if this analysis is true then the Ruritanian game of chess will not be considered to be a game of chess at all. Firstly because the network of something being called a game of chess is missing here since the competitive nature of the game is missing. And in a way both Schwyzer and Lorini have accepted this point since they considered it to be a rite rather than a game. It is a very unfair analogy because the analogy here is between a game and a rite and it is not between one and the same thing.

Further more, another point that needs clarification here is that any institutional practice does not really inculcate within it all the rules that there are. When a specific set of rules are given, it is not the case that the rules of that activity cannot be changed. There is always the possibility of change within the practice of these institutional facts. So if it is changed in the rulebook of playing chess that the bishop will not move diagonally rather it will move three steps ahead, this would be constitutive of the game. However, the possibility of change cannot be there while the game is active. After the game has started the players are in obligation to fulfill the same rules which are hard bound otherwise it would be considered a violation of the rules. Now in the Ruritanian example if it so happens that another group of people are playing the game of chess in the same place as the Ruritians, then it outrightly can be said that the Ruritians are violating the game of chess or they are not playing the game at all. The sense of winning or losing the game will be present in the game of chess and it cannot be separated because otherwise the game would have no meaning. As stated earlier, the constitutive rules

make the sense of an activity more explicit. Because it is only through following these rules one reaches the point of winning or losing. The Rutitanian case put forward by Schwyzer is a mere prototype case where it seems that they are playing chess with a different sense. However, the sense of game while playing chess is not present at all. It is not the game of chess, rather it is a rite of chess.

To strengthen his point, Schwyzer in his paper invented a new activity which he termed X-ing. Since he differentiated between the rules of the practice and practice itself, he provided X-ing with certain rules wherein two participants, the "initiator" and the "respondent" needed to sign their own names on a pad. The game of X-ing ends when the respondent signs his/her name on the other side of the pad. Now Schwyzer asserts that upon asking, the game of X-ing cannot be discussed at all because it is merely a bunch of rules.¹⁰ But we believe that the sense of the game is missing here because nothing is deliberately given to the activity of X-ing. In this case to be an activity it has to be the case that it is functional within the society. And if it is functional within the society it will have a language of its own along with all the factors we just mentioned and attain the status of a game or another activity. Perhaps X-ing is a new game wherein one needs to sign one's own name as neatly as possible. Here the network of X-ing is not given at all. What is given is merely clapping together of words which has not been practiced. Furthermore, something cannot have the sense of game or rite unless it has been *iterated*. Iteration is a very important component for institutional facts in social reality. In order to make something

out of an activity it needs a network of iteration which is missing from the activity of X-ing. If and when iterated by people X-ing will acquire the status function of say a game to sign neatly or a game among high schoolers to get creative with their signatures. So far by the analysis of the Ruritanian example and also the illustration of a new invention named X-ing it is clear that they have avoided certain basic tenets of Searle's institutional facts. The result of such an analysis leads to the assumption that there could be such activities which are senseless. However, in a living society which is the result of a cluster of institutional practices, it would be wrong to even consider a societal practice as senseless. This is also because every accepted activity has a status-function in society which is collectively intended.

The collective intentionality which Searle has proposed has the form of an anti-reductionist first person plural form "we-intend"¹¹. This is one of the reasons why it cannot be said that a full-fledged societal activity can be a senseless activity. This is because, as in the formula for constitutive rules, "X counts as Y in context C", the "counts as" locution can be identified with a necessity which needs collective intentionality as its basis. It adheres to the collectively intended status-function¹². This is the key element of collective intentionality. The *status-function* to an X cannot be given by an individual person. It needs the support of the society as such to exist. It is a label attached to any physical object like bits of pieces of papers or a chess board. Now collective intentionality is accepted by many propagators of social reality. But Searle's collective intentionality unlike certain other thinkers (like Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller) cannot be reduced to "I-intention". The anti-reductionist stance according to Searle is

because of the fact that he considers human beings like certain other animals to be biologically capable of collective intentionality and so primitive. Thus, if understood correctly, it cannot be said that some significant factor of institutional practice is there beyond the scope of constitutive rules so that the factor becomes senseless if constitutive rules constitute the practice.

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Ethical Issues of Surrogacy

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Abstract

Surrogacy is a form of pregnancy where a woman agreeing to carry a baby for someone else. After the baby is born, the surrogate mother gives custody and guardianship to the intended parents. Two different forms of surrogacy are- traditional and gestational. Surrogacy could be ethically acceptable so long as it is not harmful to anybody. In ethics, choice per se is not absolute. The decision is reached after very careful examination of a situation.

Keywords: Surrogacy, Gestational surrogacy, Commercial surrogacy

Surrogacy is basically a form of pregnancy where a woman carries and gives birth to a baby for another women who is unable to do so for any reason. Motherhood happens to be a biological destiny for women. It is socially controlled and culturally designed. Most women during her life time wishes to attain motherhood.

Motherhood is considered as an essential part of being female. Every woman strives to achieve the status of motherhood

at some point in time of her life. But this always does not happen. Instances of couple having no children are also not rare. While some of these couples accept the fact others do not. They attempt various alternative methods for getting their own (genetically related) children. In urban life style, such couples approach doctors and start fertility treatment. Fertility drugs are medications that are used to influence ovulation. Some fertility drugs are meant to strengthen or trigger ovulation. People having means also go for further advanced technology of reproduction. Such technology includes intrauterine adhesions, intrauterine insemination, IVP, etc. After all with these efforts, when people fail, there is still left one alternative—that is surrogacy.

Surrogacy is a process that involves a woman who is inseminated with a sperm or sometimes implanted with both egg and sperm of couple who has contracted her service. Her duty is to carry the baby till the birth and upon delivery she relinquishes all claims of the baby in exchange for monetary or other compensation. This involves contracts and the requesting individual or couple usually provides allowances and health coverage for the surrogate mother during the period of gestation.

There are broadly two different forms of surrogacy, namely,
i) Traditional and ii) Gestational surrogacy.

1. Traditional Surrogacy

In this form, the surrogate mother provides the egg for fertilization, and the intended father provides the sperm. Fertilization can occur as the result of intercourse, in vitro fertilization (IVF), or artificial insemination. The surrogate mother

is the genetic mother of the child. At birth, the child is surrendered by the surrogate mother to the intended parents, with the female partner effectively become the step mother of the child. Traditionally, surrogacy used to be the only way for a couple to use a surrogate, and is a commonly used technique. Artificial insemination is easy, pretty painless, and significantly less expensive than IVF, a selling point for many surrogates and intended parents. There is a high success rate when working with a surrogate with proven fertility, and the rebound time after a failed attempt is a matter of weeks while in case of IVF, it often takes months.

2. Gestational Surrogacy

In gestational surrogacy the surrogate mother is not related genetically to the child. An egg from the intended mother or from another female donor is fertilized by the sperm of the intended father, using IVF. The resulting embryo is then transferred to the uterus of the surrogate mother. If the IVF process has resulted in a number of embryos, the remaining embryos may be frozen and stored for use at a later date. Thus in gestational surrogacy, the infertile couple undergoes a standard IVF cycle to produce their own genetic embryos. The reproductive cycles of the surrogate and mother are synchronized so that the embryos can be transferred to the surrogate at the appropriate time. A surrogate can be a friend, family member, a volunteer, or a compensated person. All surrogates undergo extensive physical and psychological screening to ensure their suitability.

Results of Surrogacy

In general, results with gestational surrogacy are excellent, but vary according to the age of the egg provider. In a given age

group, results with surrogacy tend to be higher than with routine IVF. This is largely due to patient selection. Proper selection of candidates implies that these women could have children on their own, if it were not for the medical problem that lead them to surrogacy. Good embryos placed into a well-prepared, proven uterus theoretically optimize the IVF process.

Another term that we frequently come across is the commercial surrogacy. Commercial surrogacy takes place when the contract between the surrogate mother and the intended parents involves payment for the services of the surrogate mother. Some countries have legislation which outlaws commercial surrogacy, but allow reasonable expenses to be paid to the surrogate mother.

History of Surrogacy

History of surrogacy is shrouded with cloud - it is complicated as well as controversial. Many believe that history of surrogate motherhood starts with the biblical story of Sarah and Abraham. Many other cultures have their own belief system where there are synonymous with the rules of surrogacy. While discussing history of surrogacy, it is worth while to look at the story of Sarah and Abraham - the oldest recorded story having certain similarities with the present day's traditional surrogacy.

The Story of Sarah and Abraham

[Genesis chapters 11-23.]

The complex relationship between Abraham and Sarah and the individuality of their characters, make them one of the most interesting couples of the Old Testament.

Sarah is always Abraham's devoted wife. As per Bible, Sarah is infertile ('Sarah was barren; she had no child' (Gen. 11:30). And this is significant on the ground that God promised Abraham earlier that his children would become a great nation.... God also promised Abraham that Sarah would have a child, and that God would maintain his covenant with this child, Isaac.

Old Testament also has similar stories like the story of Rachel (Genesis 30:3), perhaps less well-known allusions to surrogacy date from 1500 B.C. and are found among the artefacts of the Hurrians of Mesopotamia¹. Stager et al made a reference about practice of surrogacy in classical Greek society as early as in the 4th century B.C.² and in medieval Tuscany, one mother's daily correspondence preserved from around the year A.D.1500 provides another perspective of surrogacy³. The longest intact personal inscription that survives from ancient Rome (known as *Laudatio Turiae*-a late 1st century B.C. epitaph) includes a tender reference to surrogacy as antiquity's common-sense remedy to childlessness⁴.

In 1985, the First case of Gestational Surrogacy took place. The surrogate carried the biological child of a woman who had a hysterectomy, but had retained her ovaries and then came the famous Baby M Case of 1986. As per an estimate, between 1988 and 1992 as many as 5000 babies were born in the US from surrogates and this number is rising rapidly.

The Debate on Surrogacy

The debates between the proponents and opponents of surrogacy continue despite the fact that more and more infertile

couples are asking for it. A controversial question that surrogacy raises is: "Are we selling babies?" Proponents would argue that we do not treat children as property, so how can we possibly sell what we do not own? Surrogate mothers are merely vessels who offer their services of child bearing. Therefore they deserve monetary compensation. By accepting this monetary compensation, surrogate mothers, by contract, relinquish any bond they have with the delivered offspring. Surrogacy is a purely commercial trade of putting reproductive services up for sale. So goes the argument that if men are allowed to sell sperm, then why can't women sell the services of their wombs? But then again, the debate is circular. Do we really own our sperm and ovum? In the form of sperm cells, we may think we preside over their ownership ultimately, we do not own the persons that they become.

Surrogacy has also been sometimes equated with prostitution. The former involves payment for the conception of a child without physical consummation while the latter calls for paid physical consummation without the conception of a child. In both cases, the woman sells some kind of bodily service in exchange for a fee. The moral question is that why is it that most people condemn prostitution but uphold the legitimacy of surrogacy? In reply, it is said that prostitution and surrogacy can be differentiated by the nobility of intentions in either case. Prostitution is usually sought after by pleasure-seekers without any other goal in mind. Surrogacy, on the other hand, is marketed as a viable alternative for infertility treatments to couples. Infertile couples can now turn to surrogacy to start a family. They, too, after all, have a right to want children, just like any other normal couple.

Critics also argue that payment for bodily services of the surrogate mothers dehumanizes them and it is in fact the exploitation of her reproductive organs and capability for personal gain of the wealthy class. Dr. John Lantos from the Center for Practical Bioethics in Kansas City is one of the strongest opponents of outsourcing pregnancy. He argues that this practice only raises the risk of baby farms in developing countries, compounded by the possibility that increasing competition among clinics will compromise safety measures for these 'women of the developing countries'.

There are also issues from the child born out of surrogacy. These are like - will the child feel like s/he is a mere commodity that was borne out of a rented womb when s/he takes knowledge of the surrogacy, etc. Some critics explain that for the child there is the risk of psychological harm. The mother who bears the child does not bring it up. The separation can present difficulties for the child when the fact is known. It means that 'collaborative reproduction' confuses the lineage of children and distorts the meaning of family as we know.

Arguments against Surrogacy

Traditional surrogacy is ethically objectionable to some persons on the grounds that it removes procreation from marriage and replaces natural process with artificial ones. It also introduces a third party i.e. the surrogate mothers whose presence can create potentially damaging personal relationship between both the adopting families and surrogate's own family.

Some writers also question whether surrogate motherhood

is a form of adultery. Moreover one might question whether it is ethical for a surrogate mother to conceive a child whom she has no intention of raising. When the surrogate provides the eggs used to create embryos, new complications often arise when the surrogates develop strong emotional attachments to their foetuses.

Consequentialist Argument

This style of arguments claim that the consequences of the practice of surrogate motherhood make it immoral - e.g., that surrogate motherhood will involve the exploitation of economically and socially deprived women, or will have psychological effects on the children born of surrogacy arrangements, or will subvert the basic institutions of marriage and family.

But it is also possible that having children by way of the 'normal' marriage and in 'normal' family certain situations might produce consequence for both parents and children that are not Australian Catholic. Instruction on Respect of Human Life, 1987 considered as 'normal' and healthy in a society, even within such families tensions prevail that have untoward consequences on the children. The break up of marriage and family tend to be traumatic for both the partners as well as the children.

The consequentialists are more speculative than dependent on empirical evidences. They hardly can provide substantial evidence in favour of their arguments. The making of policy decisions on surrogacy make it imperative to rely on scientific evidences. The American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology puts it as-

Both moral and consequentialist arguments against surrogacy as discussed above are based upon different themes and approach. While one is based upon moral principles, the other one is upon consequences. The position of the anti-surrogacy proponents has been criticized not only for the arguments they categorically provide, but also of their handling of the arguments that they present. It has been criticized that in much of the cases, the anti-surrogacy proponent mixes up the arguments using moral principles selectively while at the same time appealing to the supposed deleterious consequences of surrogacy.

There are also arguments against surrogacy from various other angles. These are discussed below:

(a) Instrumentalist Argument

Another objection is that surrogacy involves the use by one person. In this instance for the infertile mother, the surrogate mother becomes the means to her end. The critics of surrogacy claim that the surrogate mother is used as an instrument and not as a person.

This line of argument has been counter-argued on the basis that slavery involves force or coercion where a person is made to serve another without the will of the one who is serving. In surrogacy, this is not so. Comparing it with the prevalent social practices, critics show that instances are there where women are forced into marriage either directly or situationally or through family pressures, used by the husband as a means to his ends, treated as a property to be possessed as a domestic slave and even as a sexual object.

Some critics state that the surrogate mother is coerced,

either directly or indirectly, to bear a child for another. But neither all marriages nor all surrogacy arrangements are necessarily like this. It has been argued that Kant's principle can become applicable against surrogacy only when it can be shown that surrogacy in itself involves coercion of one woman by another, directly or indirectly, such that the surrogate fails to make a free decision to bear a child for another. But in practice many women make free decisions in this regard and thus to consider them as 'unwilling slaves' for others purposes would be a wrong assumption. There is therefore no such inherent relation between surrogacy and the use of woman as means for the purpose of others. This fails to be an argument against surrogacy. However, given the social circumstances, surrogacy like other practices can be used in an exploitative way.

(b) Wage Rate Argument

According to some critics, surrogacy is a commercial and they interpret it in terms of rich people buying baby from poor women. They showed on calculation that the wage at an hourly rate received by the surrogate mother is much less than the minimum wages. Considering the commercial aspects some critics raise objection to and advocate the banning of the practice.

(c) Infringement of Rights of Mother

Another point put forward by the critics of surrogacy is that the arrangements do not identify the rights of mother to change her mind about releasing the baby after the birth of the child. Her rights are same as all other mothers who can consider parenting her child or give for adoption.

(d) Emotional Issues

The emotions involved in surrogacy are very strong on both the sides. Hence it is advocated that there should be appropriate support before and during surrogacy period and also atleast immediately thereafter. Research carried out by the Family and Child Psychology Research Centre at the University of London, UK in 2002 showed that surrogate mothers rarely had difficulty relinquishing rights to a surrogate child and that the commission mothers showed greater warmth to the child than mothers conceiving naturally. Most surrogacy happens without problems with the parents in getting their children. It has been argued that movies and drama focus more on the conflicts that may arise than what happens in reality. There indeed may be some exceptional cases where the surrogate mothers may become so emotionally attached to the babies they carry that eventually they refuse to honour the contract and give the babies to parents.

Criticism against Gestational Surrogacy

Gestational surrogacy has also been subjected to ethical considerations. This procedure involves in-vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer and therefore more intensive medical intervention than normal reproduction. Objection against gestational surrogacy has been raised on the ground that it separates the act of marriage and reproduction which leads to several social issues about necessity of marriage.

Further, the critics consider that Gestational surrogacy arrangements are controversial. It involves extreme emotional and psychological issues that need careful handling before, during and

after such agreements are executed. However, this aspect is never taken care of. It is not to be denied that surrogate mother is coming forward for this arrangement which is generated due to their acute poverty.

Arguments in Favours of Surrogacy

Advocates of surrogacy believe, it is unfair for the Government to interfere with individuals and their private behaviour and argue that surrogacy and procreation should not be restricted. They claim that women and society as a whole benefit from the increased opportunity of choice offered by surrogacy. This group of Advocates include Libertarian groups and organisations.

Advocates of surrogacy observe this as a humane solution to the problem of infertility. Analysing the extent of the problem of infertility they show that infertility is common and affecting almost one out of six couples. Of these infertile couples only few have no option but to resort to surrogacy practices. Proponents believe that many of the women who offer to become surrogate mothers are moved by altruistic concern for other woman whose infertility prevents them from attaining motherhood. Even where the surrogate mother accepts the compensation for her services, her willingness to enter into such arrangement may still have been motivated by compassion and concern for another.

The proponents also argue that even if surrogacy were completely banned, individuals would still arrange such contracts albeit illegally. Additionally the supporters of surrogacy believe

that if a person strongly desires a genetic link to his child and after while woman agrees to bear the child, then the surrogacy should proceed. They believe that a surrogate mother is well compensated for her services and see the situation as a win-win experience for both sides.

Another group put forward the contention that surrogacy should be viewed in the same light as foster care or adoption and that the exchange of money is purely for the time and inconvenience that the surrogate faced in terms of gestating the child.

Ethics of Surrogacy

The ethical question that frequently asked is "is surrogacy ethical?" In the relatively new and complicated world of artificial insemination and assisted reproductive technology, are there right and wrong ways to proceed? Let us proceed from the surrogate mother's angle. Many view the issue as renting the woman's womb as a commodity to house the foetus for a few months in exchange of money. As a result the relation between the surrogate and the child is commercial rather than emotional. This prompts the question - 'is it ethically right for a woman to offer herself for a fee, to procreate and then to sell the baby?' The power 'to procreate a baby is God gifted; should a woman mis-utilise it?'. These and many other questions related to surrogacy have answer in the situational ethics- that accounts for bringing the greatest good to the greatest number of people through love. For situational ethics, only the end justifies the means; nothing else. The *loving* end justifies any means. A woman will not volunteer to become a surrogate if she has no feelings for the woman who is at her

doorstep for help. This feeling is understood by a woman only. This is love and the woman come forward for the good of the commissioning mother and her family. The ultimate result brings happiness to both the parties without any harm done to anybody.

Another ethical question tests with the issue that a surrogacy arrangement involves the planned separation of the child from its birth mother soon after birth. Such separation is never a desirable situation. It occurs in adoption, but in that situation it is carried out for the good of the child. In a surrogacy situation the separation occurs to fulfill the desires of adults rather than to meet the needs of the child. In support of this situation it is also said that conception, gestation, birth and nurturing are parts of a continuum of relationship. Child and parents grow into relationship together, with that relationship ultimately lasting a lifetime. The relationship is genetic, gestational and nurturing, with all facets of the relationship interacting to produce the child-parent bond.

In this ethical argument, the need of the parents has been down played. In consideration of the debate, the primary issue of parents' need has been pushed to the secondary status. It is this necessity on fulfillment of which brings happiness and does well to a greater number of people. The surrogate child is the responsibility of the couple who nurtures the child and socializes it according to the norms of the society. A British study published in 2002 demonstrated that of the 43 couples having surrogate babies unanimously have evolved into stable and loving families. This dispels the ethical concern for the baby's requirement of its birth mother.

The issue of surrogacy is a much discussed topic in Indian media today. India has been mentioned as the next surrogacy outsourcing capital of the world. Not only does India have a number of successful IVF clinics; there are a lot of women who are willing to be surrogates, so that surrogacy costs a fraction of what it would in the West. This explains the rush of foreign couples seeking surrogacy. Three reasons are generally cited for rise in surrogacy in India. The first factor in this rise is the productive tourism as people travel to India to commission a baby. Another is the economic compulsions of not so well off families and the third is the growing tribe of experts within the medical market who see profits in this procedure.

Surrogacy and Legal Provisions in India

Surrogacy in India has few legal hassles and a Government organization (Indian Council of Medical Research ICMR) has set national guidelines to regulate it. Unlike many countries where surrogacy is banned or has many restrictions, India's laws allow the surrogate mother to sign away her rights to the baby as soon as it is delivered.

Till now no law has been passed in India on surrogacy. However, The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2019 has been introduced in Lok Sabha on July 15, 2019.

Highlights of the bill are as follows :

Regulation of surrogacy: The Bill prohibits commercial surrogacy, but allows altruistic surrogacy. Altruistic surrogacy involves no monetary compensation to the surrogate mother other than the medical expenses and insurance coverage during the

pregnancy.

Purposes for which surrogacy is permitted: Surrogacy is permitted when it is: (i) for intending couples who suffer from proven infertility; (ii) altruistic; (iii) not for commercial purposes; (iv) not for producing children for sale, prostitution or other forms of exploitation; and (v) for any condition or disease specified through regulations.

- **Eligibility criteria for intending couple:** The intending couple should have a 'certificate of essentiality' and a 'certificate of eligibility' issued by the appropriate authority.
- The certificate of eligibility to the intending couple is issued upon fulfilment of the following conditions:
 - (i) the couple being Indian citizens and married for at least five years;
 - (ii) between 23 to 50 years old (wife) and 26 to 55 years old (husband)
 - (iii) they do not have any surviving child (biological, adopted or surrogate); this would not include a child who is mentally or physically challenged or suffers from life threatening disorder or fatal illness; and
 - (iv) other conditions that may be specified by regulations.
- **Eligibility criteria for surrogate mother:** To obtain a certificate of eligibility from the appropriate authority, the surrogate mother has to be:
 - a close relative of the intending couple;
 - a married woman having a child of her own;

- 25 to 35 years old;
 - a surrogate only once in her lifetime; and
 - possess a certificate of medical and psychological fitness for surrogacy. Further, the surrogate mother cannot provide her own gametes for surrogacy.
- **Parentage and abortion of surrogate child:** A child born out of a surrogacy procedure will be deemed to be the biological child of the intending couple. An abortion of the surrogate child requires the written consent of the surrogate mother and the authorisation of the appropriate authority. This authorisation must be compliant with the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. Further, the surrogate mother will have an option to withdraw from surrogacy before the embryo is implanted in her womb.

