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From the Editorials' Desk

This volume of Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (JSSH) marks the 3rd Biennial 'voyage of philosophical discovery' where the contributors all throughout made an attempt to focus on solving philosophical problems in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of human understanding and nonetheless made deep penetration on quires related with human predicaments.

As such it becomes very interesting to be on the other side of the Editorial Desk for two reasons. They are namely (a) the collective endeavour of editing, as editing itself is a voyage with insight and (b) while going through the manuscripts of scholars, it reminded us the exceptional strength in nurturing creative writing in philosophical realm. A 'voyage of philosophical discovery' significantly resembles for 'working for a more inclusive society' and during which we have not only found more about philosophical insights but also about how philosophy can make our society a better place to live in. Today's technology is shaping the society not just of today but for decades to come and here JSSH bears the light of wisdom in receiving human predicaments. As we look at JSSH, this journal is not committed to any philosophical system or method. It

represents the collective thinking of a group of innovative indviduals who are 'one in spirit but not necessarily in opinion.'

We want this issue to be a hallmark in presenting the scholarly papers which combined a philosophical voyage from eastern pragmatic insight to western analytical trend in contemporary society. The papers of the contributors are in our opinion, more than just examples of excellent and ethically relevant scholarship.

The fundamental aim of this issue is to broaden the research horizons at the National realm, so that it can promote to represent the collective thinking of philosophy in a dynamic rarity. Nevertheless JSSH objectifies to become a vehicle for a new source of conversation about insightful engagement for 'Human-Resourceful-Information' instead of the common usage of 'Machine-Information-Technology' and its place in the academic review. Last but not the least we offer deep sense of gratitude to all the contributors. Our concern of gratitude is shared with Dr Maina Sarma along with Dr Jahnabi Deka for their valuable suggestions and constant guidance for the on-going academic publishing of JSSH.

Here we want to convey that the style of Research Paper of the scholars is honoured and as such in many cases we have tried to keep the original style as far as possible.

– Editors

Common Sense Philosophy of G. E. Moore

Dr Jyotsna Bhattacharjee

The name of G.E. Moore in the history of philosophy is well-known and his importance only too obvious. His lasting influence upon technical philosophical thought is beyond question. Moore's work occupies a unique place in contemporary philosophy. He has been one of the most important leaders of the modern philosophical movement known as 'Philosophical Realism'. Dr. Rudolf Metz, the historian of British philosophy expresses that G.E. Moore was not only the pioneer of New Realistic Movement, but also the driving force and dominating personality in all the future course of its development.

The dominant feature in Moore's philosophy is his defense of common sense. He does not question the truth of the common sense statements, but takes them for granted because for him almost all the common sense statements are true. He finds it rather strange that why some philosophers should have any doubt about them? He said that only the statements of other philosophers had suggested philosophical problems to him, as he found them very strange.

Moore says that there are certain common sense statements which we certainly know to be true. We know for certain that "There exists at present a living human body which is *my* body. This body was born at a certain time in the past and has continued to exist ever since, though not without undergoing changes;... Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth; and, at every moment since it was born there have also existed many other things, ... The earth has also existed for many years before my body was born."[1] These are some common sense statements which Moore says that we know to be certain. If somebody thinks that he merely believes them and does not know them to be certain then Moore replies that he has nothing better to say than that he does know them with certainty. He admits that we do not know many of these propositions directly. For example, we cannot know the proposition, 'The earth has existed for many years before my body was born' directly. We know it through inference, but even then he does not see any reason for doubting that we do know it.

Therefore, Moore does not agree with those philosophers who have said that none of us know for certain the existence of material things or of other selves besides ourselves. Beliefs in the existence of other things or other selves are only beliefs of common sense according to such philosophers. They think that these propositions of common sense are only 'believed' and not known for certain. Some have said that they are matters of 'faith' and not of 'knowledge'. Moore's reply to them is that if they think them to be beliefs of common sense and not matters of knowledge then they imply that "there are many human beings, beside myself, who have shared these beliefs, but neither I nor any of the rest

has ever known them to be true."[2] With this statement Moore makes it clear that those common sense beliefs are true. Because when the philosopher says that these are common sense beliefs, it logically follows that there are other human beings besides the philosopher himself, who have had human bodies and who have had various experiences, including these beliefs. So, according to Moore it is self-contradictory statement of the philosopher to say that they are not true.

From these discussions we find that Moore is trying to defend common sense. He is a philosopher who 'knows', as other persons do that the earth has existed for many years past and that the earth is inhabited by many human beings. Therefore, he refuses to accept theories which contradict them. For example, he does not agree with Berkeley, who held that no idea can possibly 'exist' without being 'perceived'. Here Moore does not see any reason to hold such views contradictory to common sense.

In the same way he criticizes Hume's philosophy. Hume maintains that he is incapable of knowing external object or any other human being. Moore admits that it is difficult to disprove such a position. The only proof that we do know external facts lies in the simple fact that we do know them. But he thinks that the arguments which Hume uses in favour of his views have no conclusive force.

With regard to causation, Hume declared that our only reason for supposing two facts to be causally connected is that we have always found them to be constantly conjoined. But he thinks that it does not follow that they will always be so conjoined and therefore we cannot know them to be causally connected. But Moore thinks

that the conclusion does not follow from the premise. He believes that we may know many things which logically do not follow from anything well known. As for the supposition that the belief is caused by custom, it is also not a sufficient reason to conclude that we do not know it to be certain.

Moore further thinks that Hume's arguments that we cannot know any external object to be connected with anything we actually observe is fallacious. To prove it he has to disprove two theories. First of all, he has to disprove what he calls the 'vulgar theory'– that is, things exist even when we do not observe them. But to prove that we cannot know any external objects, he also has to disprove the philosophical theory that we can know things which we do observe to be caused by external objects which we never observe. If Hume cannot disprove this theory then his proof that we cannot know any external object also fails. Moore says that in Hume's argument we cannot observe these supposed external objects and therefore we cannot observe them to be conjoined with any objects. But Moore thinks that his theory about causal cannection does not state in order to know 'A' to be the cause of 'B' we must have observed objects like 'A' to be constantly with objects like 'B'. An external object can be like something which we have formally observed. So, according to Moore, on Hume's principle there is no reason to deny that an external object exists, even though we do not observe it. Hume therefore does not know an object to be casually connected with any other and so he does not even know any external fact.

Moore thinks that no conclusive argument can be advanced in favour of these propositions. So he says that we may conclude that we do know external facts, and if we know this, there is no

reason why we should not believe that other people also do the same. Arguments against these certainties involve presises much less certain than they are. So, according to Moore, we may confidently assert that we do really know some external facts, though we cannot prove this assertion.

We can see from these discussion that Moore all along tries to defend common sense. He takes common sense statements as ultimate. For him, an argument to be conclusive has to fulfill two conditions. Those two conditions are– 'The conclusion must really follow from the premises', and secondly that, 'we should know the premise to be true.' As Whitehead says that in order to discover whether the second condition is fulfilled we have to answer a question similar to the origin question and it leads to an infinite regress. So, Moore says that we can never know anything if we always have to use argument for it. He thinks that in the system of beliefs there are some statements which are ultimate and known immediately. They cannot be proved by reference to anything else, but other is proved by reference to them. We cannot prove these ultimate statements, but everybody agree with them. Moore admits that we might be mistaken in accepting some of them. But there is no reason to deny that we do know them for certain. If we cannot prove a thing there is no reason to doubt it. We may not be able to prove that 'This is a hand', but that need not trouble us. He thinks that a claim can be a reasonable one though it may be erroneous. Moore merely wants to say that our claims on behalf of common sense are more reasonable than any other and that our common sense statements, which assert the existence of external objects, are more plausible than those which deny them.

In 'Some Main Problems of Philosophy' Moore tries to give us a general idea of philosophy. He says that the most important and interesting thing which the philosophers have tried to do is to give a general description of the whole universe. Different philosophers have put forward different views regarding the nature of the universe. But there are certain views regarding the nature of the universe, which are held almost by everybody. They are so universally held that they may be called the views of common sense according to Moore. He admits that perhaps common sense cannot be said to have any views regarding the nature of the whole universe. But it has very definite views to the effect that there are some kinds of things which are certainly in the universe. However, there are many philosophical views which go beyond common sense or contradict it. Therefore the views of the philosophers are often very different from the views of common sense. Moore begins by considering what he takes to be the most important views of common sense.

To begin with, Moore says that we certainly believe that there are many material objects in the universe. We know that there are millions of bodies, plants and inanimate objects in the universe. We also know that the earth itself is an enormous mass of matter. We believe that though the earth seems huge to us, it is small in comparison to the whole of the material universe. We are also used to the idea that the sun and the moon and the stars are great masses of matter. We believe all these about the material universe, and it is common sense to believe it all. But in primitive times it was not common sense to believe some of these things. In primitive times people believed that there were only a small number of human bodies besides their own. They also believed

heavenly bodies to be small in comparison to earth. Moore says that we now believe that these primitive views about the material world are certainly wrong. According to him this discovery is a part of the progress in our knowledge. It can be seen that there are certain things, about which the views of common sense have changed. But the view that there are a large number of materials things in the universe has remained the same. From the primitive times men have believed in the existence of a large number of material objects. We also believe that besides having bodies human beings possess minds as well. By saying that we have minds we mean that we perform certain acts of consciousness. We see, hear, feel, remember, imagine, think and believe, we are afraid, angry, loving etc. These activities which we perform are all mental acts or acts of consciousness.

Moore says that common sense believes that there are at least two kinds of things in the universe : material things and mental acts. We also believe that acts of consciousness are attached to some material things. But Moore states that we also believe that no acts of consciousness are attached to the vast number of material things. He says that we are sure that chairs, table, houses and mountains do not really see, feel or hear anything. They are not conscious. Therefore, it seems that compared to the vast number of material objects in the universe, only a small number perform– acts of consciousness. The greater number of material objects in the universe in unconscious.