Social Attitude towards Surrogacy

Today surrogate children are accepted or tolerated in the liberal societies. No one calls for prohibition of donor insemination, or of IVF or of single parent families.

Surrogacy is known in the Assamese society today although people's opinion/ reaction in this regard is till now not open. Those who adopted this method already prefer not to make it open evidently for fear of adverse reaction of people. So far no hospital or clinic has been formally licensed for this purpose in Assam, although many infertility clinics are operating. As a result, it is difficult to assess people's views on surrogacy. The general survey carried out talking to the elderly and knowledgeable persons of

the society, opined that it is better that people adopt the already born children than to arrange for a child to be born and then adopted. At the same time they are also sympathetic to the couple who are desperate to become parents and consider that birth and death are in the hands of God in whatever way they are born or die.

Desiring for an offspring is an essential purpose for human life and it is ethical too- so long as it is not harmful to anybody. Prolongation of ones blood line through procreation is an important ethical aim of life. But infertility is a major source of stress especially for women who bear the brunt of social stigma. When such situation arises, people in ultimate crisis, go for surrogacy. As we know life and death are the results of 'karmic actions' of a person, it is immaterial in terms of life cycle, as to whose womb actually a person is born. This is decided as per her/his karma and therefore inevitable. From this 'ethico-spiritual perspective', such explanation could justify surrogacy in our society.

From the point of view of the women who are having trouble in conceiving due to a number of reasons and believe that offspring of their own is a must, surrogacy is a Godsend option for them. In ethics, choice per se is not absolute. It is circumscribed by the concepts of rightness and the goodness of actions. An action is right or proper only if it is according to dharma. Dharma is the justification for the ethical duties. Wrong intention is the defect of dharma. Enjoyment for its own sake is the defect of desire; it however, leads to prosperity. In this context of surrogacy, it can be said well that, the intention of the parties are not committing harm to its other. The decision is reached

after very careful examination of a situation, and only when a couple is at distress. This is not an easy decision for an Indian couple, who will have to prepare their minds to rear a child not genetically gestated by the mother. Such a decision in family is arrived at considering the future well being of the family, for satisfaction of all involved in the process which is also the basic tenet of utilitarianism-the main ingredient of ethical considerations.

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Ontological Alienation: Heidegger

Franati Devi

Abstract

The concept of alienation refers to the fact of separation which occurs in the relation between an individual and something other to which he or she is relating, but actually they belong together. Alienation may express in different forms. In Heidegger's philosophy, alienation occurs within the basic structure of human existence as such it is ontological. It is the state of being where Dasein is not true to oneself. Alienation occurs in the structure of Dasein's Being where Dasein first falls away from its ownmost potentiality and then falls into the public common world. The self of everyday Dasein is not of the 'myself' but the of 'they-self'. It loses its self-identity and becomes merged with the being of Others. He has no commitment for his own self; rather he is governed by the choice and decision of Others. It is conscience that summons Dasein to come back from the lostness into the "*they*".

Keywords: Alienation, Dasein, Care, Fallenness, Everydayness

Martin Heidegger, a German existentialist thinker throughout his magnum opus, *Being and Time* describes the meaning of alienation as a kind of estrangement in which the ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from human being. Generally alienation refers to the separation which occurs in the relation between an individual and something else though essentially they belong together. Alienation may assume different forms. Either one may alienate from oneself, or from other fellow beings or from social community or from even God.

The notion of alienation was originally associated with Christian theology. Afterwards, in the nineteenth century, Hegel had made this concept prominent in Western philosophy. In Hegel's absolutism, alienation occurs in the separation of self-consciousness from universal consciousness, that is, the 'finite spirit' externalizes itself from 'universal spirit' and confronts his being as something separate from or oppose to it. This kind of alienation can be overcome by realizing the unity of relation that culminates in the absolute knowledge of self-consciousness, in other words in the process of self-development. Afterwards, the concept of alienation was developed by Karl Marx who was greatly influenced by the dialectical philosophy of Hegel. For Marx, alienation occurs in the system of capitalism where workers are alienated in a number of ways, e.g. in terms of modes of production, employee-employer relations and ultimately in terms of self-identity.

In contemporary period, the issue of alienation is pivotal

in the philosophy of phenomenology and existentialism. William Barrett writes 'alienation and estrangement' constitute the 'whole problematic' of existentialism.¹ For the existentialist thinkers, the central idea of alienation lies in the fact that man has lost his 'selfhood' in his inauthentic existence. But the irony is that, the real problem for existentialist thinkers is not to deal with alienation but to deal with how to overcome alienation and making life meaningful.

Existentialist thinkers primarily emphasize on concrete unique individual existence. It is a philosophy not of things but of human situation. For the existentialist thinkers, alienation is a part of human nature. They believe that one's selfhood is his true authentic existence but in the state of alienation man is prevented from achieving his true being. Existentialist thinkers, namely Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers and Sartre and many others have discussed this issue with great deal of emphasis. In Kierkegaard's philosophy, it occurs between man and God. In case of Kierkegaard, what is threatened by the 'public' is a person's 'individual religious isolation', his capacity to enter, alone and unaided, into that personal relationship to God which is the highest human aspiration.² Sartre throughout his work, *Being and Nothingness* describes alienation as a separation in the relation between *pour-soi* (For-itself) and *en-soi* (in-itself). It occurs within the realm of the consciousness of being itself. This separation implies that we are 'others' to ourselves. In another form, Sartre's view on alienation may be interpreted from the ethical point of view according to which alienation occurs in self-deception what Sartre terms 'bad faith' where man refuses his freedom and as such the meaning and values of his existence.

In Heidegger's philosophy alienation occurs neither between man and God, nor between man and world, but within the self itself. Though Heidegger has not used the word 'alienation' directly, his concept of fallenness implies the very meaning of alienation. He always uses the term in the sense of self-estrangement, not estrangement from the world. Thus, it is a kind of 'ontological alienation' as it occurs within the basic structure of human existence. The terms-Dasein, Being, Fallenness, Everydayness, Authenticity and Inauthenticity are the key notions and intermingled terms in understanding the fact of alienation in Heidegger's philosophy.

Dasein: The German term '*Dasein*' stands for human being. In English language, it is translated as existence, more specifically 'being-there'. *Dasein*'s being cannot have the character of an entity or thing except specific human implication. Thus, it excludes all other entities e.g. stars, trees, tables, and the like. In this sense the term existence is applicable only to human being. In other words, *Dasein* only exists and it exists existentially.

Dasein is that entity which stands for 'I'. It has in each case 'mineness'. *Dasein* is the 'subject', the self, in other words, it is 'I myself am'. Heidegger writes, "*Dasein* has in each case mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*), one must always use a pronoun when one addresses it; 'I am', 'you are'."³ It is *Dasein*'s ontological constitutive state. Heidegger makes a distinction between the ontological (*Ontologisch*) and the ontic (*ontisch*) state of *Dasein*. In his words, "*Dasein* is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological."⁴ The ontological refers to the Being of a particular being, while the ontic refers to what a particular being does in the light of the Being of his being. Thus,

ontical refers to the concrete, specific reality of Dasein while the ontological refers to the deeper underlying structure of reality which is to be interpreted as Dasein's authentic existence. In ontical levels, the difference of Dasein from other particular beings lies in the fact that it takes up the question of its Being in ontological level. This view is very much close to the Indian concepts of ज्ञान and "तम, in other words to the two levels of the self viz. empirical and transcendental.

Dasein lives in the world with others with a profound intimacy which is not juxtaposition, but a unitary phenomenon. Heidegger defines Dasein as 'Being-in-the-world'. Man is embedded in the world, engaging with the tools and objects of experience. Unlike Descartes, Heidegger says that my existence presupposes the existence of others. For him, the existence of others is not known by inference; instead, man begins his ontological adventure by knowing the existence of others. Even the traditional view that self-knowledge gives rise the knowledge of the existence of others, according to Heidegger cannot be considered as valid.

Dasein's 'mineness' is the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein may exist in one mode or in another mode depending on its own choice and decision. But "Being-in-the-world" is the fundamental ground of these two modes, because the specialty of Dasein is that it can see the world of everyday in a new perspective remaining in the unavoidable contingent world that surrounds him. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger would like say that without bracketing the world of others, Dasein can project his possibilities to lead a life of authenticity.

Ontologically Dasein is characterized as an 'inquirer', a 'questioner' because the very task of Dasein is to seek something at every moment. As every inquiry is a kind of cognizant seeking for an entity or a questioning of something, so definitely question arises, what is to be asked about by the Dasein? In Heidegger's philosophy the answer is directed to the very concept of 'Being'. It implies that the basic activity of Dasein is to make an inquiry in its own being. For Heidegger, it is only in Dasein where there is self-evident pre-philosophical understanding of Being. For this reason Dasein is distinguished from other entities. In Dasein's very Being, as Heidegger says, "That Being is an issue for it". Dasein is purely an expression of its Being. Heidegger writes, "*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being*".⁵ Dasein relates itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. Heidegger writes "Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being."⁶

As an inquirer, Dasein is transparent in its own Being. Except Dasein no one can have the feature of being inquirer of its Being. In the words of Heidegger, "...to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about, namely Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term Dasein".⁷

Heidegger derives Dasein's essence out of its existence. Existence is the ground of Dasein's essence. Heidegger writes, "*The essence of Dasein lies in its existence*".⁸ Existence is neither

conceived as a property nor as a substance; rather it is understood as Dasein's ownmost possibilities. Dasein is an ever interpreting being. Like Sartre, Heidegger would not like to say that existence precedes essence, instead, he says, "The essence ("Wesen") of this entity lies in its "to be" (*Zu-sein*). Its Being-what-it-is (*Was-sein*) (*essentia*) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (*existentia*)".⁹

Dasein is not only 'in' space but 'in' time also. Dasein's temporality is understood by the term *care*. Care is the unity of past, present and future i.e. Existenz, Facticity and Fallenness. Existenz refers to the future, facticity to the past and fallenness to the present. Thus, Dasein is not only a Being-in-the-world but also a Being-in-time. Dasein constitutes temporality. M.K. Bhadra observed that, like Kant, Heidegger thinks that time is an a-priori condition for Being-in-the world. 'Time has no existence apart from the consciousness of Dasein and all objective time is based on 'subjective condition'.¹⁰ Thus, Being-in-the-world is grounded in Being-in-time.

For Heidegger, Dasein has priority over all other entities in many ways. The first priority is an ontical one where Dasein deals with its everyday existence. The second is an ontological one which refers to that aspect of Dasein in which it asks the question of Being. The third priority is Dasein's ontico-ontological condition

Being: Initially it is very difficult to describe the meaning of Being. However, Heidegger describes Being in his words as, "We do not know what 'Being' means. But even if we ask, 'What is Being?' We keep within an understanding of the 'is', though we are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies. We do not

even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. *But this vague average understanding of Being is still a fact.*"¹¹ As such, Being is the most concrete presence. Its function is to enlighten beings. Thus, the entity in which the meaning of Being is discerned is nothing but the Dasein itself. Dasein is the clearing ground of Being.

Heidegger in his work, *Humanism* writes, "Being is not God, nor (some) ground of the world. Being is broader than all beings - and yet is nearer to man than all beings, whether they be rocks, animals, works of art, machines, angels or God. Being is what is nearest to (man). Yet (this) nearness remains farthest removed from him"¹². Like Indian concept of 'Atman', Being is the inner light, the transcendent ground of Dasein that makes man what he is. So structurally Dasein is always with its Being and through its Being discloses its Being to it.

Constituents of Dasein's Being

Dasein's Being which is constituted by three components namely Existenz, Facticity and Fallenness is termed as 'Care'. Following Husserl, Heidegger describes care as intentional. But unlike Husserl, Heidegger emphasizes on the non-cognitive and practical aspects of Dasein's being. Dasein's attitude to the world is not one of knowledge but one of concern.

Existenz: Existenz refers to Dasein's ownmost genuine possibility. Dasein is thrown to the world with his capabilities. Thus, Existenz is apriori. Dasein projects his possibilities. As such, Dasein's being is ahead of itself. It can in its very Being, 'choose itself', win itself and can lose itself. In the state of 'mineness', Dasein always understands itself in terms of possibility of itself;

to be itself.

Facticity: In the state of facticity, Dasein finds itself in a particular world at a particular time. In facticity, Dasein is thrown into the world which is a set of circumstances or givens e.g. time, place, culture and the like within which he is born and he lives and dies. In other words, Dasein is placed in certain biological, historical and spiritual environment as such Dasein is determined by these factors. These 'givens' are not the products of Dasein's choice; instead Dasein encounters them to realize his existence. Of course within these limits, Dasein has freedom for choosing particular attitude to project his possibilities. For example, 'I may with this particular body, but I may choose to worship it, to look down upon it or to mould it for spiritual purposes. I may also treat it as a 'curious thing'. Here, we may refer to Indian concept of 'law of karma' and 'freedom of action' as its nearest concepts.

Fallenness: Having thrown into the world- 'the there', Dasein undertakes constant actions and reacts towards the facts of its Being. In doing so, Dasein posits a distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world where Dasein fails to recognize his Existenz, and by the way surrenders his selfhood in the self of 'they' which is the world of everydayness. This existential structure of Dasein is known as 'fallenness'. It is an absorption into 'Being-with-one-another'. It is a state of being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. In this structure, Dasein develops an inevitable tendency to refute and neglect his self-identity. In our everyday life, we are so preoccupied with our pretty tasks and problems for which we are completely unaware about our possibilities. Afterwards being reflective, it is realized that due to our fallen attitude, we are leading a life of

inauthenticity. So in the structure of fallenness, Dasein first falls away from its ownmost potentiality and then falls into the common world of experience. This kind of not-being is not only a common reduction but also a very close phenomenon to Dasein, because Dasein has a constant temptation towards his falling nature. As a result of this temptation, a new state namely 'alienation' occurs in the very being of Dasein.

Everydayness

Everydayness is the public, average and undifferentiated general world where Dasein defines himself as a part of it. In daily engagement many of us inevitably make a tendency to work in the domain of public discernment without being reflective of our own choice, freedom and decision, rather governed by the choices and decisions of others. Here, the identity of others becomes the identity of Dasein. The self of everyday Dasein is not of the 'myself' but of '*they-self*'.

'*They-self*' has no definite feature. It is the featureless public ego. To the question 'who is the 'who' of Dasein's everydayness?' Heidegger writes, "The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself (*man selbst*), not some people (*einige*), and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the "they" (*das Man*)."¹³ The they is the everyone; here no one in particular. Heidegger also writes, The 'who' of everyday Dasein just is, *not* the "I myself".¹⁴

In 'average everydayness', man keeps himself in the world of equipment. The primitive being-in-the-world is very much alike with the man who uses tools and equipments. Both are unreflective in their initial encounter. However, the paradox is that, Dasein can be authentic only in relation with Others as Being-with-others is the unitary phenomenon of Dasein.

Alienation

In the state of alienation a kind of separation occurs within the Being of Dasein. Heidegger focuses on 'ontological alienation' in which human being separates himself from his ownmost potentiality i.e. from his selfhood and merges into the being of the 'they-self'. In fact, in the state of alienation, Dasein is not true to oneself. Though the basic concept of alienation is difficult to understand as an existential issue it is only to be experienced. Heidegger's view on alienation may be conceived by concerning the following points.

Alienation is a kind of self-estrangement: In Heidegger's philosophy of existentialism, the fact of alienation occurs in the state of separation of Dasein's being from his true authentic existence. In otherwards Dasein keeps away from the projection of his ownmost potentiality and leads his life as one of the members of the public world.

Alienation is ontological: Heidegger insists that each individual is constituted by an ontological structure of care for itself. But in the state of alienation, Dasein separates himself from his deeper underlying ontological structure of reality though they actually belong together. Here, Dasein does not make an issue for Being. It is a distinct kind of illness. This is a separation between self-consciousness and group-consciousness, myself and theyself, true existence and everyday mode of existence.

Alienation is a drift: In alienation Dasein does not torn away from itself, nor it loses from its own being, instead it is Dasein's drift towards the understanding of its limitless ownmost potentialities for Being, which is hidden from it. Heidegger writes,

"This alienation cannot mean that Dasein gets factually torn away from itself. On the contrary, this alienation drives it into a kind of Being which borders on the most exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation..."¹⁵ Though apparently, it is a downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic Being, one is actually ascending to the fact of belief that he possesses every kind of possibilities which is within his reach. Actually, Heidegger writes, "This alienation *clashes off* from Dasein its authenticity and possibility."¹⁶

Alienation is essential to Dasein: Alienation is essential to Dasein, because the experience of alienation impels Dasein to move for disclosing his true Being. It provides an opportunity for understanding of what Dasein should strive for. Here, Dasein makes an ontological quest for knowing his true Being. In this state, on the one hand, Dasein alienates himself from his true Being, on the other hand he strives for achieving its true Being. Thus, alienation is the foot step, the ground, which paves the way for achieving one's true existence.

Alienation is not a mode of falling. In alienation Dasein does not fall from higher level to lower level; rather it is a movement towards self-realization. There is no primitive paradise of being from which Dasein has fallen; there is only a superior mode of being to which Dasein must rise. Heidegger introduces the concept of motion in relation to fallenness, which is existentially Dasein's own. Of course by the term 'motion' Heidegger does not mean temporal displacement of an object like kicking a ball moving from point A to point B. It only means being lost in the publicness of the 'they' which can be recovered.

Alienation refers to two ends: As alienation occurs in separation from something else, so definitely it refers to two ends. In Heidegger's philosophy these two ends are designed as authentic and inauthentic mode of existence. Authentic mode of existence is the real or essential state of being. In this mode Dasein stands in a direct relation to itself. On the other hand in inauthenticity man keeps in mediate or indirect relation to oneself. It is our normal 'everyday' state. Authenticity and inauthenticity though opposed, are so constitutively related that one mode discloses the other mode of being.

Subjective and objective pole: Fallenness is another name of the state of 'being-in-the-midst-of-the-world.' This inauthentic state of fallenness has a subjective and an objective pole. The subjective pole has been variously termed as "the One", "the Public", and "the Anonymous they" what Heidegger calls 'Das Man'. Here, pseudo- subjectivity commands the individual's consciousness. Robert G. Olson observes, "In the state of fallenness it is the public or an anonymous and amorphous third party - a kind of degraded or pseudo -subjectivity -which commands the individual's consciousness. If he refrains from acting, it is because "that isn't done". When he acts, it is because it is "the thing to do". Fallenness is a state in which the individual constantly obeys commands and prohibitions whose source is unknown and unidentifiable and whose justification he does not bother to inquire into."¹⁷ The objective pole of fallenness is the artificial, man-made world, the world as transformed by human subjectivity. It is a world in which objects exist almost entirely as instrument to be manipulated for the advantage of the public.

This world has its own time and own space. Man becomes forgetful of the ontological roots of his being while remains in the region of these two worlds.

The self of the public world is the 'they': In the state of alienation, Dasein lives in the public common world. The self of the public world is the 'they'. The 'they' represents no definite entity. Contrasting to Socratic view about examined life, '*They-self*' represents uncritical and unexamined life. The 'they' is the usual translation of 'Das Man', as expression coined by Heidegger from the indefinite pronoun 'man' (the French 'on'). In English, a variety of indefinite terms - 'one', 'you', 'people', 'we' and 'they' perform the job of 'man'. The 'They' is defined as Being-with-one-another. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein into the kind of Being of 'the Others'. In this state, Dasein takes pleasure and enjoys as 'they' take pleasure and enjoys. Similarly, Dasein reads, sees and makes judgment as 'they' see, read and judge. As everything is regulated by the 'they', so the particular Dasein is stolen by it. Heidegger writes, "We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* (*man*) take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what *they* find shocking. The '*they*' which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness."¹⁸

Everydayness is not a mere aspect of existence: Dasein's everyday mode of existence is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. It is the most positive aspect of Dasein's being. Here also

in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it in a definite way. Heidegger writes, "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in a definite way; Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of *fleeing in the face of* it and forgetfulness *thereof*."¹⁹ It is a step towards authenticity. The significance of this aspect cannot be nullified; rather it is to be considered as the prerequisite for lifting Dasein to his authentic existence. Heidegger says, "*The "they" is an existential; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution.*"²⁰ It is not true that, in the 'they' there is no opportunity for self-expression and self-exploration. On the contrary, the 'they' often encourages a busy 'versatility', 'curiosity' and 'exaggerated self-dissection'. Here, Heidegger observes that, in the 'they', a person comes to see himself and others as things present-at-hand.

Thus, the mode of alienation is not negatively evaluated. Though alienation is apparently a negative mode of existence, it is very much positive in the sense that it works as a ground to reach one's authentic existence. It is written that, in describing people's 'fallenness' or 'absorption in the publicness of the "they"', Heidegger is not expressing any negative evaluation', nor presenting a 'night view' of Dasein.²¹

Everydayness is undifferentiated: Dasein's everydayness is, in fact undifferentiated, because it lacks its definite way of existence. This everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein is termed in Heidegger's terminology as 'averageness'. Heidegger writes, "We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein 'averageness'."²² Robert C. Solomon observed that everydayness

is interpreted as the bland, undifferentiated state in which one's action and attitudes are neither particularly authentic nor inauthentic, an indifferent condition in which one is neither especially owing to oneself, one's situation, one's purposes, nor disowning oneself, evading one's unique situation, and fleeing into anonymous, generic forms of self-understanding.

Subjection to others: In the state of alienation, Dasein stands in subjection to others. It loses its self-identity and becomes merged with the being of Others. He has no commitment for his own self; rather he is governed by the choice and decision of Others. He is dominated by the powers of Others. He is a weak person as he is oppressed by Others. His being is taken away by the Others. Heidegger writes, "This distanciality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* (*Botmassigkeit*) to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please."²³ Dasein defines himself by the Others' way of life, because, most of the part, Dasein unknowingly surrenders its unique individuality to this commonly defined way of living, thinking, communicating.