According to Moore, common sense also believes that material objects can and do exist, even when we are not conscious of them. For common sense, we are, for instance, at this moment seeing some material objects in the room; we believe that they

will continue to exist even when we have all gone away and the room is shut up for the night and no one is seeing them. Moore says that commonsense believes that matter is independent of our consciousness of it. We also believe that there are many more material objects of which no man or animal is conscious, than the material objects of which we are conscious. Further Moore says that there was probably a time when there were no acts of consciousness attached to any material object on earth. We believe that the earth was hot at a time that no living bodies could exist on it. So, there could be no conscious being living on the hot earth. We believe that it is comparatively for a limited time that men have existed on the earth. As we believe that at some time in the past there were probably no conscious beings at all on the earth, so also we believe that there may come a time in the future, when this will again be so. Hence there may be long periods when consciousness is not attached to anything.

It is believed that all material things are situated somewhere or other in something which we call space. Common sense also believes that all material things and acts of consciousness are in time. By this is meant that there are such things as present, past and future.

There is another belief of commonsense, which Moore mentions. He says that common sense believes that we really know all the things which have been mentioned. For common sense we know that there are and have been in the universe two kinds of things– material objects and acts of consciousness. We know, that there are and have been in the universe huge numbers of both. We also know that many material objects exist when we are not conscious of them. We also know that the things of both

kinds existed in the past, which do not exist now.

Most of the special sciences have given us a great deal of information regarding the material objects and acts of consciousness of men or animals on earth. Moore says that we distinguish between things which are now definitely known, things which were formerly believed, but believed wrongly and things which we do not yet know. We believe that there are a large number of things which are now definitely known to be facts and a great many things which were formerly believed, but now definitely known to be errors and a great many things which we do not know and perhaps would never know. Moore says that this is a part of the beliefs of common sense.

Moore does not mean to say that these are the only views of common sense regarding the universe. He merely says that these are some of the main beliefs of common sense. The views of common sense taken together do not amount to a general description of the whole universe. Common sense asserts that there are a large number of things in the universe and that they are related to one another in certain ways. In short, common sense view is that there are certainly in the universe– 1) material objects in space and 2) the acts of consciousness. From this we may conclude that i) these two kinds of things are the only kinds in the universe and that ii) they are the only kinds we know to be in it, but there may possibly be others. Moore thinks that the second view is more plausible i.e materials objects and acts of consciousness are the only things we know to be in the universe, but there may possible be others. This view has been accepted by many people– philosophers and others. Moore thinks that there are certainly several other kinds of things besides material

objects and acts of consciousness and he believes that it is one of the objects of philosophy.

Moore says that one way in which we might get a general description of the universe is by making addition to the views of common sense. To take a view of this type, a large number of people believe that there certainly is a God in the universe. So many people have believed in God that it might be claimed to be a common sense belief. But many people, on the other, assert that even if there is a God, we certainly do not know that there is one. So, it is fairest to say, Moore thinks that common sense has no definite views regarding the question whether we do know that there is a God or not.

Further, many people believe that there is a future life and they say that we do know it. But there are many others who assert that even if there is a future life, we do not know it. Common sense has no definite views on this matter. So, Moore says that this may be called an addition to the views of common sense.

In his essay 'A Defence of Common Sense', Moore states some important points in which his philosophical position differs from positions which have been taken up by other philosophers. The question whether the common sense view of the world is true or not is clearly answered by Moore in this essay. He begins his essay by giving a long list of propositions, every one of which he claims to know with certainty to be true. The propositions included in the list are of the following types– that there has for something existed a human body which is his body, that during the time it has existed, the body has been in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth, that the earth had existed for many years past, that he has often perceived his body and other

things in the environment.

Moore knows all these propositions to be true. He says that at the first sight these propositions seem to be a set of truism. He also states that he is affirming these propositions because if they are all known to be true, then they prove that there are two kinds of things in the universe that common sense beliefs are to be there, material objects and acts of consciousness. When we speak of tables or chairs, we all know that they are material things outside our mind. This is commonly understood. It will be very strange for us to say, according to Moore, that they are 'permanent possibilities of sensation', as some philosophers have remarked. Some philosophers say that every physical fact is logically dependent upon some mental fact. But Moore does not see any reason to hold such a view.

He does not consider the question whether belief in God can be taken as a common sense belief. Moore does not think it to be so, because though many people believe that there is certainly a God, so many people again say that we cannot know God even if there is one. On the same ground Moore excludes the belief in after- life from common sense beliefs. Many people believe in the immortality of soul and many people do not.

For Moore, common sense is the general matrix from which all philosophical systems have arisen. When we step into philosophy, we do not step into something absolutely strange, but philosophical systems arise by additions to or alteration of common sense beliefs.

From his discussions in 'A Defence of Common Sense' and 'Proofs of an External World', it appears that there are two kinds of Common Sense beliefs. He says that in some cases a Common

Sense belief can be given a rational justification and need not be taken as a matter of faith. For instance, to prove the statement, 'There are material objects', Moore holds up his hand. He says that everybody can see that the proposition, 'This is a hand' is true. Since 'hand' is a material thing, it at least follows that there is one material thing. But he is aware of that the philosophers might question the truth of the premise 'This is a hand'. He does not think that he can prove the proposition 'This is a hand'. So he believes that there are certain things which must be known in immediate knowledge.

Moore says that common sense never dreams of doubting such facts as 'This is a hand', 'This is a table' etc. Common people never bother about proving them. They just believe that they know them to be true. Moore, as a philosopher of common sense, talks like any common man, when he says that he knows that there are external things. He declares that if we cannot prove a thing, it does not mean that we cannot know it. We know that 'Sun will set in the evening'. But we cannot prove this statement. Our inability to prove it does not make the statement false. In this respect the wide gulf between Moore and other philosophers, who want proof for everything is very clear. Some philosophers even say that because we cannot prove the existence of material objects they do not exist. For Moore it is silly to doubt the existence of the hand or the table or other material things. If someone says that he does not know them, but only believes in them, then Moore has nothing better to say than that he does know them to be true.

Moore himself admits that he is an 'unsatisfactory answerer'. But he is the 'greatest questioner' in the words of Dr. Metz. In

his philosophy we find a sincere attempt to defend common sense and to express ideas in an ordinary manner. Though he has not given satisfactorty answers to many of the problems, there is no doubt that Moore occupies a unique place in the history of philosophy.

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A Methodical Study of Psychological Problems in the light of Patanjali Yoga Darsana

Dr Saraju Das

One notable achievement in the advancement of knowledge in the West, in the modern period is the formulation and application of the scientific method in different areas of study and research work. Science and technology have made tremendous progress during the modern period. Scientists have given us comparatively accurate information about the nature of things and phenomena around us with the application of their scientific method. In earlier stages, science was more concerned with external objects with their physical, chemical and biological properties, but recently, the scientists have also applied their methods to the study of mind, giving rise to scientific psychology.

Scientific method is an objective method which includes observation, experiment and inductive reasoning. Modern psychology has become mostly experimental as experiment is used widely to the various problems of mental phenomena.

In 1979, Withelm Wundt established an experimental laboratory in the West. Since then experimental studies on different mental phenomena such as perception, memory,

learning etc. have been carried on with great success. As a result of which, experiment has become a very popular and effective method indicating a well-marked shift of study from introspectional to experimental.

But history of the development of modern psychology shows that at the first stage of its development it could not shake off completely the use of introspective method. According to structuralism, introspection is the proper method of psychology. Titchener, the founder of structuralism, holds that psychology is the analysis of the inner states of consciousness. In order to know its structure, introspection is the only suitable method for it. Hence Wundt, the founder of experimental laboratory revealed, by his definition of psychology, that 'introspection for the time being the primary method of psychology laboratory'[1].

According to Titchener, however, introspection is also a type of observation. It is a psychological type of observation or looking within and not physical science-type of observation of looking at.[2] Introspection is the direct observation of mental states and processes. It is not ordinary simple observation, but a controlled observation of the state and processes of consciousness under experimental conditions. He maintains that non-experimental introspection or loose introspection cannot be the method of psychology. It requires intense training on the part of the introspector to give their introspective reports in a correct manner. Thus, in the hands of Titchener, the method of introspection got the most perfect shape and became more scientific and accurate.

But strong objections were leveled against this method from the side of Behaviourists. Behaviourists wanted to reduce psychology to biological science by the application of their

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objective method of observation and experiment. Watson vehemently criticized Wundt, the pioneer of structural school and stated that 'psychology made a false start under Wundt ... because it would not bury its past. It tried to hang on to tradition with one hand and push forward as a science with the other.'[3] According to the Behaviourists, psychology has nothing to do with intangible entity like consciousness. Psychology is to deal only with objectively measurable and verifiable entities, i.e. with behaviour. By observation and experiment, behaviour can be repeated under controlled artificial arrangements and general conclusion regarding this can be arrived at.

By the method of observation and experiment overt behaviour can be studied. On the other hand by introspection, mental states and process of conscious level can be studied. But beneath the overt behaviour and the mental states and processes of which we are conscious of, there lies a vast reservoir of mind called the unconscious. Herein neither observation and experiment nor introspection can enter to the depth of that reservoir. To unfold the secret of that unconscious area of mind, Freud the founder of psycho-analysis school, found out a technical method called 'psycho-analysis'. He employed this method for investigating into the causes of and treating neurosis or mental disorder. This method is primarily the method of free-association to study the abnormal behavior of human being. It is that method by which physician or psycho-analyst instructs the patient to relax mentally and let ideas come up spontaneously. Although the whole situation is controlled to some extent by the physician-patient relationship, the method is called the method of free-association. Here physician or analyst allows the patient to take the lead, making

very few comments and interfering as little as possible with course of the patient's thought and speech. Many other techniques such as dream-analysis, word-association test, TAT test, Rorschach inkpot test have been employed by different psycho-analysts to unfold the unconscious and to analyse the unconscious behaviour as well. But the special interest of psycho-analysis is to study the conflicts of emotions which is regarded by Freud as the root cause of all abnormal behaviours or mental disorders.

Man does not behave always either normally or abnormally. They sometimes behave super-normally also. Modern psychologists, have been trying to study the super-normal behavior of man with their scientific method, i.e. with their observation and experiment. Different societies have been formed in the West to study such super-normal behavior scientifically. These societies are engaged in carrying out experiments and in collecting evidences concerning the super-normal behaviour of man. Some of the greatest scientists and thinkers of the West have devoted much of their time in such research as a result of which many valuable contributions about the hidden treasure of the deeper nature of man and the universe have been made.

From the above discussion it appears that the trend of modern psychology is to study our behaviour– normal, abnormal, paranormal or super-normal by the application of scientific method. Modern psychologists have been trying to unveil the mystery of the whole mind – conscious and unconscious with their observational and experimental method.

In the light of this if we look to Yoga psychology we find that as it is the psychology of body, mind and soul, it takes into account the overt behaviour of the body, the internal experiences of the

mind and the illuminating principle of the soul. Again for a comprehensive study of such a psychology, according to yoga, different methods are to be employed at different stages.

Scientific method, i.e. the method of observation and experiment were not unknown to the ancient thinkers of India. Ancient oriental thinkers as such, also practically used observation and experiment whenever there arose necessity. Indian thinkers were fully aware of the limitations and inadequacy of the scientific method, employed in physical sciences. According to them such scientific method can work only at the very superficial level of citta. The deeper levels of citta which are at the root of all our conscious behaviour and also the higher levels of citta which lead us to the realization of the true nature of the self cannot be properly explored by this method.

From the analysis of the origin, nature, constituents and function of citta, it is known to us that it is the finest instrument through which alone we can have a glimpse of the resolendent self. Citta is too subtle and fine and hence any scientific instrument is insufficient to dicover the human ingenuity. Even the finest scientific device discovered so far to study the external as well as internal world are considered gross and not applicable to comprehend the fineness of citta. So the real nature of citta with all its characteristics– paridrsta and aparidrsta– cannot be known by any of the scientific instrument under any controlled condition. Citta can be known properly by citta only.

This citta again is lighted by the borrowed light from the self which alone is the source of infinite light or consciousness. When all the modifications of citta are arrested, when citta becomes as pure as Purusa, one realizes the true nature of the self which is

the ultimate goal of Yoga-psychology. Thus, the modern experimental methods, used in the field of physical sciences are very ineffective, insignificantly and hopelessly inadequate to study even the real nature of citta, not to speak of the self. So Yoga uses introspection.

The ineffectiveness and difficulty of the application of the physical-science-experiment in the field of psychology was also felt by Wundt and Titchener. We find that though they were in favour of making psychology effective they advocated introspection as the primary method of psychology. Introspection, according to them, is the direct observation of the subjective mind with all its mental elements. It is the observation of the contents of consciousness under experimental conditions. In order to make the method reliable and fruitful, in their opinion, intense training is to be given to the subject to make the introspective report correct.

But Yogic introspection is completely of a different type. What Western psychologists call introspection or knowledge of the subjective mind , Patanjali regards it as objective since the mind is not the seer, but only an instrument of seeing.[4]

According to Yoga, introspection is the psychological method of bringing the citta to be occupied by one object. Ordinarily, citta is scattered and runs towards all the objects of senses in different directions. Objects are like magnet and attract the citta as if it is a piece of iron. Yoga opines that to withdraw such a restless citta from different objects and to concentrate to one object is called 'pratyahara' or 'introspection'. So to make the citta introspective, it is very difficult and therefore constant practice by following the different steps prescribed by Yoga is absolutely

necessary. Generally, citta is under the influence of the sense organs and it is citta which runs after the moving senses. So first of all, we are to concentrate the citta in one object and then to make the senses to follow the nature of citta i.e., we are to re-educate the senses. The senses are to be trained to be away from their respective objects and to follow the nature of the citta as bees follow the course of the queen bee. When the citta is fixed internally, the senses no longer perceive external objects. Thus introspection in the Yogic sense means the gathering of the citta from the association of the senses.

Psycho-analytic method or the method of free-association of the Freudians may also be termed as a special kind of introspection. Psycho-analytic method is mainly concerned with the direct observation and report of past emotions when they come up to the conscious level from the unconscious under certain controlled circumstances. It is the method of observation and experiment with introspection.

Patanjali also mentions certain impediments which disturb citta and lead to some mental disorders. According to him there are nine such impediments viz., disease, mental laziness, doubt, carelessness, sloth, non-abstention, erroneous conception, non-attainment of concentration and instability to stay in a Yogic state. These impediments give rise to some psycho-somatic diseases and neurotic conditions viz. sorrow, despair, tremor of the body and irregular breathing which resemble mostly the symptom of neurotic conditions described by modern psychiatry.

All these of course do not necessarily create pathological conditions but there is possibility that they may take a serious turn. So Patanjali suggests certain antidotes to check these

impediments such as

1. By Iswarapranidhana or complete surrender to God these impediments or mental distractions can be prevented.

2. Patanjali recommends that one should practice concentration on a single principle first to remove these obstacles.

3. But before such practice of concentration a spirit of friendliness, compassion, goodwill and indifference towards happiness and misery, virtue and vice are to be cultivated.

4. Citta can be made one pointed and calm by throwing out and restraining the breath also. Throwing out means ejection of the internal air through the apertures of the nose by a special kind of effort and restraining or pranayama means the retention of the breath. Citta can be made calm and serene by practicing pranayama, i.e., by controlling and regulating breath.

5. Regular practice of concentration on certain higher principle also brings about fixity of citta. Concentration on higher principles brings higher objective perceptions or extrasensory perceptions. These higher perceptions fix the citta firmly by removing the doubt and form the gateway to knowledge acquirable through concentration.

Acconding to Patanjali whatever principle be considered suitable, that can be contemplated upon to bring the fixity of citta because it is the habit of citta that if it can be fixed on particular thing for some length of time, then it can be easily fixed on other things also. Fixity of citta on one single principle strengthens will

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power, mental capacities and the power of resistance.

In psycho-analysis the analyst plays an important part. The analyst stimulates and directs the process and interprets the report to gain the knowledge about the unconscious dynamics of the people under controlled conditions. But in the method recommended by Patanjali the person concerned takes the initiative himself. According to Patanjali when evil thoughts arise in the citta and make the citta disturbed, and in this case constant pondering over the opposites is the remedy. This is a sort of auto-suggestion. All evil thoughts are rooted in wrong habits of thought. So one should attack the trouble at its root and alter the habit of evil thoughts by replacing them with exactly of opposite kind. To clear away all the evil thoughts of citta one should pour constantly holy thoughts and allow them to go deep into it. Thus, this method may be called the method of self-analysis or auto-psycho-analysis with auto-suggestion.

Psycho-analytic method is socially conditioned. Though Freud calls it the method of free-association yet a conditioned mind can hardly proceed with free-association. There always remains some constrains and social fear, as the person himself suggests his mind to think properly. He practices himself the process of 'pratipaksabhavanam' as a result of which the mind automatically starts getting free.

The technique of psycho-analysis adopted by Freud aims at producing a type of artificial introversion for the purpose of revealing the unconscious repressed emotions and desires to the subject which are the causes of one's trouble. Yoga technique of self-analysis on the other hand aims at adopting a natural process of introversion to remove the root-cause of one's own afflictions

by meditating upon a single principle. According to Sri Aurobindo, the method of self-analysis is the only method of controlling even the strongest of human urge like the sex urge, which springs remote from the biological life and is deep-rooted in all the living beings.

From all these it appears that Yogic method of treating the psycho-somatic and neurotic troubles of human beings has the most reliable therapeutic value and also greatly useful for human advancement in general charging the predicament in which humanity is finding itself in modern life.

Thus it may be said that Yogic introspection is quite different from the Western type of introspection including the special type of it called psycho-analysis. The former is a better and safer method in comparison with the latter to reveal the hidden property of the unconscious citta and also for the development of integrated personality.

Furthermore even by Yogic introspection the whole of citta with all its states, functions and powers lying at the deepest level cannot be known. Henceforth to know the real nature of object introspection must be sublimed by intuition-dhyana to attain prajZaloka. It is the most effective method of Yoga psychology and is regarded as the most suitable method for the realization of the goal.

Intuition is the knowledge from within. It is the immediate apprehension of the object with the eye of wisdom. The knowledge which is acquired through intuition is completely different from any ordinary knowledge. Ordinary knowledge is derived from observation, inference and testimony as it gives us the knowkedge of the object with all its peculiarities. A thing which is subtle and

hidden from view or situated at a distance cannot be known by ordinary observation. Through inference only general conclusion can be drawn and verbal testimony cannot describe particular features as they are not meant to signify such features. So by the application of the senses and by ratiocination the real nature of the object cannot be known. Kant quite rightly maintained that 'Ding-an-Sich' or 'things-in-themselves' cannot be known by the senses or the reasoning mind, since the senses and reason can only present us with their own subjective reactions. According to him it remains completely unknown to us. Objects may be in themselves and apart from the receptivity of our senses we known nothing. Again our manner of perceiving them, is being peculiar to us and not necessarily shared by everybody.

Kant did not admit the validity of any experience other than that of the senses or of the reason. So he had to conclude that the 'things-in-themselves' are unknown and unknowable. Here lies the difference between Kant and Patanjali. According to Patanjali also the true nature of the object cannot be known by senses and reason. But there is a higher method called intuition or prajnaloka above sense perception and reason by which the 'things-in-themselves' can be known.

Intuition or PrajZaloka is different from introspection also. Introspection is conscious and intellectual awareness of the mental processes of the individual. But in intuition the individual receives immediately a clear insight of the object without any conscious mental effort. But we should remember that intuition is not opposed to reason. Intuition transcends reason. According to Yoga it is the only way by which the true nature of the object is revealed to us and also the self can be realized and experienced

in all its purity and totality.

In the West Bergson, Bradley, Prof. N. O. Lossky and Croce also recognized intuition as the possible method of knowing the transcendental 'I' and 'things-in-themselves', though regarding the nature of intuition they differ among themselves. According to Bergson intuition is kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Bradley did not use the word intuition, yet in his opinion it is 'transcendental experience' or simply 'experience' which is the ultimate source of grasping the absolute reality which is according to him is the coherent system of subordinate elements.[5] Prof. Lossky, on the other hand maintained that intuition does not stand for any special kind of knowledge but covers all forms of cognition ranging from perception to memory and imagination, in which things cognized and the self-cognizing them are always immanent in consciousness.[6] But whatever may be the nature of intuition their views have a theoretical import only in regard to the method of intuition. Their works could not show the way that lead to the knowledge of the true nature of the self or 'things-in-themselves'. Their findings therefore are more or less methodological.