Disburdened by the 'they': In the world of everydayness, Dasein becomes disburdened by the 'they'. In Heidegger's words, "The particular Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by the "they". Not only that: by thus disburdening it of its Being, the "they" accommodates Dasein (*kommt...dem Dasein entgegen*) if Dasein has any tendency to take things easily and make them easy. And because the "they" constantly accommodates the particular Dasein

by disburdening it of its Being, the "they" retains and enhances its stubborn dominion."²⁴

Alienation produces anxiety : In the state of alienation, anxiety occurs as a consequence of total involvement in the world of the they. In this mode of being, there is no deep feeling, only petty fears and neurotic anxieties. Here, no attempt is made to understand what we are doing. Our behavior is determined by habit and customs. Heidegger relates anxiety to 'falling' just Kierkegaard had related it to the Sin. Once Dasein engaged in the world of the they, he falls into the complete insignificant world. In anxiety one feels uncanny. The meaning of uncanny is 'nothing and nowhere', but here 'uncanniness' also means "not-being-at-home". This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "they", though not explicitly. Of course considering anxiety as condition of reclamation, Heidegger says, "As Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'."²⁵

Idle talk, Curiosity, and ambiguity are the visible phenomena of fallenness : Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity characterize Dasein's everyday manner. In the structure of Being-with-one-another, Dasein is guided by Idle talk, Curiosity, and Ambiguity. Idle talk (*Gerede*) occurs whenever a topic is discussed in the everyday attitude of 'the they'. It characterizes Dasein's art of understanding and interpreting in its everydayness. In other words the subject is talked about as if it is already known. For example, 'I know what they say'. One does not take the subject as his own. Here, '*the they*' represents a kind of anonymous authority. In Idle talk there is nothing new to discover, only it

needs to be repeated. Dasein simply repeats whatever is said as if it is already heard about. Dasein lacks sufficient and grounded knowledge of whatever is expressed. Dasein takes something because one says so. Dasein remains here entirely cut-off from the whole truth. It is Dasein's carefree state what Heidegger describes as 'groundless floating'. Idle talk not only consists of oral communication, but also any content as well as writing that does not open one's possibilities, instead limits them. Of course, Idle talk can be overcome through an authentic discourse.

Curiosity is a tendency towards 'seeing'. Here, Dasein does not see in order to understand what is seen, but just in order to see. There is no claim about truth of the issue. It is insatiable quest about the current simply for the sake of novelty. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way that Being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein's understanding, but only in order that Being-in-the-world should be suppressed in this uprooted 'everywhere and nowhere'.

Due to the dominating presence of the 'they', Dasein falsely believes that he is 'in the best of order' and this thought produces a sense of tranquility. Dasein's authenticity is prevented by 'Tempting Tranquilization' as such alienation is created by it. Thus falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating.

Authenticity and Inauthenticity

The word authenticity as an existential notion, is especially found in the works of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. The term authentic comes from the German word '*Eigentlichkeit*' which

means 'owned existence'. It simply means 'real', or 'actual'. More precisely, the English word authentic means 'belonging to himself'. On the other hand, the term inauthentic comes from German word, '*Uneigentlichkeit*' which means 'to disown'.

One way to be true to oneself is to be honest with oneself, which is to say, inwardly sincere. To be sincere is not just to tell the truth about oneself willy-nilly but to present oneself sincerely which must appear spontaneously and naturally without requirement of any transcendent moral principle. The spontaneous sincerity includes no deliberate efforts. Sartre observes that deliberate and artificial efforts to be sincere are self-defeating.

Heidegger uses the term 'authentic' in two different senses, one evaluative, the other merely descriptive. In the descriptive sense, the word is what is formally unique and particular to each individual human being. Heidegger uses the term 'mineness' to mean it. This notion of authenticity has no normative import. It merely indicates a formal distinction between the self's relation to itself and its relation to others. That is, in the descriptive sense, Dasein stands in a direct relation to himself. It expresses Dasein's 'mineness', the 'I-hood'. Authenticity in this sense, is neither good nor bad. In the normative sense, the term 'authentic' refers to a choice worthy way of life.

Authenticity and inauthenticity are the two modes of Dasein's existence. Both are not to be considered as mutually exclusive. In authentic existence Dasein has a direct or immediate relation to oneself, but in inauthentic existence Dasein has a mediate or indirect relation to oneself. Heidegger calls the revelation of the true and unhidden self 'authentic' and the covered

up self 'inauthentic'.

Heidegger cites 'fear' as an example of inauthentic mood, because fear is fear of something, or for someone. Anxiety, by contrast, authentic because it has no external object, it only relates immediately to one's own individualized being-in-the-world. Moreover there is an undifferentiated middle range which is neither authentic nor inauthentic, which Heidegger describes 'average everydayness'.

In authentic mode of existence Dasein grasps his ownmost possibilities. Here, Dasein has an ontological recognition of his three structural constituents of Being - Existenz, Facticity and Fallenness. Living authentically means that in the face of thrownness, Dasein recognizes that he is one who has to make choices from the realm of his possibilities. It is the taking hold of oneself. It expresses 'I-hood', which gives one's personal identity. It is the choosing nature of one's identity. But in inauthentic existence Dasein refuses Existenz i.e. his ownmost possibilities and lives in fallenness. Authentic existence is a mark of self-consciousness, but inauthentic existence is a mark of group-consciousness. According to Sartre, authentic existence claims that, as man is freedom, so he should be taking responsibility for his actions and decisions. Existential anguish is produced in the facing of such situations. But the fear of facing and the failure of taking responsibility tempt him to live inauthentically, which Sartre terms as 'bad faith'.

In authentic existence man is an inquirer of Being, he asks question about Being. As Being is an issue of Dasein, he or she has a clear understanding of 'who' he or she is. Man lives, leads

and acts in accordance to his own self. But in inauthentic mode, man blindly accepts public views and acts in accordance to the 'they self'.

Authenticity and inauthenticity can be understood in terms of temporality. Dasein's present state of being refers to its inauthenticity while the unified view of past, present and future is characterized by authenticity.

Heidegger speaks of authenticity as something to be won in struggling out from a natural condition of inauthenticity, while Sartre's reference to authenticity as 'self-discovery' implies that it is the original condition, later lost through bad faith.

Of course, inauthenticity does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world; rather it amounts to a distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world. This kind of world is fascinated by the Dasein-with-others in the 'they'. Authentic existence cannot replace inauthentic life 'in the "they"'. It can only be 'a modification' of the "they", through which people do not 'float above falling everydayness' but somehow come to grip with or 'seize upon' it. Heidegger writes, "Authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon."²⁵

Authenticity understood as coming into one's own, it consists of two elements-'resoluteness' and 'forerunning'. Resoluteness is roughly equivalent to Aristotle's virtue ethics, in other words Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom. To be resolute is to remain sensitive to the unique demands of the concrete situation which cannot be subsumed under any general rules or

any category of thought. Heidegger writes, "When the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-Being, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but *calls us forth into the Situation*."²⁷ Heidegger defines authenticity as 'forerunning resoluteness', where 'forerunning' means forerunning into death. Death appears in Heidegger's philosophy as 'the possibility of - no-longer-being-able-to-be-there',²⁸ the possibility 'of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.'²⁹ To call it the possibility of impossibility is to say what we project into in projecting into death is precisely the closing down of possibilities. In this sense, death is not an accident, but a structural necessity of being-in-the-world.

Ways of Overcoming Alienation

The real problem for the existentialist thinkers is not to concern with the issue of alienation but to deal with how to overcome the problem. So the question is, how can we escape from *das man*? The obvious answer is by becoming conscious and recognizing the difference between being-in-the-world and being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. Like Sartre, Heidegger distinguishes between level of consciousness which is engaged in the everyday world and level of consciousness which lies beyond it. Thus, each person has their own way of becoming authentic. It is an individual mission. Heidegger says, "Conscience summons Dasein's Self from its lostness into the '*they*'".³⁰

Way to overcome alienation, in fact is to achieve authentic existence. As both authentic and inauthentic existence depend on Dasein's choice, so no particular method, effort, discipline, guidance, external imperative or ethical principle is required to

become authentic. It is only the response of the Dasein to his call of conscience. In order to understand or to listen the call or voice of conscience, one must first accept oneself as an individual, in other words he must recognize his own conscience. Secondly he must recognize his fallen state and must feel guilty about it. Heidegger also asserts that being authentic requires resolute commitment to the self.

Being authentic is a shift in attention from daily engagement to one's own most being. Dasein swings between his daily engagement with the *they* and his true unique individual possibilities. So the greatest challenge for Dasein is to bring himself back from his lostness in the *they*. The realization of one's unique capabilities and potentialities is the only and best way of coming back from the average world of the *they*. To realize or to reclaim one's potentialities is to live authentically.

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Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Mind : An Evaluation

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Abstract

Mind is the greatest mystery of all time. The mind as well as its relationship with the body constitutes the greatest part of metaphysics. Philosophers from ancient to present times tried to analyze the concept of mind. Some define the mind as a substance, as an entity living inside our body. Others define the mind as a behavior of bodily activity or a disposition of the body. But none of them is successful to offer a universally accepted definition of mind. Gilbert Ryle in his most celebrated book "*The Concept of Mind*" offered an elaborate analysis of almost all the mental concepts as well as the age-long mind-body problem. In this paper, First, I have analyzed Gilbert Ryle's analysis of the mind and secondly, I have tried to show whether Ryle is successful or not to eliminate the metaphysical concept of mind, especially Cartesian dualism?

Keywords : Mind, Dualism, Category mistake, Descartes' Myth, Disposition

From ancient to present time mind is the greatest mystery for all. In fact, it has a significant place in metaphysics. Philosophy of mind analyses the definitions, subject matter, and the different theories of mind. Philosophers are of different opinions regarding the nature of the mind. Some say that the mind is a thing, a substance; others say that it is merely a complex state, attributes, and dispositions of the living human body. Some philosophers again claim that a mind is a form of energy, a kind of force. The philosophers, who said that the mind is a substance, admit that it is a spiritual or immaterial, or non-physical substance. Others say that the mind is a material substance made up of organic matter and found inside the skull of living human beings. Each individual human being has one mind which is inseparably attached to him. Again, sometimes the mind and the soul are treated as one and the same entity. But in other times, the mind is said to be a part of the soul, and some thinkers again separate mind and soul entirely. They deny the existence of the soul while maintaining the reality of the mind. Thus, we see that philosophers are conflicting among themselves about the nature of the mind.

Philosophy of mind is a philosophical study of the mind. Here, an attempt is made to analyze and examine those concepts that involve the mind including the very concept of the mind itself. It constitutes a very important branch of philosophy mainly with the various problems related to the mind. In a sense, it is defined by a group of problems. The first problem of the philosophy of mind is the problem of clarifying the concept of

the nature or structure of the mind or mentality. There are also problems concerning specific mental properties or kind of mental states and events and their relationship to one another. The most important problem of the philosophy of mind is the problem concerning the relationship between mental and physical property. They are called "The mind-body problem". It is the central problem of the philosophy of mind. This is the problem of clarifying and making intelligible, the relation between our mental and the physical nature of being, or more generally, the relationship between mental and physical properties.

The mind-body dualism was formulated by Rene Descartes over 300 years ago. Descartes argued that the mind or soul is separate from the body. Descartes' view on mind-body is called "Substance dualism". According to this theory, a composite being is made up of two distinct substances, an immaterial mind, and a material body. The core idea of a substance is that of something that can "exist independently" and have properties and enter into a relationship with other substances. By thinking Descartes meant a full range of mental states and activities, such as sensing, feeling, perceiving, judging, doubting. Further, mind necessarily lack spatial dimensions, and matter necessarily lacks consciousness. For example, in perception the physical stimulation of our sensory surfaces causes us to perceive objects and events around us, and involuntary actions like our wants and beliefs cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways. According to Descartes both mind and body interact with each other through the pineal gland of the brain which is known as interactionism.

Analytical behaviorism or logical behaviorism challenges

and rejects the dualistic theory of Descartes. It maintains that statements about the mind and mental states turn out to be equivalent to statements that describe a person's actual and potential public behavior.

Gilbert Ryle published his celebrated book *The Concept of Mind* in which he said that behaviorism is a method of research used by experimental psychologists. In his opinion behaviorism is not a philosophical doctrine. But in spite of this disclaimer, Ryle is widely regarded as an exponent of behaviorism. Whether or not Ryle is a behaviorist he is certainly a 'linguistic philosopher' in the sense that he uses logic and facts about language to solve philosophical problems. *The Concept of Mind*, is regarded by some interpreters as making a strong case for philosophical behaviorism. But actually, Ryle is essentially interested in solving philosophical problems through language. On the other hand, his analysis appears to push him towards behavioristic conclusions at least to some degree.

In the introduction to his book, Ryle states that his aim is to determine the logical cross-bearing of the mental concepts. Ryle aims to demolish the Cartesian conception of the mind as a ghostly nonphysical entity existing over and above familiar flesh-and-blood living human beings, an entity whose states are supposed to be logically private.

Ryle's first aim is to repudiate utterly the Cartesian concept of mind as an immaterial substance linked in life to a corporeal machine i.e., the body. Ryle characterizes this as "The Dogma of the Ghost in the Machine". Dualism, Ryle says, embodies a "category mistake". This concept of a category mistake is a

powerful philosophical tool that Ryle explains by means of examples. Ryle argues that mistakes about the mind come from wrongly believing that mind-like matter belongs to the category of substances. The Cartesian dualists believe in the existence of two substances material and mental. But Ryle says that a person does not live through two collateral histories, the one consisting of the outward public physical doings and the other consisting in ghostly happenings on a private mental stage. Ryle argues that the supposition that there are special non-material mental events and actions which take place in a non-material substance is an unfortunate linguistic fashion which traditionally belongs to the two worlds story, the story that some things exist or occur 'in the physical world', while other things exist or occur not in that world, but in the mental world.

In his book, the *Concept of Mind*, Gilbert Ryle has used the most appropriate method of linguistic analysis to show the hollowness of mind-body dualism. Ryle alleges that Descartes initiated the philosopher's myth of mind-body dualism. Descartes had established the dualism of mind and body as two distinct substances having opposite qualities. For example, human bodies are in space and are subject to mechanical laws. Bodily states and processes being public can be observed by others. The workings of the mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is the privileged operation of the individual himself. One cannot know what is going on in others' minds. One can only directly recognize the states and processes of his own mind. Thus, one's mental states and processes are wholly and directly perceivable by him who possesses them. Descartes assumes that there is a

basic distinction between mind and matter. But Ryle says that this assumption is a 'category mistake' because it attempts to analyze the relation between mind and body as if they were terms of the same logical category. According to Ryle, Descartes' dualistic theory is an attempt to analyze mental processes in a way that the mind is distinct from the body. He explains that knowing how to perform an act skillfully is not a matter of purely theoretical reasoning. Knowing how which refers to perform an act skillfully is a matter of being able to think logically and practically and is a matter of being able to put practical reasoning into action. According to Ryle, mental processes are nothing but intelligent acts. There are no mental processes that are distinct from intelligent acts. Thus, an act of remembering, dreaming, knowing, or being willing is not merely a clue to some hidden mental process, it is how the mental process or intellectual operation is defined. Ryle argues that there is no ghostly, invisible entity called the 'mind' inside a mechanical apparatus called the 'body'. The workings of the mind are not an independent mechanism that governs the workings of the body. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body but are conceptualized as a way of explaining the actions of the body. In Ryle's own language, "A person lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first history are events in the physical world, those in the second are events in the mental world."¹ This is somewhat is either male or female, so it is supposed that some existing is physical existing and other existing is mental existing.

Ryle admits that this official doctrine is initiated by

Descartes in the 17th century. Ryle abuses Cartesian dualism as an absurd doctrine that involves "The dogma of the ghost-in-the machine." Ryle says, "It represents the facts of mental life as if they belong to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another."² His main aim is to show the logical mistake committed by philosophers in attributing a category or logical type to the mental concept.

So, separate statements like 'Mind exists' and 'Body exists' are valid, though conjunctive or disjunctive statements like 'Mind and Body exists' and 'Mind or Body exists' are invalid. Thus, Ryle makes it clear that mind and body both exist, but they do not exist in the same sense. The Cartesian dualism took them as existing in the same sense. According to it, mind and body are both substances existing together in the human body, having their own proper fields of action. Ryle is against this type of dualism and advocates forcefully that such a co-existing substance as the mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body machine. This mind is a myth. Throughout his book, he has tried to explode this myth. But by exploding the myth, he is not negating the concept of mind. Ryle has his own theory of mind. What he is negating are the idioms in which the mind was conceived and described by the dualists. He emphatically asserts in the introduction to his book that his task is only to rectify the logical geography of knowledge which we already possess. In practical life, we all use the mind involving concepts correctly, but when an occasion comes to give an account of those concepts, we describe them in a mythical way. Ryle wants to do away with this

mythical account of the dualist, particularly of Descartes.

Through his book, *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle has a stirring force in the world of philosophy and a new line of discussion about the philosophy of mind. No philosopher before Ryle gives such a thorough analysis about the nature of the mind. His chief aim is to refuse the myth of the 'dogma of the ghost in the machine' and to rectify the notions about the nature of the mind. By the word, 'myth' Ryle does not mean a 'fair story'. But by this word Ryle means, "It is a presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another. To explode a myth is accordingly not to deny the facts but to re-allocate them."³ To determine the logical geography of concepts is to reveal the logic of propositions.

Descartes divides a person's life into two parts - one is external and the other is internal. All the physical things including human bodies belong to the external world. On the other hand, the states and processes of one's own mind are internal. But Ryle maintains that this antithesis of the outer and inner world is nothing but a metaphor. As of the spatial existence of the mind is denied so it is not possible to speak of the mind as being spatially inside something. Ryle says, "This antithesis of outer and inner is, of course, meant to be constructed as a metaphor, since minds, not being in space, could not be described as being spatially inside anything else or as having things going on spatially inside themselves."⁴

In his philosophy of mind, Ryle does not deny the occurrences of mental processes. He says that the two phrases, i.e., 'there occurs mental processes do not mean the same kind of

thing and thus it is meaningless either to conjoin or to disjoin these two phrases. Ryle says, "It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds, and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'colored' or 'sexed'. They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has a different sense in the 'tide of rising', 'hopes are rising' and the average age of death is rising."³

Thus, Ryle proves that Cartesian dualism is a futile doctrine and this theory is eliminated by him from the field of philosophy of mind.

But there are criticisms against Ryle's somewhat inappropriate use of the concept of the word 'category'. Critics arguing against 'Descartes' myth' have pointed out that the idea of the category is vague, slippery, and ill-defined. We know more or less where we are with the categories of Aristotle, as well as with the categories of Kant, but not known in the same way the categories of Ryle. The distinction between things, relations, and qualities can be described as categorical distinctions, or the distinctions between facts and events, between elements and constructs, or between dispositions and their actualizations. It is a categorical mistake to confuse a fact and an event or to treat a dispositional property as though it were an occurrent actualization or a persistent manifestation of the disposition. In his article on "Categories", Ryle discusses the difference between Aristotle and Kant's use of categories without intending either to complete or make more comprehensive the list of categories. He uses the term

for his own purpose of showing the logical powers of concepts and their misuse in philosophical thinking.

Ryle's observation is that we commit the category mistake if terms belonging to one category are described in idioms appropriate to another. If we try to understand the nature of the mind in Ryle's sense then the mind is explained as a disposition or a complex of dispositions, it cannot be explained as occurring at the same time without involving the type of confusion. Because in that case again we shall be committing the category mistake of attributing two different categories or logical types in explaining the mind or the mental. If one commits a category mistake in the way described by Ryle, it is clear that some mental concepts while being dispositional cannot be occurrent at the same time. The concepts of hiding, concentrating, thinking one's thoughts are partly episodic and partly dispositional. Hence, they are described by Ryle as 'mongrel categorical' or 'semi-hypotheticals'. Does it mean that he commits the same category mistake in another form against which he himself has raised objections? Or does he mean to say that dispositions, after all, belong to the same category or logical type as occurrences?

Ryle's objection against Descartes' dualism is that Descartes tried to explain the mind or the mental by the same category as the body. The body is a mechanical system determined by its own causal laws. If it is true that the mind has no existence of its own parallel to the existence of the body, it is equally true that the mind cannot be explained by the same casual phenomena as the body. The mind belongs to the category of dispositions rather than having any mysterious existence of its own. Thus,

Ryle admits that philosophers commit a category mistake in providing the same explanation for the mind and as for the body. Ryle denies the separate existence of the mind. He explains the mind as a disposition or a complex of dispositions.

By his theory of dispositions Ryle gives a new picture of the philosophy of mind. His method is primarily linguistic and not factual. He replaces the Cartesian mind with dispositions and believes that all psychological terms are more or less dispositional in character. Speaking of dispositional properties Ryle writes, "To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state or to undergo a particular change when a particular condition is released."⁶

Ryle denies the traditionalists' account of the mind to be a substance over and above the body. Mind is thought to be a disposition, a set, a style, or an organic state of readiness 'to do and undergo certain sort of things in their appropriate situations. A disposition, however, it is not an occult or mysterious inner quality or potentiality present in the person or the object about whom the disposition is said to be true. It is nothing actual. It simply signifies a tendency for certain events to occur if some conditions are realized. For e.g., when glass is said to be brittle it does not mean that brittleness is a property secretly present in the glass. It only means that when a certain situation arises, e.g., when it is hit with a stone, a certain event takes place then the glass breaks into parts. A similar case is true to human vanity or any other disposition. When a man is said to be vain, it does not mean that there is an inner element of vanity in him which he feels or experiences. It simply means that one is prone to behave in certain

ways under some specific circumstances. Ryle believes that dispositional words are not the name of existing qualities. Dispositional statements are not the categorical reports of some secret phenomena. They have only a hypothetical import. Ryle says that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve if submerged anywhere at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this slipper knows French is to say that if, for example, he is even addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds partly in French, acts appropriately, or translates it correctly into his own tongue. This is of course, too precise.

Thus, according to Ryle, a dispositional statement may be categorical in form like 'This sleeper knows French', but it is actually hypothetical in meaning because it is always unpacked in hypothetical statements. For example, the above sentence has the following hypothetical statements- if he is addressed in French, he responds pertinently in French, if he is shown any French newspaper, he acts appropriately or translates it correctly, etc. Ryle admits that a dispositional statement cannot be a reporter of existing states and processes. By arguing that the mental conduct concept is dispositional or hypothetical, he seems to think that he can remove the misconception that they refer to a certain existing entity called the mind.

Ryle thinks that the meaning of dispositional statements involves an infinite number of hypothetical statements. He observes, "When an object is described as hard, we do not mean only that it would resist deformation; we mean also that it would, for example, give out the sharp sound if struck, that it would cause us to pain if we cause into sharp contact with it, that resilient

objects would bounce off it and so on indefinitely." ' Similarly when a man is said to be vain, we do not mean that he tends to talk a lot about himself in the company of others.

Ryle distinguishes between dispositions and occurrence. The distinction lies in his explanation of some of the significant mental conduct concepts like the concept of knowing, believing, thinking, imagining, etc. Dispositions are neither actions nor occult or unobservable causes of action. Dispositions behave like open hypothetical statements. The dispositional characteristics whether belonging to inanimate things, animals or human beings behave in the same way. They indicate the ability or propensity of things and persons to act in certain specific ways. Ryle is primarily concerned with the exposition of mental concepts displaying human character and intellect. According to Ryle, human minds are the most complex. A man displays his ability to think, imagine how or believe are present in us mostly as dispositions which we can know through our various functions of intelligence, cleverness, shrewdness, understanding, imagining, etc. Dispositions are inference tickets or the general rules for particular mental activities.