According to Bergson, man's consciousness has adopted itself to understand the world in terms of space and time. But if it were freed from keeping busy with the perception of the outer world and focused upon a world of 'Noumenon, it would transcend time and space and adopt it to perceive 'Noumena' in a special way. This way he calls intuition which is distinguished from sensuous perception.

Bergson who gives a famous account of intuition in the West

could not show the way to free the consciousness from the world of phenomena whereas Yoga psychology goes beyond Bergson's account of intuition and clearly shows the way of developing the power of prajñaloka or intuition. According to Yoga, intuitive power can be developed by the practice of Dharana Dhyana and Samadhi, i.e by Samyama.

Dharana or concentration is the citta's fixation on a particular point of space or region. The continuous flow of the same knowledge in that region is called dhyana or meditation. When the object of meditation shines forth in the citta that is devoid of the thought of the self even, then, it is called Samadhi. These three, i. e., Dharana, Dhyana and Samadhi directed together to the same object is technically called Samyama. When Samyama is mastered through practice, the light of knowledge or intuitive power shines forth. The practicing individual then gets the power of knowing things simultaneously, i.e., without any sequence of time and in all their aspects. In other word he acquires the clear light of knowledge through the power of realization. The knowledge that is gained then is filled with truth (Ritumbhar/ Ritambhara.) In that state the touch of rajas and tamas is removed, and the sattva or the enlightening faculty predominates in the buddhi which is the highest instrument of cognition. Whatever is known at that time is the complete truth. The knowledge then, is not produced and variations of the object to be known appear simultaneously. Gradually prajña is also arrested and thus citta then loses its last alombana or resort. The self, then shines in its own nature.

Western psychologists with the application of their scientific method, though have been gradually approaching towards the

knowledge of para-normal or super-normal behaviour of man, have not yet discovered the self as it is in itself. According to Yoga, super-normal psychic powers are impediments on the way of the realization of the true nature of the self. From the above discussion regarding the method of psychology, we find that according to Yoga, intuition is the proper method of the science of the soul. To attain intuitive power or prajZalika one must follow different processes prescribed by Yoga.

Yogic method or the method of intuition as practiced by the Indian Yogis is essentially scientific for it is the technique which is universally applicable and guarantees uniform results to the average people who train themselves on the method of intuition. Thus it seems to be the most scientific method.

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Ethical Dimension of Teacher-Student Relationship

Prof. Raghunath Ghosh

I

While commenting on teacher-student relationship as found in Indian classical literature the first which is to be discussed is the concept of relationship. The relation always concerns at least two entities *(dviṣṭhah sambandhah).* If the relation between a teacher and student is seriously thought of, we must see the role of right and duty of them. Two entities can be related if there is a sense of both duty and right in both. Otherwise relation is broken.

The rights of teachers and students presuppose the discussion on what right is and other related issues. There are some problems concerning the concept of duty, whether duty and right are the two sides of the same coin, or whether right can be exercised without being dependent on duty. I would like to address these questions from Indian perspective at the very outset.

II

While thinking on human rights, it reminds me two cruel scenes in public places, which are as follows. One fine morning I was passing through a market place and found a child of ten years

cleaning utensils in a tea-stall and another one of the same age was breaking coal. It reminds me of an advertisement, telecast in the National channel of Television where there are repeated instructions for not using children as labours, but allowing them to avail their own right of proper education. It is really pathetic indeed to see a scene where some beggars are sharing rotten foods left in the garbage with a few dogs. These scenes are enough to prove that human beings are not given even the rights of food leading to their survival. The scenes just narrated reflect a picture of the struggle for existence, which is at stake in this society not to speak of exerting their rights.

Human beings are the best creation of God as observed by a Vaisnava poet- *sunaha mānuṣ bhāi sabār upare mānuṣ satya tāhār upare nāi* (i.e. human beings should aware of the fact that humanity is above all and nothing exists beyond it) and hence among all forms of right the question of human right comes first. The human prosperity, the exercise of right, human pleasure etc depend more or less on social situations. Each and every human being has got some duties towards the society and social beings. For the greater interest of the society an individual should forsake his own narrow self-interest and take part in various voluntary social works. One should perform some work for the welfare and happiness of the mass- *bahujanahitaya bahujanasukhaya.* Under such a situation a man can exert his own right, because right and duty are mutually dependent and hence it is called two sides of the same coin. Without the sense of duty right cannot be enjoyed and if right is not provided, the question of duty cannot be raised. The idea-'I have my own right' presupposes that others would recognize my right and allow me to enjoy the same. If we

accept or demand our rights, we should adhere to the fact that the other human beings have also got their rights, which we should properly honour. A civil society is marked by the presence of multiple styles of life and coexistence of multiple units. Multiplicity and pluralism shape the situation of life in contemporary society.

Philosophically speaking, the concept of human rights implies inter-subjectivity or the existence of others. This is the basis of ethics or the sense of duty. No one, as Plato observes, is 'self-sufficing';[1] there are many things, which we want for our lives. Hence there arises the question of exchange. It is possible if 'one gives and another receives under the idea that the exchange will be for their good'. From this it implies that, when a man discharges his duties, other person can exert his right. Plato's observation that no one is self-sufficing and there arises the question of exchange reminds me the derivative meaning of the term 'ought' used to convey the sense of duty, which comes from the verb 'owe'. In old English the past tense form of the verb 'owe' is 'ought', which implies that the sense of 'ought' may come in one's mind if one thinks that one 'owes' *(rna)* something from others. In other words, one will have a sense of duty if one has a feeling of gratitude to others for their free exercise of rights. Hence the term '*rna'* may be taken as the sense of obligation to them who have performed their duties to them. From this it can be decided that the sense of morality denoted by the term 'ought' cannot be imposed on an individual, rather it comes from within when he thinks himself '*rni'* or obliged to others[2]. Someone can perform his right and duty if he feels a sense of obligation to others. Since the individuals find that occupation which is in accord with their respective natures and nearest and dearest to

their hearts, there is no room for dissatisfaction and the consequent frustration. The satisfaction of the individual arising from the performance of the duties of their station and the exercise of right furthers the efficient use of their talents. Social progress is ensured since each individual is eminently suited to the performance of the duty that he is assigned to. The naturality with which he discharges his duty and exercises his right adds to the case and grace of the performance.

III

So far as the dictionary meaning of right is concerned, it is a justifiable claim on legal or moral grounds to have or obtain something, or to act in a certain way. A right may be a legal right that is a right that can be enforced through a court of law, such as a 'right of way' and the legal aspects of such a right are matters of jurisprudence, the science of law. On the other hand, a right may be entirely a moral right and one which a court of law will not enforce, such as the right of a parent to obedience on the part of his children or the right of an old man to respect. In Sanskrit literature it has been shown that in some cases the right and duty are interrelated as evidenced from the Sanskrit word-*adhikāra,* which implies both right and duty. The term *adhikāra* is generally used in the sense of duty and right or authority. If it is-*'adhikāro dattah'*, the term is used in the sense of taking charge of something. If it is uttered-*'svādhikārāt pramattah',* it is in the sense of duty i.e., forgetful about one's duty. In other usages like *'adhikāre mama putrako niyuktah'* (i.e., my son is appointed to the post of authority) and *'karmanyevādhikaraste mā phalesu kadācana'* (i.e., your '*adhikāra*' is in performing work, not in result), the term '*adhikāra*' is used in the sense of authority or right and

duty respectively. If it is said that an individual has got equal access to all the branches, the word 'access' can be expressed with the word- *"adhikāra'* from which the term *'adhikārī'* i.e., having eligibility of receiving different philosophical doctrines is derived. If I accept or demand my own right to be exercised, it presupposes that other human beings have also got their rights, which I should admit. On account of this the Sanskrit term-*"adhikāra'* implies both right and duty. Without the cooperation of the two one cannot survive in our society.

The term 'right' is also used in the sense of 'possession' *('svattva')* and 'ownership' *('svâmitva')*. The Grammarians have laid down the rule of using genitive in this sense as known from the *sutra*-'*sasthi sese'*. Moreover, *Yājñavalkyasamhitā* in the *vyavahāra adhyāya* has discussed at length on the right of the property of the Brahmins, women *(strīdhana),* different types of sons like adopted son, step son etc.

<div align="center">IV</div>

So far as the rights of teachers and students are concerned, we should see what the basic characters of a teacher and a student are. If the term '*Ācārya*' is taken as Sanskrit-rendering of the term 'teacher', the derivative meaning of the term goes as follows. An individual who has examined a particular code or injunction in his life first and then thought for implementing to the pupils is called '*Ācārya*' in the true sense of the term. It is the right of a teacher to advise a pupil to guide him/her after considering his/her capacity or intellectual power. But he can enjoy this right if the injunctions to be given to the pupils are duly examined by him. Without personal experience or practice (*ācarana*), it is

unethical for a teacher to give an advice to maintain certain codes. There is a common saying in Bengali-'*Âpani ācari dharma apare śikhāo' i.*e., after practicing something in one's own life it should be recommended for others. Hence, right to advise or guide a student can be exercised if he has got a proper moral background of self-experiment. In the same way, a student is called *châtra*, because his duty is to hide his preceptor's demerits like an umbrella as derived from the meaning *'chatrena chātrah'*. Students have rights of their own, but it should be kept in mind that the exercise of right should be in cope with the above-mentioned definition of a student. They can exercise their right but at the same time they should not do anything in the name of right which is dishnourable to his/her teachers. Both teachers and students have got their rights but there is a rider of morality so that we cannot do anything in the name of right. A student has every right to develop a constructive criticism of a theory given by his teacher, which is called an academic honesty. In the West such right is commendable. Plato has formulated a definition of a man for the first time by saying-'Man is a Featherless Biped'. Next day Plato has seen that his students have put a hen after cutting its feather and outside it has been written-'It is Plato's Man'. As soon as Plato enters his classes, he has seen the featherless hen and also found that his beloved students have started laughing being critical to the matter. Plato, after considering the students critique in the form of laughing, has revised his earlier thesis and reformulated his definition- 'Man is a Laughing Animal', which has been rejected by his another student Aristotle and formulated as 'Man is a Rational Animal'. In Indian tradition also a student has right to differ from his/her teacher's standpoint

if it is grounded on logic. A teacher also feels proud of admitting his student's thesis or being defeated by him in the battle of argumentation. Russell is found to show his gratitude to his own student Wittgenstein who has completely refuted the view of his teacher. There is a common saying that a teacher or a father should desire victory everywhere, but desires defeat in arguing with a student or son (*sarvatra jayamanvicchet putrāt śiṣyādicchet parājayam*). In this context we find a mutual pride of a teacher and a student for being defeated and victorious in the battle of argumentation. This sense of pride gives rise to the sense of right in the long run.