Ryle distinguishes between single-track dispositions, the actualizations of which are 'nearly uniform' and 'many-track' dispositions, the actualizations of which are 'indefinitely heterogeneous'. The word 'Cigarette- Smoker' is a single-track disposition word because it always means a tendency for only one type of activity, viz. the activity of smoking. But the word 'vain' or 'greedy' is a 'many-track' disposition word because it signifies diverse activities in different situations. Ryle illustrates it with the concept of 'grossing'. As the term 'grossing' stands for

different activities like selling sugar, weighing tea, wrapping up butter, and so on so the time 'vanity' or 'greedy' stands for a wide range of different activities under various circumstances. According to Ryle, the many-track dispositional words are highly generic or determinable, while the single-track words are highly specific or determinate. That determinable dispositions are indefinitely heterogeneous. So, the descriptions of human beings are given with the help of many-track dispositional words. Ryle says- "Some dispositional words are highly generic or determinable, which others are highly specific or determinate, the verb with which we report the different exercise of generic tendencies, capacities and liabilities are apt to differ from the verbs with which we named the dispositions, while the episodic verbs corresponding to the highly specific dispositional verbs are apt to be the same."¹⁸

Thus, any act which is to be characterized by a mental predicate must be the actualization of some dispositions. There are many dispositions whose track of actualization is not one. They may actualize in different ways. Intelligence is an example of many tracks disposition. Intelligent activity is not one unique activity. It may take various forms. Almost all psychological concepts can be explained along the lines of intelligence. They mainly refer to disposition. Dispositions, for Gilbert Ryle, are possibilities of action, whose only evidence is actions themselves. Ryle seems to explain the disposition of man which is a highly complex phenomenon. Some indicate the individual's capacities, abilities, or efficiencies to act in certain ways. Actually, tendencies are different from capacities and liabilities.

But Ryle emphasized the difference between capacities

and tendencies, he never mentioned the cardinal point of their difference. On the other hand, he makes an effort to point out their essential sameness which lies in the fact that all are dispositional concepts requiring analysis in terms of hypothetical statements regarding over behavior.

Ryle distinguishes between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' - knowing how to typewrite and knowing that the Indian typewriter is cheaper than others. Ryle says that knowing in the sense of 'knowing how' is a disposition. The dualist philosophers maintain that knowing is an occurrence in the secret chamber of the mind. But Ryle does not find any episodic use of the term 'knowing'. Knowing is the ability to do certain acts or things. Such ability is called a disposition. There is nothing categorical about dispositions. Dispositional statements are always hypothetical statements. They always involve 'if-then'. That is why they resemble 'how statements'. Ryle also tried to prove that psychological concepts of 'know', 'believe', 'aspire', 'clever', 'humorous' etc. do not refer to secret activities conducted on a secret place called to mind. All of them are disposition words. Thus, Ryle says that 'knowing' in the sense of knowing how is necessarily a disposition to act outwardly. Ryle does not explicitly discuss the logical status of 'knowing that' though he is particular about discussing the logical status of 'knowing how'. Thus, in Ryle's philosophy of mind 'knowing how' is more basic. One does not have to plan his actions first and then act.

Ryle's distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' is based on the criticism of the traditional doctrine. According to him the mental characteristics like intelligence, learning,

thinking, imagining, understanding, etc., are dispositional in character, in the sense that the disposition to do certain things or to act in certain ways means the individual's doing them rather than meaning his inner capacity to recite rules for them. It is one and the same individual disposed to act and to actually act in a certain way. Mental characteristics like intelligence, cleverness, shrewdness, wittiness, etc. are attributed to human behavior.

We see that Ryle's philosophy of mind is anti-Cartesian and anti-dualistic. It leaves no room for inherent privacy in the life of an individual. But it can be said that there are some statements in his book to support the inner life theory. We may take an example in support of our contention. Ryle says:

"Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in the internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph- a show of visual imagery."¹⁶

In this statement, Ryle accepts that there are silent thoughts and imagining which support inner life. Ryle accepts that if the agent is unwilling to reveal them, they may not be known. Now the point is - are not these confessions sufficient to establish that Ryle is not subscribing to another form of dualism, knowingly or unknowingly? Some of the statements of Ryle speak of his acceptance of silent deliberation and calculation, silent imagining and recollecting one's head. Thus, we may ask: when Ryle accepts such silent deliberations, is he not talking of the mind which he abhors? Such a statement of Ryle's philosophy of mind is inconsistent and paves the way for the revival of dualism.

Ryle rejects Cartesian dualism on the ground that it

commits a category mistake. As against Descartes, Ryle holds that although the body has extension and it is a physical entity, the mind is not an entity but it is simply a disposition of a person. Therefore, when we made a conjunctive statement like - There exists a body and there exists a mind, according to Ryle by this conjunctive statement we make a mistake by putting 'mind' in the same category as the 'body'. For Ryle statements about the body are statements about an entity called body but statements about the mind are definitely not statements about an entity called mind because the mind is not an entity. When two things belong to the same category it is possible to make conjunctive or disjunctive statements out of them. Therefore, for Ryle by the conjunctive statement "there exists body and there exists mind" we are placing both of them in the same category and thereby commit a mistake. However, though Ryle has talked about category mistakes, he was not at all interested to define a "category".

Again, Ryle has attacked the mind as a causal theory. Following Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophy can only describe linguistic usage, he has felt satisfied with descriptions alone. But descriptions cannot be a substitute for a cause. Description and explanation are two different things concerning an event and both have their own functions. The Cartesian theory of mind cannot, therefore, be thrown completely.

When we try to understand the nature of the mind in Ryle's sense, if the mind is explained as a disposition or complex of dispositions, it cannot be explained as occurrent at the same time without involving the type-confusion. Because in that case again we shall be committing the category mistake of attributing two different categories or logical types in explaining the mind or

the mental. If one commits a category mistake in the way described by Ryle, it is clear that some mental concepts are fundamentally dispositional while others are fundamentally occurrent i.e., a concept while being dispositional cannot be occurrent at the same time. The concepts of heeding, concentrating, thinking one's thought are partly episodic and partly dispositional which is described by Ryle as 'mongrel categorical' or 'semi-hypotheticals'. Does it mean that he committed the same category mistake in another form against which he himself has raised objections? Or did he mean to say that dispositions, after all, belong to the same category or are logical as occurrences?

According to Ryle, the mind is inherently open or public. It is only by training or special artifice that we keep it secret. Ryle seems to admit that unless the mind is basically public, we cannot know about the mental qualities of others. But the critic may argue that unless the mind is private, how is that we are deprived of sharing one another's experiences? Whatever kind of privacy Ryle ascribes to mental phenomena, he does not seem to be consistent about it. Ryle thinks that mental privacy is analogous to the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key. A natural corollary of this comparison is that mental privacy is a matter of physical or physiological accident. But there are also lines in Ryle's book that state that mental privacy is only a verbal matter.

Mind-body dualism reflects itself in the speech habit of the people. When we speak of 'mental disease' or of a 'hospital meant for mentally sick', or of a man who is both 'physically healthy and mentally healthy, we are certainly contrasting mind from body. It is difficult to overcome the psychic phenomena of

dreams, images, pleasure, unpleasure, etc. from the mind. We have seen how Ryle has almost avoided discussing dreams; we do not know how to disbelieve the inherent privacy of dream experiences. We do not also know how Ryle's one-world theory is competent to account for the fantasy worlds that dreams create. Dreams are not public events. Of course, when we communicate or make statements about them, they are, in that way, made public. But to say that dreams are made public is not to say that dream is dreamt publicly.

According to Ryle pleasure and pain are not anything beyond physical behavior. Enjoying digging is not digging plus enjoying. Certain ways of digging are themselves enjoyed. Similarly, pain is some such visible behavior as groaning, screaming, shouting, and the rest. But here also Ryle's conception of pleasure and pain is in conflict. Pleasure and pain cannot be understood in terms of physical categories alone as Ryle says. We must distinguish between physical pains and the pains of the heart. For example, the pains of toothache are not of the same kind as the pains of disappointment.

But Ryle's behaviorism, though dressed in a logical robe, lacks the charm of appeal. This is primarily so because he has failed to distinguish the essence of mental qualities from those that are only their evidence. Behaviors are the criteria or the evidence that enable one to determine mental qualities in others. Ryle's behaviorism makes him look like a materialist, though Ryle declares that both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question.

Thus, when Ryle reduces mind ultimately by bodily

behavior, it is manifesting an absorption of mind by matter and there we find materialism. Of course, his materialism is not mechanistic. But Ryle's attempt to get rid of 'the ghost in the machine' paves the way to a mechanic theory of nature.

Ryle in the form of linguistic analysis tries to emphasize a theory of mind which at many points seems to go quite against the ordinary view of the nature of mind. He resorts to ordinary language to show the philosopher's myth and yet propounds a theory that is as much opposed to traditional philosophy as it is to the view of the ordinary man.

Bertrand Russell while commenting on Ryle's *Concept of Mind* has criticized him for preferring "the language of the uneducated people and condemning the sophisticated language of the learned."¹⁰

Frederick Copleston denies that there is anything as 'fixed ordinary language' and 'if there were, it is not at all self-evident that it would constitute a court of appeal in philosophical disputes.'

A dispositional account of the mind is not compatible with dualism unless it can show off each and every psychological deposition that it is ultimately to be fully cashed in physical terms.

It is, therefore debatable if a dispositional statement is not categorical insignificance, but hypothetical statements. Of course, the categorical statement is not generally made when the hypothetical statements are found to be true. If a sugar-likething does not dissolve in water, we cannot ordinarily say that it has solubility as its quality. But that is only to make the truth of the categorical statement depend on the truth of hypothetical

statements. This is not to deny the categorical significance altogether. Even when mental concepts stand for disposition, our inner life is not be denied.

Though dispositions may seem to be a good substitute for the mind, it is necessary for Ryle to distinguish between human and non-human dispositions. Merely to say that the mind is a disposition to behave in certain ways will not do. Inanimate objects have their dispositions to behave in their own ways. What is it, then, which makes us classify some dispositions as physical and others as mental? Ryle does not provide a suitable answer to this question. Nor does he seem to think it necessary to explain the criteria that will distinguish the two sorts of dispositions, In this regard, Bertrand Russell remarks:

"A plain man would say that 'brittle' denotes a disposition of bodies and 'intelligent' denotes a disposition of minds- in fact, that the two adjectives apply to different kinds of stuff. But it is not open to Professor Ryle to say this, and I do not quite know what he would say."¹¹

Mind also cannot be easily replaced by dispositions or semi - dispositions. In this regard, Hugu R. King remarks:"We cannot reduce my mind to simply my ability or proneness to certain sorts of things. Indeed, ability and proneness maybe just those dispositions which allow me to do things unconsciously and without heed, to dismiss my 'mind.'"¹²

It can be said that for his own purpose Ryle has sought to replace consciousness by disposition. The effect of such a replacement has been to present an altogether new picture of the man. Man is now a typically behaving body. Though unconscious,

he is thought to do everything that is called intelligent. One may wonder whether Ryle himself believes that he is unconscious. As a matter of fact, man's conscious nature is so dear to him that he may feel completely shocked and disappointed to hear that he is in fact unconscious. As D. S. Miller puts it: "If you learned today that your own life from tomorrow morning would be to this sort, the life of a perfectly behaving body but a perfectly unconscious one, you would suddenly cease to be concerned about it, you would not in the least cling to life on these terms. Why? Because you cannot for a moment identify yourself with a body with consciousness."¹³

Ryle has also denied introspection almost on the same lines on which he has denied consciousness. We have seen how unsatisfactory his denial of consciousness is. If introspection is the mental act of scrutinizing the private experiences of one's own, it would mean that we can attend to two things at once.

However, though Ryle's dispositional analysis of the mind underwent severe criticism from different philosophers his presentation of the dispositional analysis of almost all concepts (minus some occurrences) made him one of the most prominent of those analysts who regarded the use of ordinary language as a philosophical tool. While criticizing Cartesian dualism Ryle contends that intelligent behavior is a matter of knowing how to do something and once this fact is acknowledged, there is no temptation to explain the behavior by looking for a private internal knowledge of facts. H.D. Lewis observes "When I write these words there seems to be clearly more going on at the time, than the movement of my fingers and pencils. In my actual writing

more is involved than the physical movement and this 'more' is not merely of a dispositional kind. It is part of what goes on as I have put it. It is my sustained understanding of what I am doing and my continuous proposition to it. This cannot be dissolved into dispositional attitudes."¹⁴

Thus, a critical analysis of Ryle shows that he has taken the help of extra-linguistic consideration in order to analyze his theory of mind. But the way in which Ryle has taken the help of logic, language, and fact, he has not succeeded in eliminating the bugaboo of the ghost in the machine. A rumor about the ghost is still left in the air of Ryle's anti-ghost philosophy of mind which gives us another form of dualism and to an infinite regress.

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M. N. Roy's Radical Humanism and Marxism: A Study

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Abstract

Manabendra Nath Roy a prominent figure in contemporary Indian thought, preaches a new approach to humanistic thought. This humanistic thought is called Radical Humanism. He was a nationalist, Marxist and above all a humanistic philosopher. Roy's philosophy of Radical Humanism founded upon Marxism, but it differs from it, in so many important points. Though Marx and Roy both are humanistic philosophers, yet their methods of working and their interpretation of human development are different from each other. As a humanist philosopher, man is the centre of their philosophy. For Karl Marx 'man is the root of mankind'. But Manabendra Nath Roy believes in Protagoras dictum : 'Man is the measure of all things'. Roy gives much importance on individual freedom, which is not possible in Marxian philosophy. For the equation, Marx prefers the classless society in which all people have equal right and wealth. For Roy also, class is essential for the progress of society, but he gives much importance on middle class. Roy's way of revolution for social change is different from Marxism. He attaches more importance on philosophical revolution than any other revolution for social progress".

Keywords: Marxism, Humanism, Freedom, Philosophical revolution, Social progress.

Manabendra Nath Roy, a prominent figure in contemporary Indian thought, preaches a new approach to humanistic thought, called Radical Humanism. M. N. Roy's Radical Humanism is scientific humanism with a radical outlook. His movement for a humanist revival started from the attempt to explain what is human nature. Manhood is the beginning of human existence, and man is an end in himself. His philosophical approach is materialistic which is different from mechanical and dialectical materialism. He considers his materialism as humanist materialism, which can explain all aspects in human existence. Roy recognizes three attributes of human nature, viz., rationality, morality and freedom. These are the three main values of scientific humanism, which according to Roy are causally connected. Human nature according to Roy is essentially rational which he derives from man's biological evolution. As human beings are essentially rational, so when we persistently appeal to our reason, we will ultimately respond. To Roy morality is the ability to judge about the correct response of given situation and judgement is guided by reason. Therefore, morality finds its sanction in the rationality of man. Struggle for existence is identical with quest for freedom. Moreover according to Roy, freedom is the progressive disappearance of the manifold impediments to the unfolding or potentialities biologically inherent in man.

M. N. Roy gave much importance on reason and free thinking. Therefore, the approach to his contemporary personalities was critical. He was a nationalist, Marxist and above

all a humanistic philosopher. He worked with many great personalities of the world during his lifetime. He was influenced by some of them, and also influenced them through his personality. As a Communist, he worked with Lenin, Stalin, Borodin etc.. Again as a nationalist he was influenced with Gandhi, Nehru and other nationalist leaders of that time. Above all as a Marxist, he was greatly influenced by Karl Marx.

M. N. Roy held that revolution is concerned with ultimate things, and that the first necessity of revolutionary is a philosophy. So to say, his first choice of philosophy was Marxism up to the early 1940s. He reformulated the Marxian philosophy in such a way that it appears as a philosophy of freedom¹: Roy's philosophy of Radical Humanism founded upon Marxism, but it differs from it, in so many important points.

Marxism as a doctrine developed by Karl Marx and to a lesser extent, by Friedrich Engels. Soviet Marxism is worked out by Vladimir Ilich Lenin and modified by Joseph Stalin. The whole of Marx's work is a radical critique of philosophy especially of idealist system. Marx declared that philosophy must become reality. He thought that one could no longer be content with interpreting the world, but must be concerned with transforming it. To him, this transformation means transforming both the world itself and human consciousness of it. Marxist interpretation of human nature begins with human need. Human activity is essentially a struggle with nature which furnish the means of satisfying human needs, including the basic need of food, clothing, the development of human power and of human intellectual and artistic abilities. In this process, people discover themselves as productive beings

who humanize themselves through their labour. By their creative activity and labour, they realise their identity with the nature and at the same time achieve free consciousness. They become aware of their true structure in their struggle against nature, what separates them from it and find the conditions of their fulfilment. Thus according to Marxism, human existence determines consciousness.

Marxism exists in two main forms, with intermediate mixtures. On one extreme, it is almost pure theory and on the other it is a practical politics. Marxism tended with Lenin was carried to its logical conclusion of subordinating the theoretical side of Marxism wholly to political opportunism. Roy was against Stalin, and never showed much interest in the Lenin's technique of bringing off *Coups d'etat*. He always showed a feeling for the broad social effects of political and technical changes, within the general Marxian framework.²

Roy was inspired by Marx's original humanism and by his social goal. He considered Marx as essentially a humanist and lover of human freedom. As a humanist Marx stood for the freedom of individual and talked of Socialism as "the -kingdom of freedom", where man will be the master of his social environments. To Marx under Socialism, human reason will overcome irrational forces, which now tyrannies the life of man and as a rational being man will control his destiny, was also the ideal of Roy³. Like Marx, Roy regarded the physical being of man in constant relationship with nature, wherein man plays an active role. He was also inspired by Marx's basic doctrine of "existence determines consciousness". He agreed with Marx that biological urge for self-preservation was the moving force.

But to Roy, "I have never been an orthodox Marxist. My attitude to Marxism was critical from the very beginning".⁴ Roy differed from Marxism in several points. Although Roy was inspired by Marx's basic doctrine of "existence determines consciousness", he would not go all the way with Marx and identify this with the economic interpretation of history. To Roy, Marx made a false distinction between primitive man's intelligent effort to earn a livelihood and biological struggle for existence. Marx had wrongly held that the origin of society and subsequent human development were economically motivated. Physical urge and economic motive both were different to Roy⁵. According to Roy, Marx had started from a society engaged in economic activity and not concerning the means of production. But for Roy means of production is produced from the ideal of means of production. This idea itself is the production of brain. He maintained that an idea in the brain of the ancestor of man, made the means of production possible. He explained it with the help of biological struggle for existence. Man's urge to be free, produced the idea of means of production. "The brain is the most powerful means of production; when you talk about means of production, do not forget that".⁶ So man is greater than any means of production. That is the defeat of Marxism according to Roy, and he tried to free Marxism from its basic fallacy in his own philosophy of Radical Humanism.⁷ Roy criticized that Marx entirely ignored the entire process of becoming the man, before he entered into social relations. So he knew nothing of the human nature which underlies the ensemble of social relations, which induces man to enter into these relations⁸.

Roy pointed out that the very principle of Marx's dialectical materialism was absurd. According to dialectical materialism everything is in motion and interdependent. What causes motion is the self-motivating capacity of the matter. The law of inner contradictions prevails and as a result, progress arises as a struggle between opposite forces. Changes take place quantitatively that assume a qualitative form at a particular stage. Every stage of change, which is called revolution, shows both a form of synthesis and a form of higher development that leads to the reaction of the forces of inner conflict. According to Roy, the methodology of dialectics could be applicable to the realm of ideology, not materialism. Therefore, the dialectical materialism of Marx was only in name, it was essentially an idealistic system.⁹ Roy claimed that the processes of nature can be explained without making use of dialectic. The analysis of matter by modern physics made him to reject dialectics in the domain of ontology. Again, the movement of thought from democracy to socialism is not dialectical but continuous.¹⁰ Roy criticised Marx's materialism as dogmatic and un-scientific, because Marx did not carry the analysis of mental phenomena far enough, beyond the dawn of social history. Marx ignored the entire process of the becoming of man before he entered the social relation. Roy held that the substratum of the human nature is stable. The becoming of man involves the parallel process of mental and physical activities. The relation between the two is not causality, but priority. From primitive consciousness, mind evolves in the context of a biological organism. Mental activities are determined in the entire stages by physical existence and thereafter by social conditions, but for Marx

man's relation to matter is the relation of one material entity to other material entity¹¹.

Moreover, Roy held that the negation of a constant element in human nature lead to the negation of morality. Without the recognition of some permanent values, no ethics is possible. If morality is not found in human nature, it must have a transcendental nature. However, to Roy man is essentially rational and therefore mortal¹². Again, if the principles of dialectical materialism allied with the economic interpretation of history are unsound, naturally the theory of class war is misleading, which is the key tenet of Marxism¹³. Marx's doctrine of class war "makes social progress sterile and stagnant. If class struggle be the mark and measure of the class progress of society, then naturally there will be no progress when there is no class war."¹⁴ The cohesive force in society is the cause of progress in the society. To Roy "No class is ever destroyed owing to its antagonism to any other class"¹⁵. Further more, it is stated that, "But there is another side of the picture—the cohesive force in society. Without that force, human society would have broken down long ago, and there would have been no evolution of civilization. There is some social interest which binds classes together."¹⁶

Roy maintained that Marxism certainly was wrong regarding the role of the middle class in the capitalist society¹⁷. Roy gave much importance on the middle class. Middle class attained great height in intellectual and political considerations. The importance of the middle class as a part of society was on the increase and it played an aggressive role in the history of many countries. The decay of capitalism economically ruined the middle classes and

thus quickened in their minds a desire for a new social order. Thus to quote, "Between capital and labour the middle class numerically grows, politically as an enemy of the status quo"¹⁸. Even to him the ideology of socialism was conceived by middle class.

Marx regarded "surplus value" as the source of increasing exploitation by the Capitalist class. Roy not only remarked it as the fundamental fallacy of Marxist economics, but he condemned the entire philosophy of revolution. The surplus value of Marxist economics was called by Roy the lever of all progress. This 'social surplus' was the marginal product which was not consumed by the labour of community. Roy held that economically, a demand for the abolition of surplus value was impractical. "Social surplus will disappear if production of surplus value is ever stopped; then, with the disappearance the lever of progress society will stagnate and eventually breakdown. Ancient civilizations disappeared, owing to inadequacy or shrinkage of social surplus"¹⁹. Roy asserted that for the development of society, it is necessary that everyone must produce something more than what is just enough for himself²⁰.

Again, Roy held that the appropriation of social surplus by one particular class was certainly an undesirable system. But, the sanction for the demand was not economic. Moral and social justice demanded it, which would not result from Marxist scheme of revolution. Marxist implicitly admitted that even under the socialist economic system, social surplus was produced in the form of 'exploiter should be exploited by the proletariat'. This evidently meant that under the new order, the social surplus was appropriated, by the new ruling class- the proletariat pending the

advent or the utopia of a classless and stateless society. Roy held that the ideal of a stateless society would never be realized, because state is the creation of man through which man realizes his freedom.

Regarding the role of individual, Roy made a significant departure from Marx. Roy thought that Marx was blinded by his sense of the overwhelming importance of social factors in human character, which eventually made him to consider the individual as an abstraction and consequently attribute all reality and potency not to individuals but to classes. According to Roy, Marx ignored the self-evident truth that society is an association of individuals.²¹ "Man must be man, individually conscious of his dignity and creativeness, before he can make history riot the masses."²² Roy maintained that the community is the creation of individuals to serve the interests of individuals. The basic biological urge of self-preservation made individuals to realize the necessity of combining the struggle for existence. It never meant subordination of the individual to society. So, unlike Marx Roy held that society was the means and the individual the end.²³

Roy explained that Marx was an advocate of freedom; and as a Humanist, he stood for the freedom of the individual. He talked of socialism as 'the kingdom of freedom,' where man will be the master of his environments. However, he also criticizes Marx as, 'one who preached such a humanist doctrine could not be a worshiper at the shrine of an exacting collective ego, even of the proletariat'. "The positive value of Marxism can be appraised only in the context of liberal tradition".²⁴ To Roy, the social relationship should be to secure for individuals, as individuals, the

maximum measure of freedom. The sum total of the quanta of freedom actually enjoyed by its members individually was the measure of the liberating or progressive significance of any social order. A political system and an economic experiment, which subordinated the man of flesh and blood to an abstract collective ego, could not possibly be the suitable means for the attainment of the goal of the freedom. It was absurd to agree that negation of freedom was the road of freedom. Therefore, "the purpose of all rational human endeavour, collective as well as individual, should be the attainment of freedom in ever larger measure, and freedom if real only as individual freedom."²⁵ Explaining Marxist so-called stateless or classless society as a utopia, Roy maintained that in that utopia 'man can never be free' and that negation of freedom was logically inherent in the communist theoretical system. Therefore, Roy gave much importance on individual and his freedom.²⁶

Regarding morality, Roy held that 'Marx's ethical question, was also the tradition of bourgeois 'Utilitarianism'. Hegelian influence induced Marx to reject the individualistic approach to moral problems. The projection in the future of the Hegelian moral positivism made Marxian relativism dogmatic while the ethical relativism of utilitarian was rational. Hegelian doctrine held that 'that present might is right'. Marx projecting the Hegelian doctrine into future declared that 'coming might to be also right'. This influence of Hegel according to Roy, Marx broke away from his original moral Radicalism, which was the strongest appeal of the philosophy of revolution.²⁷ So he criticized Marx as, "Karl Marx may have put Hegel on his feet but has certainly placed

himself on the head".²⁸

Roy rejected Marxism on the ground that what Marx had written a hundred years ago, was not applicable today. However, Roy called himself a spiritual descendant of Marx.²⁹ He agreed that Marx was a passionate Humanist and with a burning faith in revolution, he was a romanticist. As a romanticist, "he proclaimed his faith in the creativeness of man, which according to the process of social evolution, brought about revolutions. Marx, being a Humanist, the force of his theory of revolution was its powerful moral appeal".³⁰ So, Roy accepted Marxism as a Humanistic Philosophy. But, the dogmatic rigidity of Marx was missing in Roy. Roy thought that his philosophy is the result of his critical approaches towards Marxism, which is free from orthodoxy. In spite of his regards to communism and materialism, Roy was inclined to believe in certain spiritual values in a limited sense. Here he comes closer to Buddha than to Marx. Roy said, "A philosophy, to be guide for all forms of human action, must have some ethics, some morals, which must recognize certain things as permanent and abiding in humanity. And only a group of human being--be it a political party or any other kind of organization--primarily moved by these abiding (and I should say even permanent, as permanent as humanity itself) values, can claim to be the maker of the future".³¹ He said that there are certain values, certain principles, which transcend time and space otherwise we shall have to lose faith in the progress of humanity. His acceptance of this abiding permanent principle and values is perhaps due to the impact of tradition and culture of Indian Philosophy on him. Roy said that none can run away from his shadow. Present is the

result of our past. In this point Roy comes closure to Buddha's doctrine of dependent origination i.e. every origination depends on some cause. As a believer of freethinking, his Radical Humanism is the outcome of his critical attitude towards Marxism.

Marx and Roy both are humanistic philosophers, yet their methods of working and their interpretation of human development are different from one another. As a humanist philosopher, man is the centre of their philosophy. For Marx 'man is the root of mankind' but Roy believes Protagoras dictum 'Man is the measure of everything'. Roy gives much importance on individual freedom, which is not possible in Marxian way. Marx approaches man as a part of society, so man should sacrifice his freedom for the shake of society. Again, for social development Roy gives importance on morality but Marx on economic equality. According to Roy moral man can constitute moral society. For the equation, Marx prefers the classless society in which all people have equal right and wealth. For Roy also, class is essential for the progress of society, but he gives much importance on middle class. He believes that the middle class attain a great height in intellectual and political considerations. Even to him the decay of capitalism economically ruins the middle class, so they try to bring a new social order. Roy's way of revolution for social change is different from Marxism. He attaches more importance on philosophical revolution than any other revolution for social progress.

It is very difficult to compare Roy with the prominent people of his period, because the circumstances in which he worked and the fields that he covered are so unique that no comparison is

likely to be meaningful. Thus as a lifelong revolutionary and a thinker of great originality, Roy makes a position of his own in the international field. Roy's attitude towards all was very critical. He accepted nothing without scrutinizing it. Perhaps, that is why, he critically analyzed all the personalities he met. He writes about 21 such personalities including Trotsky, Mao-Tse-Tung of China, Tito of Yugoslavia, Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, and also Gandhi. In his writings it is found that as a Radical Humanist, he had a liberal attitude to all the personalities.

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The Concept of Bhakti with Special Reference to Śaṅkaradeva

Sumitra Choudhury

Abstract

The term 'Bhakti' is explained in various ways by different thinkers. Bhakti is derived from the root 'Bhaj' which means to serve. Service is a special form of bhakti. It is employed in the Vedic texts in various forms. In classical Sanskrit literature, it came to mean increasingly to participate in something by some one through affection. Śaṅkaradeva considers devotion to be the best way to reach the spiritual goal. The true religious attitude towards personal God and the very foundation of the realization of man's relationship with Him is the very essence of bhakti.

Keywords : Devotion, Eke Śaraṅa Nāma Dharma, Agape

Devotion is a very common phenomenon in most of the religious traditions. It is often mediative, emotionally disciplined and subdued surrender. It consists primarily of directing one's attention to the object of devotion. In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, Krishna teaches Arjuna to centre himself mentally in God in all his actions in order to make his entire life as an act of devotion. There is a

similar emphasis in most theistic traditions in which the devotee is taught to be attentive to God.

Bhakti is defined in various ways by its different exponents. The derivation of the word Bhakti has its root in the verb 'Bhaj' which means 'to serve'. Service is a special form of bhakti. This method of service distinguishes bhakti from other cultures. It implies true partnership and mutual relationship between God and devotee. The root 'Bhaj' from which 'bhakti' is derived is found employed in the Vedic texts in various forms. The meanings of which are: to distribute, allot or apportion, to furnish, to supply or bestow, to share with, to partake of or enjoy to set about, to resort, but never in the sense of 'to love or adore'. In the Ṛg Veda (1:175.5) the words 'bhakta' and 'abhakta' occur, and Agni is said to have discriminated between the two categories in meeting out favours; but Sayana takes the words as referring to sevamāna or asevamana worshipping and non-worshipping yajamanas. The word Bhakti in Vedic literature meant distribution, partition, separation or a share, and in the Nirukta, in the Ṛg Veda prāṭisakhya, it gives the sense of succession, order or series or an attribute.¹ The words bhakti, bhakta and Bhāgavat are all cognate terms obtained from the root 'Bhaj'.

From the etymological and semantic analyses of the term bhakti, it appears that the root 'Bhaj' means to participate and to share. When it is used in respect to people it implies a certain communion of mind and heart, and in this sense bhakti denotes a personal relationship. The semantics of bhakti and bhaj are Bhakto, loyal or devoted. In classical Sanskrit texts, it came to mean to participate in something by some one through affection.

When devotion is expressed in terms of a love relationship, the Deity is usually cast in a very approachable role and is described as reciprocating the devotee's love with passionate love. Throughout the theistic devotion, the deities assume the roles of loving parents, intimate friends, lovers in response to the devotees own devotional role. The new Testament describes God as a loving Father.

The concept of love might be reduced to three broad categories, namely- the emotional, moral, spiritual qualities of experience:

1. Carnal love arises out of the erotic desire to enjoy or (possess or otherwise) possess an object of beauty or virtue for one's own pleasure or gratification.
2. Friendly love or affection.
3. Divine love manifested as self giving grace and represented as *agape*.

The 'New Testament' uses the term *agape* for divine love. It uses this same term for man's love for man and man's love for God. *Agape* unites the lover and the beloved because of the image of fulfillment which God has for both. *Agape* is the Nirguna bhakti or unqualified devotion preached by Śaṅkaradeva, the Vaiṣṇava saint of Assam. Śaṅkaradeva describes bhakti as a 'rasa' which can be realised only by spiritualising the actual domestic and social relations. The concept of *dasya bhakti* is discerned in the section of people whose occupation is mostly agriculture.

Jesus Christ is the central point of 'New Testament'. In the 'Old Testament' God reveals Himself as just and terrifying, but

in the 'New Testament' as good and loving. St. Paul says that it is this God who has shone in our hearts and has light of knowledge and the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ can do nothing by himself. He is appointed to do his Father's work, and to be His spokesman. One who loves deeply has an insight of the true nature of God as Father. According to the Christians, God Himself suffers in order to redeem human beings from misery.

Jesus Christ as the Son and Holy spirit is the power which dwells in our heart. This problem clearly explains the Son's distinction from the Father without destroying the unity of God. No doubt, Hegel conceives the Trinitarian notion in relation to the revelation which is actualised in Jesus Christ.

The Christian love also rests on three facts:

1. God has sent His only Son, the Son of love.
2. God has bestowed His Divine love upon individuals.
3. With the gift of Holy Spirit, God's love is shed broadly in our hearts as the truth of the Spirit and such a kind of divine love is not ignored in the Upanishads.

The spiritual thought of Saṅkaradeva's "*Kirtana Ghasā*", represents the love of man for God and love of God for man. The Bhakti is the way of love and devotion. It teaches that the final aim of all religions can be reached through love. Love is the creative force. The devotee's love for Kṛṣṇa represents the finite individual's eternal love for the Supreme Divine being. Christianity and Vaisnavism are intensely humanistic. The divinity of man is stressed by Jesus and by Vaisnava Saints. According to Ritchell,

the Fatherhood of God and His love manifested in Christ implies a corresponding doctrine of God. A growing tendency has been discernible to adopt a humanitarian doctrine of Christ with its co-relative unitarian doctrine of God.

In Jesus Christ, the love of God is first manifested in its fullest capacity. Goodness and love are generally treated as two attributes of God. In the 'New Testament', God's goodness, love and grace are all virtually synonyms. Love is an ontological concept. Its emotional element is a consequence of its ontological nature. Hence, it is one sided to define love by its emotional aspect. Love is absent where there is no individualization and love can be fully realized only where there is full individualization in man. In order to understand what the 'New Testament' means by the love of God, it is necessary to first distinguish the two kinds of love signified by two Greek words 'Eros' and 'Agape'. Eros is desiring love, that which is evoked by the desirable qualities of the beloved. This love is evoked by and depends upon the lovableness of the objects. When the 'New Testament' speaks of God's love for mankind, it employs a different terms 'agape'. Unlike Eros, agape is unconditional and universal in its range. It is given to someone not because s/he has special characteristics but simply because that person is there as a person. The nature of agape is to value a person in such a way as to actively seek her/his welfare and fulfillment. All the love except agape consists of dependent or contingent characteristics which change and are partial. But agape unites the lover and the beloved because of the image of fulfillment which God contains in both.

The ethical precepts of Jesus like 'Love Your Enemies' are

also taught by the Upanishads, Buddha and Saṅkaradeva. The four Noble truths of Buddha inherently include love and compassion towards fellow human beings. "To love thy neighbour as thyself" is inherent in the Vedic formula of union with the Absolute Self. As K. Bahner says, the love of neighbour is the primary act of love of God. The Upanishads declare that man is 'potentially divine', so we can worship God by serving our neighbours.

Saṅkaradeva considers devotion to be the best way to reach the spiritual goal. It is the best, because it is the easiest. It can be practiced by any one; by the monk as well as by the peasant. Human beings have an inner longing to love God. In the light of love, Jesus realised his unity with the supreme. It is possible to establish a connection between Vaisnavism of Saṅkaradeva and Christianity so far as the concept of love is concerned. Love is promoted both by Jesus Christ and Saṅkaradeva. In such love - desire, ambition, love of power and thought of 'I' are transcended.

The Bhakti doctrine of Saṅkaradeva is also characterised by a profound sense of self abasement. The devotee is aware of his sinfulness and implores God's forgiveness and mercy. The devotees regrets for not responding more generously to the tremendous love of God. Union with God is, what is called liberation, in which the devotee places himself as an eternal servant of his Deity of love.

Saṅkaradeva was careful to develop Bhakti doctrine in a social and puritan way and taking up the *dasya* bhakti which was free from tantric influences. He was extra careful in his bhakti theology which attempted to attract the masses to a path of *niskama* bhakti to the Supreme Deity. He did away with the

worship of images, the elaborate rituals and sacrifices and the esoteric rites practised by the Śāktas. He introduced simple ceremonies consisting of Nāma or recitation of hymns and prayers. His notion of devotion was based on an implicit faith which combined two elements- Guru or teacher and Hari or Viṣṇu.

In the period of Feudalism and priesthood, Śaṅkaradeva kept open the door of bhakti religion to all. He tried to attract people who were victims of the various evils and sufferings of the society, so that those down-trodden people could get some kind of relief or mental peace. At that time it was a difficult task and Śaṅkaradeva had to face many hardship, but he was not defeated. His Bhāgavati Vaiṣṇava movement was a kind of revolution against the injustices and malpractices of certain classes of people. He was a revolutionary prophet, but his silent revolution was based on logic. So we can term his Bhakti movement as a social reformation too. Śaṅkaradeva, through his Bhakti-Dharma, hearing and chanting of God's name ends by the congregation of devotees and has given solace to the tormented hearts of the people. The religion of love and devotion preached by Śaṅkaradeva was not a new religion. It was embedded in the 'Bhāgavata Purāna', the 'Gītā' and some other Vaiṣṇavite works like 'Nārada Bhakti Sūtra' and 'Sundilya Bhakti Sūtra'.

Śaṅkaradeva derives inspiration from the 'Bhāgavata Purāna' for his Eka Śaraṇa Nāma Dharma. He also creatively assimilates the ekānta bhakti culture of Pancarātra Bhāgavata tradition with the monotheism of the Gītā.

Vaiṣṇavism which was preached by Śaṅkaradeva is known as the Eka Śaraṇa Nāma Dharma or the Mahapurusaia Dharma.

As the name implies, the Eka Śaraṇa Nāma Dharma is a religion of supreme surrender to one Supreme Deity Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa who is also known as Hari and Vasudeva. Śaṅkaradeva was against the blood sacrifices of the Tāntics. Not to injure any one by thought, word or deed is regarded by him as the basic law of ethical life. The path of non-violence is said to give more religious merit than performance of sacrifice, ascetic practises etc. He rebelled against such practices and was determined to protect and restore Hinduism.

The true religious attitude towards personal God and the very foundation of the realization of man's relationship with Him is the very essence of bhakti. Bhakti is the disinterested performance of all deeds and complete surrender to God. The widespread bhakti movement is a corollary of the Vaiṣṇava ideal of a loving personal God, which is the highest goal of salvation. Complete self-surrender (prapatti) came to be distinguished from bhakti as a superior means of spiritual realization. One of the chief purposes of the 'Bhāgavata puṛāṇa is the glorification of an intensely personal and passionate bhakti that gradually develops into a decidedly erotic mysticism, independent of all alternative means of salvation. According to this text, there are nine types of bhakti which have been endorsed by Śaṅkaradeva. In the Kīrtana Ghoṣā, Prahlaḍa explains bhakti as Śravana (listening), Kīrtana (chanting) Smarana, Archana, Padasevan, Dāsyā (servant of God), Sākhyā, Bandana and Deha arpana. These nine kinds of bhakti are to be performed and this is the best teaching or uttama patha. 'Śravana' is listening to the glories of God. 'Kīrtana' is the uttering of the names and glories of God. 'Smarana' means

remembering the glories of God. To worship or adore God or his idols is called 'Padasevana'. To offer water and flower etc. to God is 'Arcana', 'Bandana' is praising in veneration to God. 'Dasya' is to feel oneself as the servant of the Lord. To trust God as friend in 'Sakhya' and to dedicate the body in the name of God is 'Dehārpana' or 'Atma-nivedana'. Of all these, Śravana and Kīrtana are given more importance and Śaṅkaradeva at times says that these two are the key notes of bhakti.

In his Assamese Vaiṣṇava scriptures, Śaṅkaradeva, without denying the Nirguṇa or the indeterminate aspect of God, has laid more stress on the Saguṇa aspect. For the purpose of devotion, the personal aspect of God has been specially extolled. In short, attributeless God has become attributive in Śaṅkaradeva's hands. Śaṅkaradeva, in his celebrated work 'Kīrtana Ghōṣā' describes the two fold aspects of God. He says that since an indeterminate God is not comprehensible, so devotees worship His beatific form in the person of Nārāyaṇa. In 'Nimi Nava Siddha Samvāda'. Śaṅkaradeva says that the original, unmanifested, and undifferentiated Reality is Brahman and when Brahman for the purpose of worship is manifested, He is known as Nārāyaṇa or Vasudeva.

An impersonal God can never evoke our religious sentiments. At the bottom of all religious sentiments there lies the great feeling of oneness and solidarity with Him. We are His and He is ours. We know none but Him. We must cling to Him and Him alone. He is to lead us to happiness and glory.

Śaṅkaradeva says that such a Supreme Personal God can only fulfill our spiritual communion with a personal God. Bhakti

is the only means of realising the Supreme God and the Vaiṣṇava śāstra has attached great importance to it.

In the *dāsyā rasa*, there is a feeling of personal attachment. Here the relationship between God and the devotee is that of a master and servant. Hence, the respectful distance between the two is always present in the mind of the individual in this relation with God. One of the most common metaphors used in theistic devotion is that of love relationship; that of the devotee or that of a servant for his master. Śaṅkaradeva and his followers looked upon God with the attitude of a faithful and loving servant. Taking into account the relation between Jīva and Īsvara is that between creator and the created. The limitations under which the Jīva operates under the invisible control of the Lord, Śaṅkaradeva was of the opinion that *dāsyā bhāva* is the proper attitude of the devotee towards his Master. It is also the proper method with which God should be approached. He has expressed his relation by describing himself as the servant of Kṛṣṇa. In one of his verses, he says that 'I have become a slave, of thy slave, Oh Lord, Oh Madhava do not forsake thy slave'.

Śaṅkaradeva propounded the Vaiṣṇava culture in the form of *Eka Śaraṇa Nāma Dharma*. His basic teachings centre round the four basic Realities - *Carivastu*, *Deva*, *Guru*, *Nāma* and *Bhakti*. The process of initiation (*Saraṇa lōa*) is the commitment on the bhakta's part to enter into the bhakti path, to interpret life as a theist. One needs spiritual illumination which a Guru provides and the means to reach the goal is *nāma* (chanting the name). It will be helpful to understand how Śaṅkaradeva reinterpreted some of the basic concepts of the *Bhāgavata purāṇa* to safeguard the

superiority of the path of Bhakti.

The spirit of Eka Śaraṇa Nāma Dharma of Śaṅkaradeva reminds us of Christianity's emphasis on service to man and service to God.

Śaṅkaradeva in his '*Bhakti Ratnākara*' (chapter on Vairāgya) deals with four kinds of Vairāgya - viz., (i) Indifference to wealth or property, (ii) Indifference to palatable food and drink, (iii) Indifference towards all the objects of pleasure and enjoyment. (iv) Indifference to all these both mentally and physically. This Vairāgya or indifference is said to be the result of bhakti.

In this '*Nimi Nava Siddha Samvada*' Śaṅkaradeva gives an account of the different kinds of devotees or bhaktas which throw further light on the nature of bhakti. He also makes a distinction between Saguna and Nirguna Bhakti. Saguna bhakti is of three kinds, namely - (i) Sāttvika, (ii) Rājasika and (iii) Tāmasika. Each again is divided into prakṛta, madhyama, and uttama. However, this should not be confused with the nine characteristics of bhakti. He who does not pay respect to living beings and does not adore the bhaktas or the devoted souls, but worship the Lord through idol or image (eka pratimaya matra aradhe Hatika) is known as prakṛta bhakta. He who reveres the bhaktas or devotees, is kind to the innocent and also worship God with love and devotion, is a madhyama bhakti.² The uttama bhakta or Mahābhāgavata is he who sees all living beings in God and God in all living beings and treats this universe as a manifestation of the Lord.³

Śaṅkaradeva's Eka Śaraṇa Nāma Dharma in Assam centred all its attention to this basic concept of bhakti and so a distinction

was made between the two aspects of magic and religion. The attention of the people was drawn to a pure and disinterested love, a suddha bhakti for the Supreme Deity.

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Vivekananda: Prophet of Rediscovering Vedanta

Sucharita Dey

Abstract

Swami Vivekananda a Prophet of Rediscovering Vedanta believes in the unity of the ultimate Reality, its identity with the self and immediate awareness as the only means for one's spiritual awakening. A practical Vedantin, who redefines the priorities and draws a line of action based on the wisdom that 'Jiva is Siva'. And as such reverses the pyramid of Advaita teaching - base on top and apex standing on the ground, he asked every individual to focus on the base accepting the truth of the apex. This is the originality of Vivekananda's philosophy. Herein lies the essence of this paper. In making Vedanta practical, he profoundly made his philosophy positivistic, practically this worldly and socially responsible while making a universal appeal with applicability that practical Vedanta is the essence of all religions and has the potentiality of becoming universal religion.

Keywords : Renaissance, Vedanta, Humanity

"The time is ripe. The faith of the Rishis must become dynamic. It must come out of itself". – Vivekananda

Swami Vivekananda was amongst many other committed personalities who contributed for Renaissance, in the nineteenth century India. The Swami is known to the common people for his missionary life which had its global effect from the Chicago Address. This Address was held in 1893 at the 'Permanent Memorial Art Palace', presently known as the 'Art Institute of Chicago'. But as an Advaitin and Prophet of Rediscovering Vedanta, Vivekananda believes in the unity of the ultimate Reality, its identity with the self and immediate awareness as the only means for spiritual awakening. He beholds that there is partial dimension of truth which can be explored in and through the discoveries of science, philosophy, morality etc. These dimensions of human understanding of Nature are not adequate henceforth insufficient in knowing the transcendent Truth (Reality). Herein Vedanta teaches that from the ultimate standpoint, this empirical world is only an appearance. The Reality is one and Brahman is manifested in this world of relativity citing the Upanisadic slogan: 'Tat tvam asi'. Tattva darsana is the key word for understanding the essence of Vedanta monism at the backdrop of which Vivekananda expounds his ideology of Rediscovering Indian culture, strength and wisdom. He has identified wisdom with the teachings of Vedanta and profoundly states that only immediate awareness can make us to reveal the existence of Brahman.