In our *Dharmasastra* it is admitted that any person has right to be a student of a particular teacher. A teacher has right to teach ten types of students like a son of the preceptor, one who is desirous of hearing or learning, one specialized in different field of knowledge, religious at heart, sacred, reliable, one who is capable of accepting and retaining the acquired knowledge, one who can pay money, one who is desirous of attaining one's well-being, one who is a relative. A teacher has no right to accept a student who does not belong to one of the ten categories as endorsed by Manu. ("*Âcāryyaputrah śuśrūṣurjñānado dhārmikah śucih/ Âptah śakto'rthadah sādhuh svo'dhyāpyo dasa dharmatah//"Manusamhitā 2/109, henceforth M.S.).* From this prescription the following points can be highlighted. If a man is really not interested in learning or if a man is not endowed with basic things to learn a *Śāstra*, he is not treated as qualified as a student. A teacher who is knower of Brahman will embrace death but will not disseminate knowledge to an unworthy student even at the time of crisis. ("*Vidyayaiva samam kāmam martyavyam*

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brahmavādinā/ Apadyapi hi ghorāyām na tvenamirine vapet" M.S.-2/113). Moreover, a man possesses the capacity of providing money for education, he is considered as a student, which is similar to our courses ran as self-financed basis. The term '*śuśrūsā'* is worth-pondering here, because it may mean both 'desire to hear' and 'service in the form of nursing'. I think both are not completely unrelated. When a student desires to know something *(śuśrūsā)*, he starts serving (*śuśrūsā*) his teacher. In fact, the fact of serving indicates the hidden desire of the student. It may be recollected in this connection that three methods like salutation *(praṇipāta)*, repetitive questioning (*pariprasna*) and service (*sevā*) have been accepted in Indian tradition to know something from the teacher. It is rightly pointed out by Manu that if a student is not initially trained how to read the *Śāstras*, he loses his right to learn as a learner. For the teacher is supposed to teach a student who at least acquires the capability of learning. That is why it is desired by the teachers and students in a *mantra* of the Kenoponiṣad that the student must acquire the power of grasping and the teacher must acquire the power of teaching successfully -'*saha vīryam karavāvahai*.' Moreover, teaching-learning process must receive sustenance for a longer period of time as prayed in the same *mantra- "tejasvi nāvadhitamastu'.* Hence any student cannot have the right of learning unless he/she attains the above-mentioned qualities. Regarding nursing (*sevā)* it is said by Manu that just as a man gets water after digging soil again and again, a student gets knowledge from the teacher through his repeated nursing.*("Yathā khanan khanitreṇa naro vāryadhigacchati / Tathā gurugatam vidyām śuśrūsuradhigacchati"* –M. S.-2/218)

It has been stated earlier that a teacher should not answer any question until and unless it is asked for. A student must adopt the method of repeated questioning *(paripraśna)* to know something. A student will lose his right to learn if the questions are asked to the teacher in a bad manner or without maintaining courtesy. Hence the codes of conduct are valuable for a student to exercise his right. A teacher under this circumstance will voluntarily act like a dumb person without answering the question in order to *teach the student a good lesson.* ('*Nāpṛṣṭah kasyacid bruyānna cānyāyena pṛcchatah/ jānannapi hi medhāvī jadavalloka ācaret//' M.S. 2/110).* Punishment has been prescribed for teacher who answers the question asked in a non-courteous manner and also for the student who asks question in a bad manner. *(" Adharmena ca yah prāha yaścādharmeṇa pṛcchati/ Tayoranyatarah praiti vidveṣam vādhigacchati//M.S.* 2/111).* No wrong can go unpunished in the teaching-learning process in ancient India. When the question of right is discussed, the prescribed codes and conducts must be taken into account. For the right can be protected if codes are maintained by the incumbents. It is further stated that if right is exercised without maintaining codes, it may create an enmity among the students and teachers, which is not also desirable. For this reason it is prayed by both the teacher and student-'*Mā vidviṣāvahai'.*

In our tradition a teacher feels his sense of right of disseminating knowledge, if he finds the possibility of getting something as honorarium from the students in return. It may be either virtue *(dharma)* or money *(artha)* or free nursing service *(śuśrūsā).* If there is no possibility of getting any of these, a teacher may not feel inclined to teach, just as a good quality of seed should

not be scattered in the barren land. ("*dharmārthau yatra syātām śuṣrūsā vāpi tadvidhā/ Tatra vidyā na vaptavyā śubham bījamivosare//"M.S., 2/112).* From this it can be easily be taken into account that to take something as honorarium from the student was not taken as an offence, but professionally justified.

It has been stated earlier that a student *(chātra)* is so called if there is supposed to have a tendency of hiding the defects of the teacher, which also finds evidence in the *Manusamhitā.* It is observed that if a student gives false ascription or imposes some false allegations to the teacher *(parivāda),* he will be destined to take birth as a donkey. If he blames a teacher for something, he will be born as a dog. *("Parivādam kharo bhavati śvā vai bhavati nindakah."M.S.-2/201).* If there is any comment adversely made against the teacher by someone, a student should immediately leave the place after covering his ears with two hands *("Karnam tatra pidhātavyanm gantavyam va tato'nyatah." M.S. 2/200).*

A student has no right to worship his teacher remaining far away from him, or to worship him in an angry mood. He should greet his teacher after getting down from his vehicle or leaving his own seat if necessary. Any talk derogatory to his teacher should not be spoken. *("Dūrastho nārcayedenam na kruddho nāntike striyah/ Yānāsanasthaścaivainamavaruhyabhivādayet//" "asamsrave caivam gurorna kiñcidapi kīrtayet//" M.S. 2/202-203).*

We come across two terms '*ācārya*' and '*upādhyāya*' standing for a teacher, though Manu has made a distinction between the two. A teacher in the sense of *Acarya* has got right to make a student to be aware of the whole Veda including Upanisads

and knowledge relating to the performance of sacrifice. He must be a Brahmin for being a teacher.(*"Upanīya tu yah śiṣyam vedamadhyāpayed dvijah/ sakalpam sarahasyañca tamācāryam pracakṣate// M.S.2/140).* A teacher in the sense of *Upâdhyâya,* on the other hand, has got right to disseminate knowledge regarding the ways of maintaining livelihood which may be a part of the Veda or *Vedangas ("Ekadeśastu vedasya vedānganapi va punah/ yo'dhyapayativrttyarthamupadhyayam sa ucyate//"2/ 141).* In present days a teacher of Sanskrit and Philosophy covers both the areas related to his profession as well as Vedas and Upanisads and hence no distinction has been maintained between *ācārya* and *upādhyāya*. All can be broadly designated as Brahmins so far as their profession is concerned.

A teacher having such characteristics must teach his students without creating any psychological pressure on them. He has right to teach in a non-envious manner. If he wants credit or virtue for this, he has to apply sweet and non-harsh words to the students (*"Ahimsayaiva bhūtānam karyam śreyo'nuśāsanam/ vāk caiva madhurā ślakṣṇā prayojyā dhanamicchatā"// M.S.2/155).*

In the way it has been shown that envious attitude (*himsā*) after adopting harsh words called *vāk-pāruṣya* or getting some punishment (*dandapāruṣya)* should be discarded in the education system. From this ethical or moral restriction it is shown that a teacher has no right to adopt *himsā* whatever situation may arise there. That is why, the term *'himsā'* is taken in diverse perspectives like rebuking a student, killing animals, plants etc.

The modern Indian thinkers like Gandhiji and other education policy-makers have given instruction to all the teachers, students and employees to behave modesty in such a manner so that the

students do not feel any psychological pressure. Moreover, the National Knowledge Commission has drawn our attention to be more student-friendly in the academic institutions after using sweet non-harsh words. The instructions are not given to the teachers only, but also librarians, library employees, officers and others after keeping the importance of student-friendly attitude in view.

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Understanding religion through Multiple Paradigm Model.

Dr V. Prabhu

Philosophy, by the merit of its subject content is closely associated with religion. Bertrand Russell remarks in his *A History of* Western Philosophy, " Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is something intermediary between theology and science".[1] Philosophers for centuries have been concerned about religion, for there is always a mutual influence of one domain over the other domain, since both talk about the same issues but with appealing to different faculty. Religion and philosophy have always been interacting with each other throughout. The influences of philosophy on religion at times have been positive and at times negative too, for philosophy itself is a dialectics between different camps. Depending upon the orientation of the respective philosopher, their philosophical attitude towards religion differed. Some philosophers were too dispassionate with religion to expound the religious doctrines' validity. Some other philosophers had a considerate approach towards religion. Even among the latter group, individual philosophers differ, with respect to their approach towards

religion. These different viewpoints are an outcome of their personal attitude in relation to the historical context in which they are. Some may go for a rational approach; some others tend towards "mystical" (non-rational) approach, which make them to generate newer arguments and concepts to support their claims.

This paper is an attempt to provide a novel way of having a considerate approach in understanding religion, by taking some cues from Ibn Rushd's approach towards religion. Ibn Rushd, being primarily a philosopher, tried to give more emphasis on understanding religion through rational means. In this paper, his conceptions with respect to religion are outlined and evaluated, to evolve new ideas in philosophy of religion like 'contextual infallibility', 'multiple paradigm model of interpretation'.

Ibn Rushd (1126—1198 A. D.) better known as Averroes in the West is one of the greatest philosophers of Islam. Ibn Rushd was primarily a rationalist, might be because of the influence of Aristotle, whose works he extensively commented on. We shall focus here on some of Ibn Rushd's theoretical conceptions with regard to understanding religion, leaving aside the other non-theoretical issues related with the outcome of his theories with respect to religion. Even these theoretical conceptions are taken as cues for a liberal way of understanding. The very attempt is to identify the way of interpreting the text, particularly scriptures.

Ibn Rushd begins with the contention that Quranic Law demands the study of philosophy. Many Quranic verses, such as "Reflect, you have a vision" [2] and "they give thought to the creation of heaven and earth"[3], command human intellectual reflection. IbnRushd took recourse to such type of verses in order to make

it a point that rationalizing religious scriptures are not against scriptural commands.

Ibn Rushd viewed that truth was accessible to both philosophy and Islamic theology. According to him, not all people are able to find truth through philosophy, which is why the Law speaks of three ways for humans to discover truth and interpret scripture: the demonstrative, the dialectical and the rhetorical. These, for Ibn Rushd, divide humanity into philosophers, theologians and the common masses. Ibn Rushd maintained that demonstrative truth cannot conflict with scripture (i.e. Qur'an), since Islam is ultimate truth and the nature of philosophy is the search for truth. If scripture does conflict with demonstrative truth, such conflict must be only apparent. If philosophy and scripture disagree on a particular issue, then scripture should be interpreted allegorically. Ibn Rushd contends that allegorical interpretation of scripture is common among the theologians and the philosophers.

The interpretation of scripture is carried out in such a way that is proper for the audience concerned. There are categories of interpretations depending upon the nature of audience. The same type of interpretation could not be carried out to the masses and to those who are qualified through education, opined Ibn Rushd. To teach the masses a dialectical or demonstrative interpretation, is to hurt the faith of the believers. The same applies to teaching a theologian philosophical interpretations.

This conception of Ibn Rushd leads to what may be called the 'parity' or 'harmony' of truth, philosophical and theological. The only difference is the path to truth—philosophical and the theological. For any 'apparent' conflict between the religious texts

and the philosophical texts, one has to resolve the conflict by taking recourse to the suitable method of interpretation.

This led to the development of what came to be known as "radical Averroism" or the "double truth theory", according to which religious and philosophical propositions are incompatible but both true. This was not actually part of Ibn Rushd's argument, instead he argued that religion and philosophy were alternative routes to the same destination, ie., salvation and that the apparent contradiction between them was only apparent.

Having highlighted the crux of Ibn Rushd's philosophy, some of the key features of Ibn Rushd's conceptions are pointed here, which are taken as cue by me in developing new method of interpreting texts: -

Reasoning religious scripture is granted

People who adhere to religious faiths are of different types with different natural dispositions

To gratify different set of people, different types of interpretation is accepted

One category of interpretation need not contradict/ supplement other categories of interpretation

These key features lead us to what I term is "contextual infallibility". This suggests that the meaning of the statement does not mean the same to all set of people at all times and place. For example, a statement that is interpreted and addressed to masses might be different from the way that particular statement is interpreted among the theologians. Still, as far as the masses are concerned the statement is infallible though the meaning of the statement is different among the theologians or philosophers. This

might be termed as "contextual infallibility". This idea operates on the notion that there are hearers (people) with different natural disposition and addressing them has to be different too.

Extending this concept that there are different sets of people, I am trying to point out that there are different types of statements within a religious text. And identifying the frameworks of these different statements lead us to a liberal interpretation of the text. This is carried out by me through a method of interpretation called as "Multiple Paradigm Model" (MPM). An attempt is made to explore the possibility of interpreting texts through different paradigms. This is worked out by proposing a way of interpretation. This model functions with a consideration that the hermeneutics of a text need not operate on one single paradigm. There can be very many paradigms that influence in understanding the contents of this text. This model is based on two grounds: (i) a text is not a separate entity, but it consists of many constituents within it. It is an organic whole. (ii) Understanding and interpreting text must proceed first with classifying under what head this text can be categorized, and then proceeded further.

And here, through the approach of considering multiple paradigm structures in interpreting any text, I make an attempt to introduce a liberal way of interpreting texts. Traditional interpretations, for want of maintaining the autonomy status of religions, often go with the rigid framework of authority of God. Each religion does not only want to maintain its individuality, but also wants to maintain its autonomy. We also find the presence of other schools of interpretation, which sociologize the religious

enterprise. On the one side, all religious enterprise is carried out with a 'divine' framework, which excludes rational and social dimension. On the other hand, the same enterprise is carried out with 'social' framework, which excludes dimension of identity, autonomy and transcending aspect of religion. This is the existing state of affairs.

I propose to envisage a model of interpretation that takes into account both the dimensions, namely, divine and social. I make an attempt to find out the scope of ascribing an autonomous status to religion. The main objectives of this project are:

- To provide a new model that accommodates changes within the system and still retains its identity.

- To give a philosophical rationale in the process of interpretation of a text.

- To explore the possibility of understanding the text beyond the orthodox/traditional ways of interpretation.

- To find the different frameworks involved in the process of interpreting the religious texts.

Religion as an organic whole does not only have a philosophical base, but sociological base as well. These bases can be considered as paradigms within which the process of interpretation takes place. Each base/paradigm is characterized by certain traits and has the corresponding epistemological foundations and a defined function to perform.

Theological base: This is the base that signifies the canons of the religious text. It pertains to those zones where reason can

work and also extend beyond reason. These sections of the text are characterized by the non-temporal and non-spatial features.

Mythological base: This is the base that marks the events in a religious context. For the practitioner of a particular religion these events may be historical whereas for an onlooker these events may be mythological. The spatio-temporal dimension of these events is contentious.

Sociological base: This is the base that points out the sociological dimensions of a particular religion. This is concerned with the living ways of religion that comprises of rituals, customs, habits, etc. This is marked by the spatio-temporal factors.

While carrying out a hermeneutic of text through **MPM**, three major concepts have to be discussed. They are as follows:

Autonomy

Legitimate movements

Trespassing

Autonomy : It is the idea that every interpretation that is carried within a particular framework need not be validated or justified from other frameworks. For example, the mythological interpretation of the text need not be given a theological base.

Legitimate movements : This is concerned with the possible movements that are applicable within the interpretation base. That is, all possible theological interpretation can be worked only within the theological framework. Similarly, a sociological interpretation can have its own additions, mutations (positive or negative) etc., within the sociological framework. Those movements are legitimate movements.

Trespassing: This is an illegitimate movement from one base to another. This goes against the spirit of autonomy of interpretations. For example, if a sociological interpretation of content is supported by a theological interpretation, then, the interpretation acquires a theological flavor, subsequently resulting in the features of atemporality, eternality, infallibility etc. This kind of 'trespassing' closes the room for further interpretation of the text even from a sociological point of view.

As mentioned, every philosopher proposes his/her philosophy based on his/her personal orientation, his/her historical setup and the need of that hour. This they achieve through new arguments and rationalizing principles. I tried in this paper to propose a new model for interpreting religious scriptures. The three concepts do play a major role in interpreting a text through this new **MPM**. In the wider context, these three concepts help to establish the identity of a religion in a pluralistic setup. This new model, I believe, can take care of the present day problems that one faces with respect to understanding and interpreting religion and religious scriptures.

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Morality and Religion in the Religious Philosophy of Sankardeva and Nanak

Dr Maina Sarma

In the contemporary ethical thinking, the question of the autonomy of ethics is a very hotly debated issue. Ethics is said to be autonomous in the sense that it cannot be a branch of any other discipline. Goodness is its own reward. Without going to the intricacies of such debate, one observation must be made at the outset that the problem of the relation between different disciplines arises only at a comparatively advanced stage of culture. Morality and religion like science and art had proved themselves as normal aspects of human culture. Some sort of connection must subsist between them, for each in its own way is a reaction of the human spirit on the facts of experience. In face of their common origin, one would say that there must be bonds of affinity between them [1].In the idealistic philosophies of Sankardeva and Nanak, the two cannot be split into two non-communicative territories. A brief analysis of certain striking features of morality in the religious thoughts of Sankardeva and Nanak help towards a conclusion about the relation between morality and religion in their thoughts.

The basic assumption that precedes every endeavor in Sikhism is the fact of underlying unity which runs through all. "Within us is God, without us is God too, yea, God is in the three worlds"[2]. As being created from this single source all are contained in God. It is thus conceived that all are spiritually related. The moral trouble lies in the human failure to discern this element of unity.[3] The failure to discern this unity is ascribed to the influence of individuation, or what Nanak calls *haumai*. The moral agent is required to direct his efforts to the realization of this underlying spiritual unity of the self. In this respect, Nanak stresses on the need to realize the unity in terms of actions.

The effort, through which the moral agent is to realize the underlying spiritual unity of the self, necessitates moral progress. This is an ethico-spiritual progress leading to a unitive experience. In this, the concerted efforts of the whole personality along with the grace of God is involved.

The path of spiritual progress described by Nanak at the end of japji in the Adi Granth involves a process comprising of khands, which is very important from the standpoint of morality as well. It points to a life of progress towards the solution of the contradiction between man's higher and lower nature which is accompanied by the transformation of the lower into the expression of the higher. This is a basic problem of morality. The essence of the moral life in Sikhism consists in the renunciation of the private or exclusive self and the identification of our being with a widening sphere of spiritual life beyond us. [4]

Morality thus implies progress. This progress in Sikh ethics is conceived in the six-fold stages. These are – (1) A preparatory

stage. Nanak has given no specific name to it. But its crucial importance lies in the way in which it describes the spirit of the proceeding seeker. (2) Dharamkhand, the second stage is generally rendered as region of customary or conventional morality.[5] (3) Giankhand, the cognitive dimension. (4)The Saramkhand or the aesthetic dimension. (5) The Karamkhand or the dimension of action. (6) The Sachkhand, or the dimension of truth.

In the first stage of the journey of moral transformation undergone by a person, what is required to be of great importance is the spirit of renunciation of pride.[6] In Sankardeva also, the spirit in which a person has to proceed in his journey is one of humility and equipoise .Adevotee has no pride of his achievements[7].