Immediate awareness of Brahman is possible only because of its nature of being pure or divine conscious. It can be realized by 'aparoksanubhuti'.

We find Vivekananda as a traditionalist. His importance lies in redefining the priorities and drawing a line of action based on the wisdom of Vedanta. The point is not that the Reality (Brahman) is and I am a manifestation of that divine consciousness i.e. 'I am that'. He states very emphatically that, the point is – unless we don't take into consideration and concentrate on 'me' 'us' 'the world' as an intact expression of Brahman itself, where can we search Him? The result of this immediate intact awareness of Brahman is -God is all around us in various forms, the search for Him can be an immediate awareness of existential 'Truth'. In redefining Vedanta philosophy Vivekananda stands as a prophet to the world audience in general and as monk who kindled the philosophy of humanism as 'Love and serve people is to serve God'. This is what we find as a direct influence of Sri Ramakrishna, the spiritual teacher into the life of young Narendranath Dutta. To be a little more precise, in reference to the emergence of Vivekananda as a mystical teacher then Naren, Vivekananda confirms that "he found 'the assurance he sought in the Saving Grace and Power of his Master', and 'his creed of the Universal Man and the absolute, and inalienable sovereignty of the Self, was the realization of his Master transmitted to him"¹.

The most credential philosophy of Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa (1836 to 1886) finds in many conversations and dialogues between him and Bengal revivalists like Vijay Chandra Goswami, Michael Madhusudan Dutta, Bankim Chandra

Chatterjee, Keshab Chandra Sen and many more devotees. In one of such conversation we find him as a mystic revivalist as well as a Vedanta Advaitin who reconciled theism with the absolute spiritualism at the base line of empirical reality. To put in his words as such: "Sometimes the Divine Mother would put me in such a state that my mind would descend from the Absolute to the phenomenal world. At other times it would rise from the phenomenal world to the Absolute".² This particular gospel depicted in Kathamrita reflects the revivalism of Hinduism from its core essential view of 'Tattvadarsana'. Moreover conversation between Sri Ramakrishna (Thakur) and the personalities of Brahmo Samaj seems to be an epoch making of blending the harmony between the Vedas and the Tantras.

Moreover, Sri Ramakrishna in ecstasy and vision of Divine form while engaged with a conversation between Rakhal, Prankrishna, Kedar and other Devotees, justifies that (in particular to Prankrishna): "Brahman and His Power are one and the same. If you don't believe in His Power, the world becomes illusory for you. I, you, hearth and home and the family-all of them become illusory. It is because of the Primordial Energy that the world stands firm. A frame can't be made without bamboo poles. You can't even make a beautiful image of Durga".³ Here the edifice of redefining Vedanta with a mystic's realization of So'ham, can be seen vividly. The intellect surrenders at the bottom line of mere ritualism. The spirit of culminating with theology along with the spirit of monism can be seen too. This is reawakening of Advaita Philosophy which never makes the world as illusionary rather the Primordial Energy makes all our actions, ritualism, cult, prayers

significantly this worldly. This is the phase of reawakening of Bengal Renaissance and Vivekananda steps in as a prophet to redefine Vedanta while redirecting practical Vedanta with a dictum: 'Jiva is Siva'

Prior meeting Sri Ramakrishna, Narendranath Dutta was a young man of fun and frolic, ruthlessly energized with multiple gifted personalities and an iron will force stumbled with certain skeptical intellectual queries. The struggle vividly started in the involvement of intellectual activity when Naren read J.S.Mill's 'Essay on Religion' which has upset his belief in Hindu theism. Of course later on partially recovered himself only after reading Shelley's 'pantheism of impersonal love' and his 'vision of a glorified millennial humanity' wherein he could indistinctly perceived the spiritual unity. The conception of 'Para Brahman as the Universal Reason', as conveyed by Dr. Seal, the then mentor of young Naren as "The Universal Reason was all in all" created more confusion in the realm of ethics, social and political creeds because this theory of Universal Reason delimits individual as the principle of morals and consequently all individual feelings appear as a pathological cases.⁴ To quote Santi L. Mukherji: "This revolutionary and impersonal rationalism of Seal's conception came to satisfy Narendranath's intellect but it brought him no peace... When he attempted this 'the struggle took a serious ethical turn', the fascinations of the sense and cravings of nature appearing to him as impure, gross and carnal. This was the hour of darkest trial for him".⁵ But in one of the lectures of Wright on Wordsworth's Estacy, he found the clue of visiting Dakshineswar and meet Ramakrishna but of course in a sceptic spirit. But latter

Vivekananda confessed that 'with an authority as none had done before, and by his Shakti brought peace into his soul and healed the wounds of his spirits'.⁶ Here we find Vivekananda in fact 'Sri Ramakrishna's Peter or Ananda or Nityananda-he was almost entirely of Sri Ramakrishna's making, and the conjunction of the two personalities was a divinely ordained phenomenon'.⁷ Biographers comment that: "To Sri Ramakrishnan Narendra Nath played this complementary part".⁸

This particular observation of the biographers, becomes so relevant at the Parliament of Chicago, when out of all odds Vivekananda stands before the world audience in 1883 and starts the speech with an introduction: "Sisters and brothers of America", and the applause continued for few minutes. This designated cult of love which Hinduism beholds from time immemorial emphasized catholicity and he felt it as the supreme need of the time. The Hindu Monk turned to be the most illuminating personality, friend, guide a philosopher and a prophet to reawaken Vedanta and thus preached the essence of Hinduism. From the platform of the Parliament of Religions he declared: "Unity in variety is the plan of nature, and the Hindu has recognized it".⁹

Vivekananda has justified that religion is the feeling of Reality because religion cannot be justified by mere principles created by human intellect rather religion allows spiritual discovery. In such spiritual discovery religion touches the whole individuality since spirituality is the expression of human soul conscious existence. This soul conscious awareness is the eternal existence of 'Sat-Chit-Ananda'(Truth-Consciousness-Force-Bliss).

Henceforth Vivekananda reminds us that we are all moving towards perfection, some are moving consciously while others are moving unconsciously. Religion as an expression and experience of Truth can never be a vain speculation of Truth but it can be a bewildering study of certain facts which may be of lesser significance in the expression of that Truth (Om or Aum). The differences we find in the expressions of that Divine Reality is only at the level of degree of perfection in terms of human language and not in the nature of its Divine Existence of Pure Consciousness. It sometimes refers to patriotism to call someone's religion to be the best and in the opinion of Vivekananda patriotism on its own is always partial and never allows universal feelings for others. To bring back Hinduism to its glory of past he tried to free Hindu religion from Brahmanical cult, lofty metaphysical wonders of human life, theologies and logic. Vedanta teaches that, 'Divine Truth' is the expression of every soul right from amoeba (unicellular organism) to human being (multicellular organism). Religion which is the highest expression of that Truth can touch human conscience only when the reality in all existence will become the object of worship. To quote him therefore: "One word of truth can never be lost. It may be covered with the rubbish but it is sure to be uncovered sooner or later. Truth, virtue and purity are all indestructible".¹⁰ The Vedas being the authority of Hinduism which is more a philosophy than religion and moreover Hinduism which is never made but grown in courses of time immemorial, teaches in strength and fearlessness i.e. 'ahambrahmasmi', so Vedas are eternal. In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad the meaning of 'ahambrahmasmi' is stated as: atha (adhuna) aham (brahmasmi); Whoever knows thus 'I am Brahman,'

becomes this all.

At this backdrop, recalling the theme of Vedanta philosophy as: "Thou art one with this Universal Being", Vivekananda observes that every other soul and body is just identical with the spirituality of soul existence. Hence in hurting anyone, we hurt ourselves, in loving anyone, we love us. As soon as a current of hatred is thrown outside, whom so ever else it hurts, it hurts me or mine. If love comes out from anyone individual, it is bound to come back to the individual. (This refers to the law of causation: As you sow so shall you reap, thus every action has its equal and opposite reaction). The remedy then, the clear-eye Swami saw that renunciation and service become the twin ideals of India. It is at Kanyakumari, the zeal of the mission of being 'a patriot and a prophet in one', flashed so thoroughly that in the letter of March 19, 1894 Vivekananda writes to Ramakrishnanda from Chicago, "Did not our Master use to say, 'An empty stomach is no good for religion'?..."¹¹ Even direct experience of Brahman in the Nirvikalpa Samadhi for him, has become delusion. What is needed is only training in the practical things of life which will reconcile excessive spirituality of the East with the material progress of the West. With this principle he tried to revolutionize the Indian society along with the European.

Vivekananda thus emphasized for physical capacities, as it is the best instrument for the observances of any religious austerities to be followed on. The self has to be realized like a fruit on the palms of one's hand. Here lies the fundamental point of his deviation from classical Vedanta. His comprehensive acknowledgement of every realm of human existence gives the

final stroke to make the monistic trend of the Advaita Vedanta as a means to realize the end of religious pursuit of truth. So he proclaims that religion is a vision and inspiration of the reality. Religion for him is Vedanta. All throughout his life, though a short one, tried to establish that it is 'Vedanta Religion' which is a symposium of all faiths of the world. The solutions of all problems, whether national, international or universal lie in the awakening of human values which already exist in mankind. His remarkable 'Universalism in Religion' can only withstand all the predicaments of sectarian or theological religious expressions of God. Freedom while living, which allows self-abnegation can only awaken the lost individuality that lies inherent as eternal spirituality. Thus the clarion call made by the Prophet to reawaken the lost individuality of the Indian mass, "...Be strong, get beyond all superstitions and be free".¹²

So we can recollect his opinion that education is man-making. The tone of Universalism which is synonymous to Spiritualism, is so prolific in Vivekananda's awareness, gets revealed in his words as : "Above all, be strong, be manly! I have a respect even for one who is wicked, so long as he is manly and strong; for his strength will make him some day give up his wickedness, or even give up all work for selfish ends, and will then eventually bring him into the Truth".¹³ Nihilananda too opines in this context that all aspects of life to be perceived clearly and distinctly through religious interpretation in 'Advaita Practical Philosophy' of Vivekananda. It can be referred here that Vivekananda has justified in redefining the Christian theology of man, being the highest creation of God who can establish the kingdom of heaven

in this earth only through unconditional service to the humblest of all species. This view is just akin to the view of Lokasamgraha of the Philosophy of Gita. To quote Vivekananda thus: "All men are sons of the same God. He who wishes to serve must serve man in the first instance, man in the humblest, poorest, most degraded form. Only by breaking down the barriers between man and man one can establish the kingdom of heaven on earth".¹⁴ We find him to be a committed Advaitin and not an arm chair idealist. Tapas Chandra Sankar Dutta very aptly remarks that Vivekananda's application of universalism is the cornerstone of his practical life. To put in his words: "Swamiji not only felt and talked of universalism he applied the doctrine of universalism, in practice as well. The flow of his spontaneous love did not stand in the way of his belonging to religion".¹⁵

A vibrant humanist par excellence, Vivekananda, harmonizes monism of Upanisadic teaching with the living realities and constraints of life. It is in such harmonization, choice less decision of living in unity follows on meaningfully. Unity-in-existence is the essence of humanism. Vivekananda accentuates the fundamental components of humanism. He is therefore a pathfinder to open the avenues of humanism in modern context to life and its living experiences of individuals in terms of society, science, education, religion, spirituality, mysticism, aesthetics and peace.

Thus being the 'Prophet of Harmony and Synthesis,' Vivekananda has visualized that in order to make modern technology and scientific discoveries more human oriented, spirituality and religion has to be integrated with science and

technology. As such philosophy too has to shake hands with physics. He always agreed that science and Advaita Vedanta point to the most fundamental principle of knowledge. Science is concerned with the objective truth while Advaita Vedanta represents the total subjective truth of existence. The goal of these two approaches is to discover 'that unity which admits in itself all varieties in Nature. The Atman is the potency of the universe that reconciles with the unthinkable, invisible whole potency 'Atom' of the physicist. From this stand-point Vedanta and modern science are not antagonistic to each other. This actually discards nothing but increases the quality of everything. His words are worth recalling when he speaks in the World Parliament of Religion, Chicago (1893) about the final goal of physics. Vivekananda puts in his paper that: 'Science is nothing but the finding of unity. As soon as science would reach perfect unity, it would stop from further progress, because it would reach the goal. Thus chemistry could not progress farther when it would discover one element out of which all other could be made. Physics would stop when it would able to fulfill its service in discovering the energy of which all others are but manifestations'.¹⁶

This interpretation puts science and religion on a secure pedestal since it is modern science that has strengthened the position of religion rather than weakening it. Religion thus becomes synonymous with Universalism of spirit. He practiced that religion which is for mankind. Man symbolizes divinity because he has seen the 'Divine Self of Man'. 'Divinity of Man' and 'Essential Spirituality' are the two fundamental key words for Vivekananda's 'Universal Religion'. To evolve a consistent

Universal Religion, his elation call in the Parliament of Religion was: "Help and not Fight", "Assimilation and not Destruction", "Harmony and Peace and not Dissension".¹⁷ This reminds the watch word of Vivekananda's spirit of reawakening Vedanta: "Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached. Arise, awake! Awake from this hypnotism of weakness. None is really weak: the soul is infinite, omnipotent and omniscient".¹⁸

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The Concept of Free Action and Freedom of Will in A. I. Melden's Philosophy

Manashi Bora

ABSTRACT

The concept of action is an important philosophical concept of a particular area of philosophy known as the philosophy of mind. The concept of action implies a particular type of human behaviour. Abraham Irving Melden discussed about the problems of philosophy of mind and basically the problem of philosophy of action in detail. He was led to this enquiry due to the general view that a science of human conduct is possible and what any man may do in the most serious, sensible and careful way can be understood and explained. These points had instigated Melden to cast doubt upon the view that human actions are free. His concept of action was mixed with his notion of freedom of will. According to him, until and unless the action of an agent is said to be free, it cannot be called to be an action. The concept of free action and the freedom of will are related with one another in Melden's philosophy.

Keywords: Action, Responsibility, Free action, Free will, Context and circumstances.

Abraham Irving Melden was a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He taught at the University of Washington at Seattle from 1938 to 1964. He then moved to the University of California.

Melden impressed the readers of philosophy with a series of his effective articles in moral philosophy like '*Why be moral?*', '*Two Comments on Utilitarianism*', '*The Concept of Universal Human Rights*', '*The Obligation to keep a Promise*' etc. He continued his enquiry on human rights in a series of books like '*Rights and Right conduct*', '*Human Rights*', '*Rights and Persons*' etc. A. I. Melden in his book '*Free Action*' first published in 1961, maintained that it is possible to have a science of human conduct. According to Melden, it is also possible to have an understanding and explanation of what a man may do even in moments of the most sober and careful reflection. This has inspired many philosophers to cast doubt upon the common view that any kind of human action can ever be said to be truly free. Melden's book entitled '*Free Action*' looked into crucially important issues that are often ignored in the familiar arguments for and against the possibility of free action. Hence, Melden's book has brought these issues to light and examined them in some details.

What is Philosophy of Action?

The concept of action is an important philosophical concept of a particular area of philosophy known as the philosophy of

mind. The concept of action and the philosophy of mind are interrelated in the sense that the concept of action makes clear the views regarding different theories of mind. Not only so, the extent to which the concept of action is intertwined with other areas of philosophy is very wide because philosophers have come to realize that one cannot go very far in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, or to any other fields of philosophy without confronting the crucial problems in the analysis of action. The concept of action is one among those interesting topics that attracts philosophers as well as commoners. The concept of action implies a particular type of human behaviour. For such kinds of human behaviour, there has been a considerable interest among philosophers for providing a satisfactory analysis of it. The concept of action occupies a significant place in contemporary philosophical thinking. The word 'action' refers to what a person has done. It is different from those events that merely happen to people.

There are certain important philosophical questions that can be raised so far as the concept of action is concerned. These questions are like: What is it to act? What is the difference between an action and an event or a happening? What is the nature of connection between an action and a will or a desire? Is it logical, reasonable or causal? Will any type of explanation be satisfactory to explain the concept of action like causal, reason and any other? Does the concept of action imply morality or is there any moral or ethical value in performing an action? And so on and so forth.

Melden discussed about the problems of philosophy of mind and basically the problem of philosophy of action in detail.

His main point of enquiry in philosophy of action was whether human actions are free or not? And if it is, then how is it possible? He was led to this enquiry due to the general view that a science of human conduct is possible and what any man may do in the most serious, sensible and careful way can be understood and explained. These points had instigated Melden to cast doubt upon the view that human actions are free. His concept of action was mixed with his notion of freedom of will. According to him, until and unless the action of an agent is said to be free, it cannot be called to be an action. Thus, the concept of free action and the freedom of will are related with one another in Melden's philosophy.

A.I. Melden's Concepts of Free Action and Freedom of Will

A.I. Melden talked about the theory of free action that centres round the concept of freedom of will. A free action is that kind of action or behaviour which comes out of free will and only such type of actions which are always subject to accountability, responsibility and to any moral criticism. According to Melden, free actions are performed only by normal and mature human beings and not by any infants, wild beasts and lunatics as the latter's actions and behaviours are not subject to any kind of moral criticism. So, Melden maintains that, "moral terms like 'right' and 'wrong' are appropriately applied only to the actions of normal and relatively mature human beings."¹

According to Melden, no human action can be judged until and unless the action is free and no kind of action is free unless the doer of the action has the chance of doing the action

otherwise. In the words of Melden, "No man can be accountable for anything he does unless what he does is free, and no man's action is free unless he could have done otherwise."² In this context, Melden has stressed upon the use of the phrase 'could have done otherwise'. According to Melden, a bodily movement can be an example of action if the agent has the chance to perform his action otherwise. The agent could have done otherwise his action if he had chosen to do and he 'could have chosen' to do it provided he has a choice i.e., it is freely chosen by the agent and only in such situations he could have chosen. By virtue of such phrases 'could have done otherwise', 'could have chosen otherwise' etc., the actions of an agent can be judged as free and responsible. Melden is of the view that no man's action can be said to be free unless he could have done otherwise. It is so because the question of responsibility comes only after it has been established that the act performed by an agent is free. If the agent acts out of his freewill then he can be said to have acted voluntarily and if one's action is voluntary then it logically implies that the agent is responsible for his action. But if the action of an agent is involuntary or if he has acted out of some pressure or compulsion then his actions cannot be said to be free. Hence, no kind of question of responsibility be assigned to such case. Therefore, the concept of free action is always related to the phrase 'could have done otherwise'. For justifying this point, he had given examples of some cases and circumstances where a person is compelled and causally necessitated to perform certain acts as he does. In other words, he had given examples of some cases which would prove that human actions are always free.

One example of such cases is where a person was made responsible for killing a pedestrian because he has chosen himself to drink and drive the car. There was no constraint or compulsion which forced him to act in that way. So, the person is both morally as well as legally accountable for his act. Here, given the circumstances and situations then present, what did happen, had to happen necessarily. No one has compelled the person to drive the car even after he felt somewhat tipsy. The person has a chance not to choose to take the drink and thereby not to do the things he had already done. This means that the person has a chance for doing or acting otherwise. He has the freedom to do the action otherwise. Hence, the person is fully responsible for running into the car and killing the pedestrian. In this case, his action is said to be voluntary in the sense that what he has done already, is his own fault. He has chosen to take the drink by himself and also choose to drive the car in that situation by himself. There was no compulsion or exertion of force upon him in such circumstances. Hence, what he has done or what has happened is something that has happened because of his free choice and in this sense, his action is said to be voluntary.

Gilbert Ryle's Arguments for Voluntary and Involuntary Action

This view of Melden is similar to the views of Gilbert Ryle when Ryle maintains that the question of voluntary or involuntary only comes whenever what has been done by a person turns out to be his or her fault. "We discuss whether someone's action was voluntary or not only when the action seems to have been his fault. He is accused of making a noise, and the guilt is his, if the

action was voluntary, like laughing; he has successfully excused himself, if he satisfies us that it was involuntary, like a sneeze."³ According to Ryle, the terms like 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are used as adjectives to those actions which ought not to be done. Moreover, the question of responsibility can be raised ordinarily when someone is blamed with an offence, justly or unjustly. In this sense a boy can be charged while acting voluntarily or involuntarily and also become responsible for his action when he has broken a window which he could have not broken it and therefore it is his fault. But this question of responsibility and question of voluntary and involuntary do not arise when a boy got a long-division sum right as it was not his fault. Also, if he gets it wrong, he may show that it was not his fault because perhaps he has not been shown how to solve such sums till then.

Sneezing is said to be involuntary in ordinary sense because a person cannot control it or in Ryle's words, 'the person could not help doing it.' From this point of view, then, a laugh can be said to be voluntary as the person can control it or he could help doing it. In this sense, the boy can get his sum right by learning to do it which he actually got wrong and so his action can be said to be voluntary. Some such cases of voluntary actions which are agent's fault and for which they can be held responsible are like when a person knows how to behave, but he misbehaves with someone. However, philosophically the word 'voluntary' denotes correct, incorrect, admirable acts. When a person could have avoided committing a lapse or error or simply, it was his fault that he has committed, and then it indirectly means that this person knows how to do the right thing or he is efficient or competent

to do the right thing, yet he has not exercised his knowledge or competence. He has not tried enough. But whenever a person does a right thing, then it cannot be said that he knows how to do the wrong thing or in other words he was competent or efficient in making mistakes. Making mistakes is not an exercise of efficiency or competency. In fact, it is a failure to exercise knowing how.