In the stage of Dharamkhand, the moral agent is to cultivate moral virtues and perform his social obligations.[8]It is the moral context in whichthe moral agent resides. There are no specific duties mentioned in connection with this stage. The fact of situational peculiarities makes it not possible to lay down specific duties in each case. In the next progressive stage, there is a process of gradual realization in and through the dimensions of knowledge, feeling and action. The apex of moral progress is to be reached through the integration of knowledge, feeling and action. According to Nanak, the apex, namely the *Sachkhand*, is not an independent stage. It is an integral stage where knowledge, feeling and action are all fused.[9] This is the ultimate stage where none but true One manifests. This also indicates that the whole moral endeavor of the moral agent culminates in a spiritual realization.

In Bhakti-ratnakar, and also in Nimi-nava-siddha-sambada, devotees are classified into three classes on the basis of the nature of the stage achieved by them. These three classes are (1) *Uttama*(best), (2)*Madhyama* (middling) and (3)*Prakrita* (ordinary). In Sankardeva's religious literature also, the classification is not exclusive but integral. The three types differ in the possession of certain moral values in the devotees. The difference is however one of degree. In short, one who sees God in all creatures, who does not inflict violence towards anybody, who is indifferent to worldly pleasures, who sheds off greed, attachment, desire, anger, and who never acts in view of results is the *uttama* bhakta.[10] One who is friendly with the society, have respect for the superior and bestows kindness to the inferior is the *madhyama* bhakta.[11]On the other hand, one who worships the image of God with devotion but have no special feelings for the devotees of God and other persons is the *prakrita* bhakta[12]. Certain qualities like sacrifice, mental tranquility, self-control, forgiveness, faith, modesty, aversion etc. are possessed by the best type of devotee in a maximum degree, the ordinary devotee in a minimum degree and the medium type of devotee stands in between. Bhakti-ratnakara has recorded and Guru-carita Katha has referred to antaranga bhakti as the supreme devotion.[13]In this mental stage a devotee perceives the immanence of God in all animate and inanimate objects and devotees. Under such a state of mind one develops respect for all objects and consider them as his own self.[14]

In Bhakti-ratnakar, it is stated that God's grace favors those who practice devotion in the association of devotees[15].Such a

devotee achieves a mental state of indifference to worldly pleasures and knowledge of God comes to him which in turn begets liberation. Like Nanak, Sankardeva also emphasizes the importance of a preparatory mental state. The ground for the cultivation of the name of God is to be cleared first. It is only in such a mental state God's name can be implanted. But until and unless God favours him with His grace, he cannot expect to attain knowledge[16].Till this stage is reached, a man should perform such duties as are not in conflict with the path of devotion. The last stage or the ideal stage is the stage of complete detachment or in difference to worldly pursuits[17]. In the final stage, ordinary ethical laws of good and bad conduct cease to operate on him. But till the final stage is reached, a devotee should scrupulously observe prescriptions and injunctions of the scriptures. Defiance or transgression of those scriptural codes is *adharma* or sin. This gradual process of spiritual elevation towards the attainment of the ideal bhakti, has been termed as *Pippalayana* bhakti in Guru -carita Kotha, because it is advocated by Pippalayana, one of the nine siddhas who gives devotional instructions to the Nimi.[18]

It becomes clear from the above analysis that Nanak as well as Sankardeva in their own ways recognize a basic fact of human life. The fact being that in man there is a discord between two natures –a higher nature which is rational and universal and another which is particular, limited. The solution of the problem as to how this contradiction can be solved furnishes the key to man's life as a moral and spiritual being. Morality can offer only a partial solution to this discord. Hence it has to transcend to a still higher stage where this division in man's nature can be

overcome. It is religion which can solve the discord completely. The achievement of the agent consists in a step by step process. Each step is a step in the road of spiritual progress. Incidentally, it may be noted that in Buddhism, though in a different background, the ethico-spiritual progress of the seeker is conceived in various stages. These stages are four in Mahayana Buddhism and eight in Hinayana Buddhism. The stages are called Bhumis. [19]

· The seeker is required to shed his false notion prior to the commencement of the spiritual progress in the pre-bhumi stage, somewhat similar to the preparatory stage in Nanak's religious philosophy.A Putthujjana is defined in the MajjhimaNikaya as – "one who labours under the delusion of I-ness and mine-ness. Not knowing the true law, he develops attachment to things which he should avoid."[20] In Sankardeva, though the stages are not clear-cut, they are discernible. Sankardeva shows how the seeker prior to the commencement of his journey affirms his insignificance in the total scheme.[21]

In a way, asrama-dharma of the Hindus also describes the various stages of spiritual progress. There is however, difference between the two approaches. In Sikhism, tekhands do not stand for controls as in Buddhism.[22] The way in which Sankardeva and Nanak deal with the whole issue, we may find a fine exposition of how the gap between morality and religion is bridged.

Here a very important question emerges as to whether in Sikhism as propounded by Nanak the process of realization of the three khands is simultaneous or not. Interesting discussions may take place in this regard. We may however mention the

views of three eminent scholars of Sikhism. They are Sher Singh, Surindar Singh Kohli, and Avtar Singh. Sher Singh regards the process of realization of these three khands not as simultaneous process while he says: "The defect of the intellect makes us emotionally alive and we enter a region of happiness"[23]Surindar Singh Kohli also holds a similar view while he says "This realization takes him into the next region, i.e., region of effort (saramkhand), wherein he beautifies his mind and intellect."[24] Here progress in the realization is conceived in terms of step by step process, that is, finishing one and then entering into another. Avtar Singh maintains, "knowledge and feeling are to function in harmony with action. But in so far as the realization of the ideal of all these three is concerned, they mark of continuity".[25] The interpretation that the seeker first furnishes with one and then enter another region cannot be held on the ground that the khands do not stand for the division of life as it is the case with Hindu asramadharma. Further, all the three khands of tri-dimensional progress have reference to three elements of human mind viz., intellectual, emotional, and affective. These three elements are not isolated fragmentary elements of human consciousness. Hence the view of Avtar Singh to consider the fact of simultaneous realization instead of continuous transition from one khand to another seems quite tenable. Further, this view presents us the whole scheme of progress as one of integrated progress of which Avtar Singh describes as "Integrative Spiritual Practicalism".[26]

The religious thoughts of Sankardeva and Nanak have strong social dimension. This leads them to insist on the fact that pursuit of religion is not at the cost of the duties of the members of the

society. The devotee belongs to a society of persons to whom he bears some obligations. Sankardeva and Nanak have repeated the point that without membership in the community man cannot fulfill himself. Even salvation comes through service. In fact, the test of spiritual realization is in the conduct of the person. This is called his Rahit(conduct)[27]. Nanak remarks-"When one dwells on the word, one's mind flows out to serve others......On hearing Guru's word, one becomes jivanmukta. His conduct is pious (or true) and he is ever in bliss".[28] In this way, they depart from the traditional division of life into four stages in the ethics of the Hindus. According to the traditional Hindu ethics, in order to realize the supreme ideal, a person should completely renounce the social context (banaprastha). But both Nanak and Sankardeva emphasized the need for a change in attitude; the basis of this change must be social. Even in this stage, a devotee does not cease to work. The following remark well expresses the real import of such a state- "True self freedom can never think of the restricted self-expression of any unit of life. His free instincts will revolt against such an idea. He will earnestly work to secure full realization of free life for all ....He will do everything that leads to the highest good of all ....To work for highest life is to work for all life, for all is in that One."[29]

The relation between morality and religion in Sankardeva and Nanak is broad based upon this conception. We have seen that moral life implies progress. Now it is evident that a religious life too implies a progress. But unlike morality which is progress towards the infinite, religion implies progress within the infinite. Hence, while morality is the pursuit of an ever eluding infinite,

religion is the ever deepening consciousness of an infinite that is already in our possession.[30] Unlike the modern thinkers Sankardeva and Nanak were critical of any system of ethics cut off from metaphysics. Morality is based upon certain metaphysical assumption. Man has to live for an ideal, for a purpose, or goal. The goal is to realize the unity of man. This ideal itself is metaphysical in nature. Sankardeva and Nanak have recognized the basic truth that cut off from the ontological foundation, morality degenerates into expediency and prudence. That is why the relation between morality and religion is very intimate in the religious philosophy of Sankardeva and Nanak. The general Christian thinking is also in line with this. For a devotee, the idea of perfect goodness and the idea of God coincide. That is why in obeying commands of duty and in the cultivation of goodness the devotee feels that he is obeying God. Here one proceeds from religion to ethics rather than from ethics to religion. Here the following remark made by Dr. TrueBlood is significant- "Some of the hardest problems of our day are moral problems, rather than economic and political ones but, moral problems as they are, many of them cannot be solved except on a religious basis.....we will not accept all man as brothers until we are really humble, and we are not really humble until we measure ourselves by the revelation of the God"[31]

Sankardeva and Nanak were practical moralist in the sense that their chief concern is not to discuss what goodness is, but how to become a good man. This led Nanak to say- "Truth is higher than everything, higher still is true living".[32] Morality is not a question of laws and conventions but one of purity of mind

and actions as its outward manifestations. The all important thing is the realization of truth as it is encountered in the experience than in the striving after a theoretical, dry as dust, empty and abstract logical compatibility.

Sikhism as propounded by Nanak and Vaisnavism as propounded by Sankardeva are predominantly normative and it is natural for them to encourage the members of the faith group to move in the desired direction. The fundamental aim of their thinking is to link the daily life of human beings with the eternal purpose of life and inspires spiritual unity amongst people.

Religion, according to them, is integration. It transforms the whole being of the individual self. But this transformation is not confined to individual's private self. It must spread to the community. Both the thinkers realized the ethico-spiritual importance of religion. Moral actions of a person are the necessary factor in self-realization. Morality and self-realization go together. It is because of this reason morality and religion in their thoughts is complementary to each other. Consequently each and every moral value is at once a religious value. All values are grounded on the absolute;but are to be realized subjectively by the self through his active effort.