A person can be ascribed to do some action competently or efficiently on the basis of the exercise of knowing how. If a person is competent or efficient enough in making or performing some action then whenever he fails to perform such action, it can be called to be his fault. For example, a boy ties a granny-knot instead of tying a reef-knot. The boy is competent and efficient enough to tie the reef-knot. Instead he has tied the granny-knot. This can be called to be his fault because he is competent and efficient in tying reef-knot. But out of his fault, he has tied the granny-knot. In order to establish that it was the fault of the boy who has tied granny-knot instead of reef-knot, first it is necessary to establish that the boy knows how to tie a reef-knot and also that the hand of the boy has not been forced by any external power or that there is no agency that has prevented him from tying the correct knot. That the fact that he can tie the correct-knot can be established by finding out that he has learnt practiced how to tie the reef-knot. That he can tie the correct knot is implied by the fact that he can detect mistakes and correct knots tied by others, by finding out that he is ashamed of what he has done and he can right himself without taking help from others. Moreover, the fact that the boy is not acting out of duress or in panic or high fever or with numb fingers can be described by observing that in

the above case where the boy has tied granny-knot instead of a reef-knot, no highly exceptional case has been taken place. Ryle says, "The lapse was his fault because, knowing how to tie the knot, he still did not tie it correctly."⁴

Ryle discussed about the involuntary cases of action where a person could not have avoided doing or getting it. Here, what the agent has done is not his fault. For example, a boy has arrived late for school. After enquiry it has come to light that he had left home at the usual time and had taken the usual bus. But the vehicle broke down and the journey was not completed. So, the boy ran as fast as he could reach his destination i.e., the school the rest of the way. However, he was still late. Here, in this case, all those steps which the boy has adopted are either the ways which normally bring the boy to the school in time or are the only steps that are opened for the boy for reaching his destination by being a remedy for the effects of the breakdown. There was no other way that he could have done. His late arrival is not the result of the failure to do what he is capable of doing. In fact, he was prevented by the circumstances which were not within his power to modify. The teacher judges his action by referring to the capabilities and opportunities available to the agent and after this the boy has been judged that he could not have done better than he did. In such cases of involuntary actions, no question of responsibility can be assigned. Here, the question of involuntariness of the late arrival of the boy to the school is decided without the boy being asked to report any kind of deliverances of consciousness or introspection about the execution or non-execution of any volition. So, in this case, there

is a possibility that if the boy could have done better than what he did, then there is also a chance that he could have helped doing it as badly as he did.

A.I. Melden's Concept of Responsibility

According to Melden, the concept of responsibility could be challenged on some philosophical grounds. They are like –

(a) According to A. I. Melden, in the above case, all the circumstances and situations present at the time of the killing of the pedestrian were the necessary causal compelling factors of the agent's action which exerts upon him the force to act in that particular way. Just like as in the case of any natural event, there are always some necessary conditions which necessitates the event to occur in their way. Similarly in the above case also all the circumstances compel the person to perform in that way. Melden gave the example of a natural event like breaking of an egg when it role off the table and hits the floor. Here, the events consisted in the breaking of the egg was necessary. In this case, there is no chance that the person could have avoided driving after he had taken the drink and killed the pedestrian. As the person is by nature a habitual drunker and so it was difficult for him to refuse the drink and avoid being tipsy. All the relevant antecedent psychological conditions and circumstances forced him to accept the drink and killed the pedestrian.

There is one more possibility that the person was by nature a man of such easily tempted, venturesome and willing to take all sorts of risks. And anyone who knows his nature well will easily judge him responsible for this act of killing the pedestrian. Hence,

he could not have the chance of doing the action otherwise. He had no other way than to accept the drink which his friend invited him to take. Thus, his own nature and all the relevant antecedent circumstances compelled him to act in that way. Hence, his action cannot be said to be free and consequently he is not fully responsible for his action.

(b) Secondly, it may also be possible that the person may have a different character than the one he actually had. The character of the person is formed by his own past doings which he himself chosen to do. These freely chosen activities formed his character out of which his actions followed necessarily and causally. These causally necessary activities compelled the drunken person to accept the drink, drove the car and thus killed the pedestrian. However, according to Melden, "not only choice, but all of the other psychological factors that issue in actions are themselves enmeshed in the bonds of causal necessity: my perceptions, desires, interests, motives, needs, no less than the character traits I now have or had at any other time in the past."⁵ But even after that he had always a chance that he might change his character in due course of time. That is why, all the antecedent causal conditions must be same for all time because if they are different then the person could not have chosen as he did and developed the character he now had. These are the conditions in favour of the view that the person could have done otherwise and they are called by Melden as 'contrary to fact conditionals'. Such type of conditions can be given only in case of human actions and not in case of natural events. Because if such conditions are present in nature, then any natural event can said to be free. They

can happen in some other way than they actually happen. Thus, in the above case of the killing of the pedestrian it seems to be false that the agent could have done otherwise than what really or actually he did. Hence, the person is no more responsible and free for his any type of act.

Hobbes and Hume's view about Human Action

In this connection, a point of distinction can be made between the views of Melden and Hobbes. According to Hobbes, liberty and necessity are consistent with one another in human action. While, according to Melden, these two are quite opposite to each other in case of human action. If there is liberty, there cannot be any necessity and if there is any kind of necessity then there cannot be any liberty. But, if Hobbes's view is accepted, then there cannot be any distinction between natural events and human actions. According to Hobbes, to say that a man acts freely is to say that he acts out of his own will which is said to be a causal antecedent that necessitates the action. If it is a case of necessity by such causal antecedents, then the man could no more choose, will and act differently from the way he normally does.

The acts of will are called as volitions and they work as antecedent causal conditions of human action. However, there is always a chance that if these volitions are otherwise, then there is always a chance that the person can act otherwise. So, a question about freedom can be drawn between the conduct of a normal responsible agent and a compulsively neurotic person. If a person can act otherwise then, by depending upon volitions it can be said that the neurotic person is equally free just like the normal

responsible agent. Similarly, in the example of the drunken man killing the pedestrian certain bodily states caused him to drive his car in that way which seems to be the genuine causal operative conditions of his behaviour. But Melden rejects such type of view and maintains that a complete causal explanation of the killing of the pedestrian can only be given in terms of brain states, stimuli, muscle movements, the depression of the accelerator of the car, the person's motion and resulting impact of the affected vital organs which caused the death of the pedestrian. According to Hume also, free actions are to be distinguished from non-free actions not by the absence of any causal conditions, but by the presence of certain specific sorts of mental causes. In the above case, the person is a helpless victim of the conditions of his body and its immediate physical environment which led him to kill the pedestrian.

These mental causes provide the causal explanation for a human behaviour in terms of his volitions, desires, interests etc. "If these are causal factors and if these are subject to causal explanation in terms of antecedent psychological factors, then whatever happens is none of my doing but of these very psychological factors, themselves."* So, it is wrong to say that people can do anything freely and to blame him for his actions is a mistake. This implies that even if a person thinks, feels, wills and acts, yet he cannot be said to be responsible for his action. These are causal factors which simply get done and the person has no command over them. Hence, he is the victim of these causal antecedent factors. So, it would be a futile attempt to recommend that each person is free and his actions are free actions.

Therefore, in order to know about what is free action, Melden's view is that "if we are to understand what is involved in the idea of someone doing something of his own free will we must look to the centrally important and fully enriched cases in which a rational, indeed a moral agent chooses and decides to act as he does for reasons he considers good and proper."⁷ Voluntary actions are those kinds of actions which are somehow produced by the will. These are the acts of volition of agents. On the other hand, involuntary actions are those actions which proceed from other events. Voluntary actions are done out of the agent's free will where he rationally and morally chooses to act as he does for some reasons which are thought as good and proper for his act. But this does not mean that every action done of one's own free will is the one chosen or decided, or that every such action is one performed for a moral reason. This means that the concept of free will is applied or applicable only to a moral agent who is capable of rational choice and decision. Whenever there is free will, there is rational, moral choice, decision and vice versa. It is only by reference to such cases that the concept of free will can be fully elucidated. Again, an action becomes voluntary or involuntary depending upon the items that comes under the general term 'will'. But, this will not solve the controversy between voluntary and involuntary actions. So, according to Melden, the whole thing will depend upon the proper understanding of the performed action and its various implications.

A.I. Melden on what is Free Action and Aristotle's notion of the term Voluntary and Rational Choice

However, Aristotle had given a different interpretation of the term 'voluntary'. According to him, the term 'voluntary is a

blanket term that covers many different things and it is applied to a wide variety of bodily movements. This term 'voluntary' is too much wide because voluntary behaviours are found in animals as well as small children who are exempted from moral criticism. Aristotle was also right in rejecting the view that an action is a bodily movement that is chosen or deliberated. There are some cases of voluntary actions where the choices and deliberations are not applicable. For example, the cases of spur-of-the-moment actions are said to be voluntary and for these, agents are held responsible. Such is the case of a traffic light turns red as one approach in his vehicle. Here, he does not generally deliberate and then choose to release the accelerator and apply the brakes. These are the cases of habits, desire and impulsive acts where people act without any reflection or pondering of any kind.

This explanation of voluntary action given by Aristotle was not acceptable and it has added nothing to the various examples that he has cited. So, no new point has come up in his formulation of voluntary action. He maintained that certain behaviours are voluntary if the moving principle is in a man himself. But what he meant by a moving principle, is not made clear by him. Hence, according to Melden, "Aristotle's own elucidation of the term 'voluntary' is wholly unilluminating, and the view which he seems to hold off the nature of action is less than satisfactory."⁶

Melden's idea of rational choice is significantly connected with the concept of voluntary action. An action is a voluntary behaviour if and only if either in cause or in actual occurrence there is rational choice. For him, an adequate account of the concept of 'voluntary action' is necessary to supplement with the

help of further conditions. This condition is that there should be rational choice in any voluntary action. Because in Aristotle's account, rational choice was introduced in connection with the formation of the states of character from where impulsive actions are alleged to spring because all actions are not deliberated and chosen in Aristotle's account. But, in Melden's view people are responsible for impulsive actions as they are responsible for the states of character from which such actions spring. People are responsible for such states because there is rational choice in their action which led to the formation of their character.

The presence of rational choice in one's character implies two other points. First, the presence of rational choice in one's action implies that the action of the agent is free in the sense that the person or the agent has applied his choice and decision freely towards performance of the action. So, he is not acting under any compulsion or pressure from outside. This means that what he has done is done out of his own choice and so he is fully responsible for his action. Secondly, the presence of rational choice in the performance of an action also implies that the person or agent is the moral agent of his action. The rational choice makes the character of the agent moral in the sense that whenever anyone performs out of one's own choices which are chosen by one rationally, it means that he is morally responsible for his action. The person has to accept all the moral and legal consequences of his actions. But in order to know whether one has acted morally or not, it is necessary to know about the agent's further intentions and reasons. This enables a person to understand the moral features of the agent. However, in view of Melden, in order to

know whether a person has performed his action morally or not, it is necessary to know and see the circumstances under which the person is placed. Even in judging an action, a judge will judge the action by examining all the circumstances and situations present at the time of the performance of the action. The judge will judge the action from his point of view and as is circumscribed by the situations of the agent. Depending upon such circumstances and situations and one's interest, actions can be either voluntary or involuntary. But according to Melden, the proper understanding of such voluntary or involuntary actions will only be possible through the knowledge of the other person about the interest, desires and reasons of the person who perform such voluntary or involuntary actions. Therefore, Melden says, "The centrally important uses of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are those which refer us to the scene of social and moral conduct, where actions performed by one agent have a bearing upon the lives and actions of others."⁹ By depending upon such interests, desires and reasons one and the same action can be sometimes voluntary while sometimes it may be involuntary also. Hence, Melden opines that the issue of voluntary and involuntary actions becomes a complexity of matters that can be solved only by observing the practical context and circumstances of actions. With the help of these two elements it can be known and observed whether a person has performed a particular action freely out of his own will. So, these two elements seem to be a solution to the problem of free action and freedom of will. Thus, Melden's theory of action is known as free and responsible action. And whenever there is no such action, there will be only happenings or events.

The concept of moral responsibility implies freedom of will. Without free will the question of moral responsibility does not arise. If the concept of moral responsibility exists, then there must be some kind of freedom of will and if there is any freedom of will, then someone will be held morally responsible for something he has done or for something he has left undone. Again, to be morally responsible for some act or failure to act implies that the agent could have acted otherwise. This ability to 'could have acted otherwise' is meant to have free will. If no one has free will, moral responsibility does not exist. Human actions are freely chosen out of judgment of conscience and only such kinds of actions can be morally evaluated. Responsible behaviour must be freely chosen and freely performed. Person can be held to be morally responsible only for those outcomes which occur through their actions where the action is an exercise by the agent of his or her powers of control over what occurs.

Gary Watson's view about Free Action

However, philosopher Gary Watson has given a different formulation of free action than Melden. According to Gary Watson, a person is said to be free to that extent where he is able to do what he wants. To restrict the freedom of a person is to contract the range of things he is able to do. Watson maintains that the term 'free action' seems to be an exaggeration on the analysis of freedom of human beings towards performing their actions because if a person does something intentionally, then it means that the person is able to perform the action at that particular time. So, he can be said to be free towards performing the action. Watson says, "The concept of free action would seem

to be pleonastic on the analysis of freedom in terms of the ability to get what one wants. For if a person does something intentionally, then surely he was able at that time to do it. Hence, on this analysis, he was free to do it."¹⁰ This account of action embodies a conjunction of free action and intentional action. But in the cases of action which are not free (of course, Watson has used the term 'unfree' for those actions which are not free), the agent is unable to achieve what he wants most or values and this inability of him is due to his own 'motivational system' i.e., his will. Here, the blockage to the action which the agent wants most to do is his own will. It is in this sense that the action is not free i.e., the agent is blocked in and by the very performance of the action.

According to Watson, the talk about free action arises from the fact that what a person wants most may not be able to get finally. It follows that what one wants most does not follow or determined only by the strength of one's desires, but by the effectiveness of such desires upon one's action. The strength of such desires or wants of the agent are measured by how much the agent acts upon them. But if what one wants most may not be what one most strongly wants then question arises as in what sense can it be true that one wants it? So, ¹⁰The problem of free action arises because what one desires may not be what one is finally moved to get."¹¹ This may be so because of two reasons and the difference between evaluation and desiring. First, it may be quite possible that what one desires is not valued to be good or worthwhile to any degree at all. One may assign no value to the object of one's desires. Second, even though one values what he desires, yet the strength of such desires may not properly reflect

the measure or degree up to which one values its objects. Hence, even though one's object of desire is valuable, yet it may not be thought to be most valuable in those specific circumstances. In such cases, one's desires for the object may be stronger than the want for which it is most valued.

The valuation system of an agent is a set of considerations which when associated with the factual beliefs of the agent creates some definite type of judgements. Any free agent always makes such type of judgements. Moreover for a free being, one must be able to value the alternative states of affairs or must be able to rank the alternatives according to their worth.

The motivational system of an agent motivates him towards performing action. But whenever an action is not free or whenever there is possibility for certain action to be not free, then it will be only because of the fact that the valuational system and motivational system of an agent is not in conformity with one another. These systems harmonize with one another in the sense that what determines an agent's judgments also determines his actions. Any free agent has the capacity or ability to translate his values into action and so his actions flow from his evaluational system. Thus a point of distinction can be drawn between A.I. Melden's and Gary Watson's concepts of free action.

Objections and Criticisms against A.I. Melden's view on Free Action

However, certain objections have been levelled against A.I. Melden that made his treatment of the concept of action defective. Melden maintains that though actions are bodily movements of

a certain sort, however it is necessary to specify the distinctive features of bodily movements that are considered as actions from those which are not in order to elucidate the concept of action. Melden's conception of action is known as the concept of free action where he has used the term 'could have done otherwise' where a person has free will towards performing any action and in this sense he has the chance to act or do otherwise and can choose freely any of the alternatives among the various alternatives provided to him towards performing the action. But if it does not happen, then the person or agent cannot be said to have performed the action freely. So, Melden's concept of free action can be challenged on this particular point.

Melden was a thinker who rejected the explanation of human action on the basis of causal relation in the sense that cause and its effects i.e., human action and its causes cannot be differentiated or separated from each other. The relation between human actions and its causes are totally inseparable, in fact it is logical or conceptual and so it would not be possible to call their relation to be causal. In fact, Melden tried to give an explanation of human action on the basis of reasons for performing action which was also not up to the mark.

The main objection against his theory is that he supposed that there is a logical or conceptual relation between reason and action and thus reasons are inseparable from actions which remain unexplained by him. What he needs to show in maintaining that there is a logical connection between reasons and action is that reasons itself logically or conceptually imply some action and vice versa. If there is a logical or conceptual relation between two

entities then it must be the case that the one must logically entail or imply the other or the other must be logically or conceptually follows from the one. Logical relations indicate relation of entailment and implication. But in Melden's case, he has not shown or say anything about how there is a logical relation between action and its reasons. So, his formulation of human action is nothing but a vague formulation of the relation between reason and action.

Again, Melden's remarkable point of making the elements of practical context and circumstances was also not free from criticisms. Melden's contextualist account of human action was criticized by J. L. Austin by exposing some of the confusions that surround the concept of context and circumstances and some other phrases related with these concepts. These confusions are the immediate consequences of the failure to recognize the relevant details of the circumstances where phrases like 'could have done', 'could not have done' are familiarly employed. This is so because someone may fail to recognize the relevant details of the context and circumstances of a particular action. It is not always possible to immediately grasp the knowledge about the context and circumstances of a particular action as a result of which the action that is performed will be difficult to understand. The element of practical context and circumstances do not always provide any information about why a person has performed that kind of action that he has performed. There are some cases where the observer fails to see or grasp knowledge about the context and circumstances of a particular action. So, in such cases, the element of context and circumstances cannot provide any better understanding about the concept of action. Hence, Melden's

concept of practical context and circumstances do not always provide any help for knowing or understanding action. Melden's theory has also not provided any other alternative to understand and judge action. But in spite of such confusions, Melden was repeating that the phrases like 'could have done', 'could not have done' are intelligibly employed only in the context of human actions and not to the events occur in the nervous system or within the human body. These are the language games, according to Melden, in which the above phrases are intelligibly employed. However, the critics are also not right in criticizing Melden. Critics can be criticised for not providing any other alternative apart from practical context and circumstances for action. In such cases, question arises as what these critics made or begged people to depend upon apart from the elements of context and circumstances? Hence, it has been seen that neither Melden nor his critics are right in analyzing the concept of human action. No one has been able to provide any kind of acceptable formulation for the theory of action. Therefore, it is better to reject both Melden and his critics and further investigation should be done regarding understanding about the concept of action.

In spite of facing severe objections, it has to be said that Melden formulated his theory of action in a very nice and efficient way. Melden was the prominent philosopher who for the first time stressed upon the concept of free action and freedom of will in Philosophy of Action depending upon the element of practical context and circumstances which proves to be very fruitful towards judging actions. Based upon such element, he maintained that an action can even be judged as free or unfree,

voluntary or involuntary etc.. For free action Melden talked about freedom of will where the agent has always a chance to act otherwise. Melden has in fact put more stress upon the phrase 'could have done otherwise' where an agent has the freedom of choice, decision and deliberation in the sense that a man can be said to do something out of his free will and by this he had made a remarkable point in Philosophy of Action. Hence, from this point of view, Melden's formulation of the theory of free action is quite appreciable.

However, if someone has to offer a better line of thought in understanding action as a concept then, it has to be said that the term 'action' is a term which itself implies some sort of responsibility which arises from the fact that actions are done or performed out of one's motive, purpose, choice, intention, etc. which are nothing but some subjective states of human mind that make people responsible for their actions. In such cases, no kind of explanation can completely explain human action and so, it is said that the concept of action can neither be judged nor can be explained. When a person performs an action, then it implies that the person is himself completely responsible for performing the action and there is no need to explain the action anymore. Whenever some action is performed, thereby it itself means that it is done out of someone's will, intention, belief and desire and when action follows from such factors, then definitely there is someone who is responsible for it. This concept of responsibility in turn implies the moral or ethical perspective of the concept of action and therefore, the term 'action' itself implies its judgemental perspective. Therefore, the concept of action needs no other factors and explanation to explain it.

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Technology and Responsibility: The Problem of Many Hands

Pooja Choudhury

Abstract

With the advancement of technology, discussion of moral ascriptions has been granted utmost importance. Since life in general is seen to be affected by modern technology, there is the need to put light on the ethical dimensions of technology. This paper mainly concerns with technology and moral responsibility. The focal point is Dennis Thompson's- The problem of many hands. We have started by discussing the basic understanding of what technology is? Then put more importance over technology as an activity. Problem of many hands mainly deals with the moral blameworthiness wherein modern technology is involved. Since a hub of people is involved for bigger technological inventions, it becomes difficult as to who should be held responsible. I have tried to deal with this issue in the paper.

Keywords : Technology, Morality, Responsibility, Blameworthiness.

What is Technology?

The locus of technology from the minutest level has been constantly seen within the natural elements. Amidst the natural bounty wherein beings grow and continually nourish, can be seen the building disposition which animals have and cannot be left unnoticed. And this can be seen reflecting in our built materials. In the earliest time, Democritus had claimed that humans build houses and this is an imitation of what the natural animals like birds simultaneously do. Aristotle, however, maintains a divide between the natural elements on the one hand and artifacts on the other hand. The divide is ontological since it considers the very existence of both. Nature for him has the principles of generation and motion. They have the inner final causes and accordingly grow, reproduce, nourish and so on. Artifacts on the contrary require an outward force for its existence. Etymologically, the term "technology" comes from two Greek words "techné" and "logos"- techné "combines the meanings of an art and a technique, involving both a knowledge of the relevant principles and an ability to achieve the appropriate results."¹ It thus involves two aspects, first is the aspect of application and secondly the aspect of reason.

Technology as an Activity

The relationship of technology to activity is of much significance. The point that needs to be stressed here is that technological endeavours are not merely abstract. The structure of technology encompassing the hub of rules and concepts need

application in real life situation. In this point it can be contrasted with science. In his paper, *Technology as Knowledge: Implications for Instruction*, Herschbach pointed out that one major distinction between science and technology is the purpose towards which both the disciplines are directed. Scientific knowledge is mostly about knowing and understanding the laws of nature. Contrary to that technological knowledge he claims is "praxiological". Due to this, the effects of technology can be seen reflected in the real world and it can be said that it manipulates the physical world. It has the power to influence or control the activity for which it is designed. Here comes the meeting point between technology and ethics. In his paper, *Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics*, Hans Jonas claims that ethics is concerned with action and the type of human action has considerably changed due to technological contributions. So, this considerable change demands in the change of ethics as well. Traditional ethics for Jonas was mainly concerned with the immediate environment. However, with the development of modern technology, this immediate environment is surpassed by global influence. The sphere of responsibility has increased from a mere individual perspective to a global level. In general, moral responsibility of a person is judged by the action and also the effect which was seen as a result of the action. However, with the inclusion of modern technology, the doer, the deed and the effect are not the same. The responsibility of human beings is especially taken into account here because of the connection we possess to modern technology.

Moral Responsibility

A morally responsible person is a moral agent who is

worthy of praise or blame for a particular action. For it there needs to be someone or something open to responsibility ascriptions. These responsibility ascriptions have one peculiar feature. That is they apply differently to different situations. Thus, saying that- "dark clouds are responsible for rain" is one way of ascribing the responsibility ascription. But saying that- "Ram's stabbing is responsible for his death" is another way. In the former, there is no space for morality. It is a mere causal relation stated. But the latter can be analyzed as moral. This is because a moral agent is involved in it. The presence of moral agent in any form is necessary to see whether an act can be considered to be morally responsible.

A moral agent is one who is responsible for their own work and has a reasoned understanding of a specific moral situation. S/He is held accountable for their own actions. Such an individual is morally obligated to follow certain code of 'conduct' the violation of which will lead to punishment or blameworthiness. Since the maker of technology is a moral agent so there has to be moral responsibility ascribed to the technologist.

Mario Bunge has put forth certain special responsibilities for a technologist. In his paper entitled *Towards a Technoethics*, he considers that a technologist has moral responsibility just like any other moral agents. The term 'technoethics' was coined by Mario Bunge in the year 1974 to denote the special responsibilities of technologists to develop ethics as a branch of technology.

The technologists have contributed to a society considerably different and vast than one was there before. The difference in the society which has reflected now because of their contributions

hold them morally culpable and thus they are morally responsible agents.

Secondly, moral decision is to be taken by every technologists. To elaborate, technologists go through conflicting interest. In case of any technician building anything leads to a conflict of interest because there are people who will be benefitted from it and there are also people who will suffer or will be less benefitted. It is obvious that there will be demand of interest and also protest against the project. In such a case the technician need to take decisions for or against the task at hand.

The third point on which he emphasized - the technology which influences both human and non-human. A source of power is being vested upon by the usage of technology and such powers can be both beneficial as well as disastrous. War for instance is never beneficial for any civilization. Modern warfare requires technology at its peak. So, a technologist must be held morally responsible not only regarding the proper working of the asset he is constructing but also regarding the effect that object will have on the society. Both large scale and small scale technological achievement have an effect on nature and society. In such cases, the technologist need not hide behind but rather s/he must give proper guidance and be at the forefront to take responsibility of their action.

These are some of the reasons stated which Mario Bunge has pointed in his paper. A technologist is also a moral agent. So, being a moral agent s/he must undertake responsibility for the object created. However, even in this responsibility criteria there will be many problems due to the work force included within the

construction of any technological device. The problem here centering is- who is to be held morally responsible while constructing a device?

In most technological inventions, it is often impossible to hold one person culpable since many inventions are done by more than one person. This problem is referred to as "the problem of many hands". It was first introduced by Dennis Thompson. The phenomenon that, due to the complexity of the situation and the number of actors involved, it is impossible or at least very difficult to hold someone reasonably responsible is sometimes referred to as the problem of many hands. Dennis Thompson, who was probably the first to use the notion "the problem of many hands" in an article about the responsibility of public officials, describes it as follows: "Because many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify who is morally responsible for political outcomes"². He introduced this problem with regard to the policies that are being implemented by the officials. Since a lot of people are involved in the decision-making and the implementation of the policies, therefore it is often difficult to consider who is to be held morally responsible. This problem has also occupied a major part in the technological field.

This is because in large scale technology (or even small scale technology) there are a lot of people involved. This can be seen from Hertschbach's article. He puts forth the different levels of technological knowledge. The amount of reason increases with the increment of the levels. There are three forms of technological knowledge. They are- descriptive, prescriptive and tacit knowledge.

Descriptive knowledge describes things as they are. This description can be of rules, abstract concepts and general principles. Prescriptive knowledge aims at improving the scientific procedures to experience greater gain. Tacit knowledge is largely the result of individual judgement, skill and practice. This form of knowledge is learned by working side by side with a craftsman or a technician. This constitutes the lowest level of knowledge.³

The problem of deciphering the one who is morally responsible will be especially judged because the preconditions of moral responsibility like the intention, knowledge and the freedom to act is distributed over many people. There are two main demarcations of moral responsibility- backward looking and forward looking. The former deals with something happened in the past and the latter deals with responsibility for things which has not yet occurred. More stress is put upon the former and it is always equated with blameworthiness. The blameworthiness notion is important here because when someone is accounted responsible for something, then the common denominator of the different reactive attitudes towards the collective or the individual is always blame.

Now, responsibility as something blameworthy needs to have certain conditions. To quote in this context :

"...the following conditions together capture the general notion of when it is reasonable to hold an agent morally responsible-as-blameworthy:

(1) Capacity (2) Causality (3) Knowledge (4) Freedom (5) Wrong-doing"⁴

In capacity, the focus is usually on the moral agency. It is

widely accepted that children and insane persons are not considered to be culpable for moral blameworthiness. In the case of the problem of many hands the issue is whether the collective can be held responsible or are capacitated for moral blame worthiness.

The second condition is if the agent caused the event for which s/he is held morally blameworthy. To this it could be added if the person will be considered to be responsible if s/he has performed the moral blameworthiness involuntarily. If an action is performed voluntarily, then there should not be any compulsion or ignorance.

The third condition is Knowledge condition. Knowledge condition is important because people are expected to know the things they perform.

The fourth condition is the freedom condition. If any action which leads to moral blameworthiness is performed under compulsion then s/he is not morally culpable. Since there are many theories of morality, the conditions under which someone is held morally responsible will differ.

The fifth condition is the baseline for all the wrongdoings. The baseline would be that the agent was eligible for normative assessment and did the action knowingly and freely and so the action constituted wrong-doing.

Further more there can be seen three dimensions to the problem of many hands put forth by Mark Bovens. They are practical, normative and preventive.⁵ As already discussed, it can be said that the problem of many hands is very difficult to identify and to prove who is to be held morally responsible. Especially for

the people who are not directly involved. Hence the problem of many hands is a tough shell to crack. It can be considered to be in the practical dimension. The significant reason as to why the problem arise is because there is no knowledge about who is to be held accountable. Therefore this problem needs to be considered as an epistemological one.

This would bring us to the conclusion that nobody is responsible. Here Bovens says with regard to the moral dimension that the collective can be held responsible with respect to certain moral regard. So the collective can be held responsible here but the individuals which constitute the collective will not be held responsible. He is suggesting here a kind of "non-reductive collective responsibility" which means a collective responsibility which cannot be reduced to individual responsibility. The main issue related to the problem of many hands is that there is no possibility of retribution and there is absence of a forward looking responsibility. Since no one is to be blamed so the possibility of retribution is impossible.

Here to summarise the problem of many hands, it can be said that the problem of many hands occur in collective settings and since the problem is of attributing responsibility to someone there is a gap of responsibility distribution. Also, this gap is morally problematic. The reason why responsibility is necessary is not only retribution but also to see if the desired goal is reached efficiently. Backward looking responsibility will be connected to retribution and forward looking responsibility will be connected to social efficiency.

In every technological innovations (mostly in large scale building up of technology) the problem of many hands mostly for undesirable consequences may occur. Especially with respect to the climate change that takes place environmentalists may claim that technological development is the sole cause for it. But when it comes to pinpointing or ascribing responsibility there is always no clear picture. It may therefore be observed that a clear picture can be tried to be achieved by sieving the decision makers in the descriptive level and putting utmost importance to them and holding them morally accountable. However, the engineers have full freedom to reject the proposed inventions and so this strive can only be considered utopian.

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Animal Rights and Indian Philosophy

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Abstract

The animal rights movement that emerged in the eighteenth century Europe ushered in a new way of looking at nonhuman animals. Philosophically, this movement has been shaped by an ethical consideration for the nonhuman animals. This movement sought to reverse the anthropocentric tendency of Western metaphysics that places human beings at the centre of the creation. Though the animal rights movement is essentially a western phenomenon yet an ethical consideration for nonhuman animals can also be found in the various philosophical and religious traditions of India. In this essay I explore some of the common grounds between the animal rights movement and the pan-Indian Vaisnava bhakti movement. The purpose of this essay is to consider how the animal rights movement can benefit from the ethical concerns of the Indian philosophical and ethical thoughts for nonhuman animals.

Keywords: Animal rights, Animal ethics, Religion, Vaisnavism

In Europe, the period between eighteenth and twentieth century was marked by the emergence of various rights movements. These movements have had a lasting impact on the western societies. They have also shaped the modern human civilization as we know it today. Such movements were spearheaded by various deprived and marginal sections of the society, and were driven by a need to establish many basic legal rights for them, whether in the sphere of gender, race, politics or culture. However, the concerns of these movements were not limited only to the interests of human beings: they also included the interests of animals and other nonhuman entities as well. Two such movements have been the environmental movement and the animal rights movement. Both of these movements broke new grounds and ushered in new ways of looking at the animate and the inanimate world.

In this essay, I briefly look at the animal rights movement that emerged during this period, and consider its various philosophical underpinnings. It is important to look at these contexts because only then we can understand what the animal rights movement is reacting against, philosophically speaking, when it advocates for the 'rights' of nonhuman animals. After quickly considering the place of nonhuman animals in the history of western thought, I move on to discuss the place of nonhuman animals in some of Indian philosophical and religious traditions. Such a comparative view enables us to better appreciate the strengths of each tradition and identify their shortcomings. It also

shows us what they both can learn from one another. Finally I discuss how the animal rights movement can benefit from the wisdom of various Indian philosophical schools, particularly from their sympathetic attitudes towards living creatures.

The philosophical concerns of the animal rights movement fall under the domain of animal ethics. This branch of applied ethics deals with the moral principles or values of how we should treat nonhuman animals. Animal ethics questions and challenges many of the central tenets of Western metaphysics, most of them characterised by an inherent anthropocentrism. As a doctrine, anthropocentrism considers human beings to be the pinnacle or centre of creation, and allots to every other entity, living or non-living, only a peripheral position in the overall scheme of things. Anthropocentrism has long been a given in much of western thought, including the Judeo-Christian religions. In contrast to this, animal ethics takes an essentially ecocentric approach, and it sees both humans and nonhumans playing an equally important role in nature, without any inherent hierarchy. It also maintains that the nonhuman world has an intrinsic value of its own, independent of its utility to human beings. Therefore, it advocates an equal ethical consideration of all nonhuman animals, a position that also underwrites the philosophy of the animal rights movement. To better appreciate the significance of this position, we need to look at the general attitude towards animals in the Western philosophy. This is what I do in the following section.

Animals in Western Thought

As I noted earlier, ever since antiquity, the dominant view

of animals in Western philosophy has primarily been anthropocentric, where the nonhuman world is considered to be under the dominion of human beings. Peter Singer, one of the most important animal rights philosophers, points out that by saying that God made man in His own image, the Bible "allots human beings a special position in the universe, as beings that, alone of all living things, are God-like. Moreover, God is explicitly said to have given man dominion over every living thing". Singer further adds that after the fall of man (for which the Bible holds a woman and an animal responsible), killing animals clearly was permissible. We can point out that this view of human supremacy is can also be found in the philosophy of Aristotle, who in the Book One of his *Politics* says, "Animals are for the sake of human beings, domestic ones both for using and eating".² In the same breath, he also says, "If then nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it must have made all of them for the sake of human beings".

Likewise, Pythagoras (570-495 BC), though a vegetarian and firm opponent of meat-eating, also displayed a strong sense of anthropocentrism. He disapproved of meat-eating "on the grounds that devouring an animal might entail ingesting one's own relatives"⁴. This curious notion has to be understood in the light of the theory of transmigration of souls, of which Pythagoras was a firm proponent. This theory held that souls are immortal, and upon the death of an organism, its soul transmigrates to other bodies. Such bodies can either be of humans or that of other animals. Because of this, Stephen Newmayer argues that though at first glance the Pythagorean endorsement of vegetarianism may

seem sympathetic towards animals, Pythagoras' firm belief in the theory of transmigration of soul "might reasonably be considered a more anthropocentric motivation than the kindness towards animals"⁵.

This attitude towards animals persists even into the modern period of European philosophy. Influenced by the mechanical philosophy of Sir Isaac Newton, René Descartes considered animals as mere soulless automata, devoid of any ethical standing. Descartes' statement was influenced by his attempt to explain the material universe in mechanical and mathematical terms. While doing so, he postulated that animals too conformed to this mechanical pattern and 'functioned' more like lifeless machines than living beings. For instance, in his *Discourse of Method*, Descartes compared a living animal to "a clock composed exclusively of wheels and springs"⁶. T. Z. Levine says that in doing so, Descartes explicitly "denied that animals have reason, intelligence or mind, or any inner mental states ... reduced animals to being nothing but matter in motion"⁷. In this way, Descartes both conformed to and departed from the ancient philosophers: on the one hand, he continued the same anthropocentric view of Western philosophy, and on the other hand, he rejected the classical view that animals do possess a soul, even if that soul is qualitatively different from the soul of humans.

A similar anthropocentric view can be found in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, despite his firm injunction against causing any harms to animals. Kant advocated non-injury to animals on the grounds that such an attitude and habit might lead to our moral corruption and encourage us to harm fellow human

beings. Thus, in his ethics, the moral soundness of humans remains the primary concern, with an ethical consideration of nonhuman animals taking the back seat. Therefore, despite his advocacy of non violence to animals, Kant also declared that "all animals exist only as means, and not for their own sake, in that they have no self-consciousness, whereas man is the end ... it follows that we have no immediate duties to animals; our duties towards them are indirect duties to humanity"²⁸.

It is the English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham who is often credited with giving equal ethical consideration to nonhuman animals. Bentham made the sentience of animals the ground for his ethics. In a radical departure from much of early Western philosophy, Bentham laid down his primary criterion for giving animals equal consideration with the words, "the question is not, Can they *reason*? nor Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?"²⁹. This stress on the sentience and embodiedness of nonhuman animals, on their capacity to experience pain and pleasure, became the bedrock of modern animal ethics.

Animals in Indian Thought

When we look at Indian religious and philosophical traditions, we see that unlike the anthropocentric nature of Western philosophy, many of these schools and traditions demonstrate a compassionate and reverential attitude towards nonhuman nature, including all living beings. For instance, we find that the doctrine of ahimsa is a core component in most of the philosophical schools of India, whether Jainism, Buddhism or Hinduism. Many scriptures and saints of these religions advocate non-injury to all living beings and endorse a respectful attitude towards the same.

Hindu sacred texts like the Upanishads, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the two epics all preach the oneness of all beings. The *Bhagavadgītā* says, "The wise sees the same (reality) in a Brāhmin endowed with learning and culture, a cow, an elephant, a dog, and an outcaste" (5.18). Similarly, in the Buddhist tradition, we find a severe condemnation of animal sacrifice. Instead, they praise alternative sacrifices using oil, butter, and molasses.¹⁰

Such sympathetic attitude towards animals is reflected in the wide prevalence of vegetarianism and injunctions against meat-eating in various religions of the Indian subcontinent. For instance, in the "Anusāsana Parva" of the *Mahābhārata*, it is said:

The man who kills living creatures kill them for the sake of the person who eats flesh. If flesh were regarded as inedible, there would then be no slaughter of living creatures. It is for the sake of the eater that the slaughter of living creatures goes on in the world. Since ... the period of life is shortened of persons who slaughter living creatures or cause them to be slaughtered, it is clear that the person who wishes his own good should give up meat entirely. Those fierce persons who are engaged in slaughter of living creatures, never find protectors when they are in need. ... That man who seeks to increase his own flesh by (eating) the flesh of others, has to live in this world in great anxiety and after death has to take birth in indifferent races and families. (*Mahābhārata*)

This passage shows how the injunctions against meat-eating

in different Indian traditions is mostly the result of a compassionate attitude towards animals, which may have solidified into various norms about vegetarianism. In other words, though vegetarianism is by no means a universal phenomenon of Indian cuisine, such prohibitions on flesh food can be seen a result of a sympathetic attitude towards nonhuman suffering.

However, it is also true that in Hinduism there have been certain glaring exceptions to this non-violent and sympathetic attitude towards animals. One such exception is the practice of animal sacrifice. This was true even in Assam, where before the advent of the neo-Vaiṣṇava movement, Śaktism was the dominant cult. In Śaktism, blood sacrifice is the primary mode of worship. For example, M. M. Sharma refers to a detail in the *Darrang Rajyamāvalī*, a metrical chronicle supposed to have been composed in the late eighteenth century Assam, where it is mentioned that after building the Kōmakhya temple king Naranarayana and his brothers took a vow (*vratā*) and remained without food for seven days and got the inaugural function celebrated by offering three lakhs of homa and one lakh of animal sacrifices, and made full provision for regular worship in the future¹¹. It is in this context that we have to understand the significance of the neo-Vaiṣṇava movement in Assam, as well as of the pan-Indian Bhakti movement. I take a very brief look at the importance of this movement to animal ethics in the next section.

Animals and the Bhakti Movement

In Assam, the neo-Vaiṣṇava movement, pioneered by Sri Śaṅkaradeva had a profound impact on the ethical treatment and consideration of nonhuman animals. Śaṅkaradeva challenged the

conventional practice of animal sacrifice prevalent among the followers of Śaktism and replaced it the practice of *nāṃ-dharma*, the ritualistic chanting of God's name. From the perspective of animal ethics, the most significant feature of Śaṅkaradeva's theology was to claim that we don't need to sacrifice animals in order to worship God; rather, it is only by taking care of all living creatures that one can achieve God's grace. This view is succinctly encapsulated in Śaṅkaradeva's following couplet:

*Kukur, srigaḥ, gadarbbharo 'stman nām,
Jānyā xabāko pari karibā pranām.*

[The Lord resides even in a dog or fox or a donkey; fall down before them all and take a bow.]

Thus, the philosophy and theology of neo-Vaiṣṇavism radically challenged the prevailing anthropocentric ideas that authorized and justified the use and abuse of nonhuman animals to narrow anthropocentric ends. Instead, it supplanted those ideas and world views with a more egalitarian values.

In this respect, Śaṅkaradeva's philosophy has a number of similarities with the teachings of other proponents of the Bhakti movement, such as Tukarām and Kabir. These saints too held a similar sympathetic and reverential attitude towards nonhuman creatures, and considered them to be part of the Divine. For instance, Tukarām, the seventeenth century Bhakti poet from Maharashtra, says, "Trees, creepers and the creatures of the forest/ Are my kith and kin./And birds that sweetly sing"¹². Similarly, saint Kabir from Northern India says, highlighting the similarity between humans and nonhumans: *Māns māns sab ek hain, murgi,*

birni, gai/ ānkihi dekhi nar kbāṭ bāi, to nar narak hi jāyo. This can be roughly translated as: “all flesh are alike, whether from fowl, or deer or cow. People who partake of such meat surely go to hell.”

Here we should note an important thing. In all these views about the significance of nonhuman entities, including that of Śaṅkaradeva's, the primary approach is theological. However, these theological considerations are very strongly and clearly influenced by an ethical approach to nonhuman animals and their sufferings. Similarly, the ethics of these religious traditions is perfectly complemented and supported by their theological views. In this sense, this theological-ethical position of the various Indian traditions have striking similarities with the ideas of contemporary animal rights movement, something that I discuss below.

The Animal Rights Movement

Historically, the first notable animal rights movement emerged in nineteenth century England, with an aim of abolishing the use of unanaesthetized animals in scientific research.¹⁵ This movement resulted in the development of various animal rights and protection organisations and led to notable changes in legislature in the United Kingdom. However, towards the early twentieth century, this movement lost much of its steam and gradually faded from public view.

In the final quarter of the twentieth century the animal rights movement was given a new lease of life by the publication of Australian philosopher Peter Singer's hugely influential book *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals*. Influenced by the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham,

Singer declared in this book that "the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a *prerequisite for having interests*"¹⁴. Since animals had all these capacities, they can be seen as having various interests like curtailing pain and suffering, prolonging life and pleasures, etc. Singer also popularised the term "speciesism," first introduced by British psychologist Richard D. Ryder. Singer defines speciesism as "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species"¹⁵. Though like anthropocentrism speciesism also refers to the idealisation of one particular species, but at the same time, it also underlines how that idealisation functions to justify a prejudiced attitude towards and treatment of the members of other species. Unlike previous philosophers like Kant, who opposed cruelty towards animals on narrow anthropocentric grounds, Singer denounces the same because of his conviction that "[p]ain and sufferings are in themselves bad and should be prevented or minimized, irrespective of the race, sex, or species of the being that suffers"¹⁶.

However, Singer's position of animal rights itself is criticised by subsequent philosophers on the ground that it takes a rigidly utilitarian and quantitative view of suffering, which makes allowances for animal suffering if it leads to greater good of human beings. That is to say, Singer's defence of animals is not absolute: he does not refuse cruelty towards animals *absolutely*, but only when it is unnecessary and avoidable, and does not lead to not any greater (human) good. Contrary to Singer, Tom Regan, another important contemporary advocate of animal rights, takes an absolutist position regarding animal suffering. In his book *The Case for Animal*

Rights, Regan asserts that the suffering of sentient animals should be our only concern when it comes to debating the rights of animals, and the pain of such beings should be stopped at any cost. Regan himself opposed the utilitarian ethics of Singer which believes in maximizing pleasure over pain. Regan says that human pleasures are not always desirable as they also might include the torture of animals. Josephine Donovan points out that Regan "maintains an absolutist deontological nonconsequentialist position," where he treats animals as an end in themselves, and considers it a "matter of justice, not kindness"¹⁷.

Despite such differences, both Regan and Singer remain two of the most important figures of the contemporary animal rights movement. Underlining the importance of these two thinkers to this movement, Lisa Kemmerer says, "In the seventies and eighties, philosophers Tom Regan and Peter Singer exposed the horrors of the slaughterhouse and cruelty of animal laboratories, noting that humans could get along quite well without these cruel animal exploiting institution"¹⁸.

The 'Right' in Animal Rights

It has often been pointed out that we must not understand the word 'right' in animal rights in a legal sense, that is, as legally defensible rights; rather, we should understand the term in an ethical or moral sense. In other words, when we say that animals have certain 'rights,' what is meant by that is that they have a moral status and certain interests, which must not be violated. David Degrazia points out three specific senses in which the term 'rights' is used in this context:

- a. Moral-status sense: animals have at least some moral status, and they should be treated for their own sake.
- b. Equal consideration sense: interests of animals should be given equal consideration as humans.
- c. Utility trumping sense: the interests of animals should not be overridden in order to maximize the pleasures of human beings.¹⁹

This means that despite their obvious differences with human beings, non-human animals deserve equal consideration as human beings. Thus, to say that nonhuman animals have certain rights does not mean that they are in effect similar to human beings. In fact, such rights apply *despite* all the differences. For example, animal rights condemns practices such as factory farming, animal slaughter, vivisection, hunting, animal husbandry etc because they cause immense and visible suffering to animals and violate the interest of animals. Singer sums up this position when he says, "The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights"²⁰.

Essentially both the western-origin animal rights movement and many of the Indian attitude towards nonhuman animals share a lot of common concerns. As we can clearly see, both the aspects encourage a non-violent and non-instrumental view of animals, urging people to consider animals as sentient, individual beings than as mere entities for human use and abuse. This is true despite all the fundamental differences between these two outlooks, such as the primarily theological nature of the Indian outlook as opposed to the secular concerns of the animal rights movement.

However, we should also point out that despite of such secular concerns of the contemporary animal rights movement, it has been drawing on different religious traditions of the world and looking at the ways such traditions put forward a case for an ethical treatment of animals. This is an integral part of the animal rights movement's attempts to replace the anthropocentric ideas and presumptions prevalent in the (Western) thought and culture with the holistic and reverential world view offered by these ancient traditions. Liza Kemmerer brings to our attention the importance of such intersections between the various religions and the animal rights movement by saying, "As it turns out, the world's great religious teachings concur with Regan and Singer—we ought not to be exploiting nonhumans as we do in our animal industries"²¹ In this respect, the animal rights movement has much to gain from Indian philosophical traditions.

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