Sankardeva and Nanak were not that type of mystics who turned their back to the world. For Nanak this world is an abode of truth(*sachdikothi*), and a temple of righteous living (*Dharamsal*).[33] Sankardeva likewise maintains that this earth, though temporal, yet is instrumental to the realization of the highest value[34].In these teachings, they were realists. Hence through the philosophy of activity they have offered a unique way of

harmonizing mysticism with realism. On the other hand, in their ethico-religious philosophy of values, both the thinkers are idealists. In the question of enforcing these values or principles they are relativists in the sense that according to them, absolute perfection can be achieved by means of relative goodness. This position reconciles the dualism of idealism and pragmatism. They are pragmatists in the sense of being practical. But they never identify the truth with the useful. We therefore come to the conclusion that morality and religion in Sankardeva and Nanak are never opposed to each other ; nor one is subordinate to another. Man's awareness of infinity produces in him a desire (propensity) to realize this infinity fully in this life. This is both a religious and a moral endeavour. The moral awareness of what is good is not to be clashed with the religious awareness of infinity.

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Phenomenology and Existentialism : An Appraisal

Dr Akoijam Thoibisana

The historical background of the philosophy of phenomenology and existentialism can be set back to the nineteenth and twentieth philosophical traditions of mainland Europe. It specifically belongs to the era of contemporary continental philosophy that also home many other movements like, hermeneutics, structuralism and post-structuralism, French feminism, psychoanalytic theory and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Among the essential characteristic themes of the continental philosophy, mention may be made of its non-naturalistic scientific approach to human science that is conditioned by human experience or reason. It also gives due consideration to conditions of possible experience such as context, space, time, language, culture and history. Its philosophical inquiries are thereby closely related to the human experience– individual, moral and political. The paper seeks to give an appraisal of the two most popular continental philosophical movement, namely phenomenology and existentialism.

The tradition of philosophy has undergone changes with the academic training and degree of professional affiliations. The progress in philosophy can be categorized in terms of metaphysics,

epistemology, ethics, logic and aesthetic. It can also be divided in terms of the era or history like classical or ancient, medieval or Renaissance, modern or enlightenment and contemporary. Accordingly, there are philosophers who participate in different traditions of philosophy, namely: analytic, social, applied, speculative and phenomenology. While analytic philosophy which was popular in the middle of the twentieth century offered a specific approach to problems through linguistic analysis, be it problems of language or questions of semantics; social or moral philosophy in the tradition of Socrates and Plato, that are also defined by the tradition of Marxists, Existentialists and Pragmatists, approaching the problem both from social and individual point of view. Applied philosophy, on the other hand, took the forms of applied ethics, be it public affairs, political, environmental, media, technology, identity, conflict, etc.,thereby calling upon the issues centering the problems of contemporary thought in value based society. Speculative philosophy addresses the philosophical issues from a metaphysical point of view. Finally, phenomenology sets out as a movement of philosophy that addresses the issues not from a naturalist scientific perspective but more from the insight of a conscious human subject. Since philosophy evolves an entire world-view that encompassing conceptual as well as the practical framework, it is an intellectual thought process that does not end here. It continues to groom in the name of postmodernism, post-structuralist, hermeneutics, critical thinking etc.

Continental philosophy began with the philosophy of German idealism advocated by Immanuel Kant. The philosophy of Kant puts a limit on what can be understood, by bringing everything under the conditions of objective judgment. Kant in his effort to reconcile the conflicting approaches of the rationalism and the empiricism, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781-1787)

established a new groundwork of metaphysics, known as the transcendental idealism. His idealism maintained that things–in-themselves though operates in a conceptual or a categorical framework of mind that includes space and time, exist independently of human perceptions and judgments and therefore not knowable. The transcendental idealism of Kant was criticized by other German philosophers namely Fichte, Schelling and most notably by Hegel. Hegel in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*(1807) tries to reconcile the apparent contradictions that appear in human experience, be it in terms of being and non-being, existence and essence, reason and experience etc. at a higher level of examination, known as the Hegelian dialectic in his *Absolute Spirit*. Following Hegel, is the idealism of Bradley and Mac Taggart, whose philosophy of idealism was overthrown in the early twentieth century with the historical antecedents of Frege, Russell, Moore,Wittgenstein and other logical positivists. The latter philosophy rejected the Copernican turn of Kant and the subsequent philosophy surrounding it develops a new tradition in the history of philosophy, namely the analytic philosophy. On the other end is the movement of philosophy as phenomenology and existentialism.

Phenomenology and Existentialism

Phenomenology and existentialism as a comprehensive part of contemporary continental philosophy can be articulated in the work of German philosopher Edmund Husserl and his student Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Though the term phenomenology was implicitly used by other philosophers before Husserl, it was Husserl,who explicitly made it a philosophical movement. Existentialism was also implicitly present in the work of the nineteenth-century philosopher Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky though the term was coined by Gabriel Marcel.[1]

However, it was first popularized by French philosopher and writer, Sartre,[2] who proclaims himself as an existentialist, and also adheres to his predecessor by this name. Heidegger, as the immediate predecessor of Sartre,was labelled as an existentialist, though Heidegger himself neither claimed nor admitted himself as an existentialist. Heidegger even refuses to be called himself a phenomenologist. To quote Heidegger, "It is hardly necessary any more today to expressly observe that my thought deals neither with existentialism nor with existence-philosophy."[3] Nevertheless, his work carries on the thought of the existential tradition as laid down by the progenitors of existentialism. What follows hereafter is a brief outline of the philosophy of phenomenology and existentialism.

Phenomenology as a movement of philosophy initiated by Husserl is closest in temperament and interest to the German logician Gottlob Frege. Husserl's phenomenological notion of the content of thought, *noema* corresponds more with Frege and his investigation into the nature of logic, continues to generate interest among analytic philosophers. Another two important philosophical predecessors of Husserl are Descartes and Kant. While the Cartesian tradition of Descartes takes Husserl's phenomenology to the primacy of first-person standpoint, the Kantian search for the basic principle of *apriori* became the modus operandi of his phenomenology.[4] Husserl introduced a range of key concepts like intentionality, *noema, noesis, epoché*, phenomenological reduction, temporality, intersubjectivity and life world to establish his philosophical movement. Phenomenology in the hand of Husserl developed as a *rigorous science* that could clarify all species and forms of cognition. It is a study of the structure of consciousness which proceeds by *bracketing* the objects outside of consciousness itself so that one

can proceed to reflect on the *objects of consciousness* and systematically describe the contents of the conscious mind in terms of their essential structure.[5]It is characterized as a *return to the things themselves*, to the *phenomena*[6] or *intuitions.*The phenomena are not to be identified with any natural phenomenon, but implies *appearance* that is either intuitively given to experience or the concrete act of intuition. The starting point of Husserl's phenomenology is the suspension of the natural standpoint or the presuppositions of any phenomena, by the *ego cogito,* that ultimately takes up the standpoint of *transcendental subjectivity.* Phenomenology, however, is not and should not be confined and restricted to the philosophical movement of Husserl. Doing so will narrow down phenomenology merely to Husserl's phenomenology. Phenomenology is a loose-knit system of thought that releases a way, whose demand is not limited to an interpretation of their text but to follow a path laid down in their writings. As Mohanty said, the Husserlian mode of thinking provides us with an understanding that lay bare the experiential phenomenon that embodied any normative structure.[7]

Coming to existentialism and its chief characteristic, existentialism is a study of human existence that begins with a human being, not merely as a thinking being but as the being that exists in the world and thereby cannot escape the existential attitude of the being-in-the- world like anguish, anxiety, despair, dread, freedom, responsibility etc. According to this approach, the being or the man is generally disoriented and confuses in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world. The philosophy of existentialism is predominately concerned with freedom and its primary virtue lies is finding the authenticity of the being or man in this absurd world. In other words existentialism proposed that it is the individual who is solely responsible for giving meaning

to life and living it passionately and sincerely or rather authentically. That the individual is with-the-other or for-the-other is another explication that is inherent in its philosophy. Existentialism ignores the importance of science, mathematics and proofs of the objective validity of human existence. In short, it rejected the idea of *philosophy as science.* Existentialism in contrast to the scientific approach celebrates the existential human conditions and illustrates their ideas in novels, plays and other philosophical essays that are pseudo-science.

Kierkegaard is widely considered to be the first existential philosopher. His philosophy gives specific priority to concrete human reality like their emotion, feeling, choice and commitment over abstract thinking. He was critical of the idealistic trends of Fitches, Schelling and Hegel as too scholarly and focuses on the lives of a single individual. Nietzsche too emphasises the existential passion and anxiety of an individual man. His idea of *Superman*, the *Will to Power* and morality indicate the existential elements in his philosophy. The influence of Heidegger in the development of existentialism cannot be denied. His analysis of *Dasein* in terms of existential categories (*existentiale* or *existenz*) made him a prominent figure in the existentialist movement. Sartre posits the idea of existentialism in the fundamental doctrine that *existence precedes essence,* according to which man *exists* first and foremost as a being before any preconceived categories of its *essence.* According to him *man first of all exists*, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterwards.[8] Existentialism in Simone de Beauvoir reveals how a woman is treated as the *Other.* Her *The Ethics of Ambiguity (*1947) is an investigation of the ethical implications of existentialism.

An Appraisal between Phenomenology and Existentialism

The argument over the issue of compatibility between phenomenology and existentialism as the two most influential separate movements of twentieth century philosophy had been rendered moot.[9] It no longer seems pressing to decide the extent to which existentialism can be phenomenological or whether phenomenology leads one inevitably to existentialist views on the self and the world. [10] What is at hand is the inescapable unavoidable relationship between the two movements that are not accidental but indeed logical. It is not difficult to identify the cannon, if it is the similarity where they may be merged. For instance, both are concerned with providing a description of human experience and the world, without restoring to any scientific presuppositions, but highlighting on the non-rational dimensions of human existence like habits, practices, moods and passions. Both also focus on capturing the world as it is presented to us in experience. However, while Husserlian phenomenology is directed specifically towards *rigorous science* that seeks to provide *the principles of all principles*, existentialist develops a particular concern to the various moods of human existence in everyday life as absurd and meaningless. The challenge of existentialism lies in the authenticity of a man in terms of its responsibility and freedom. Considering both views, their similarity definitely outshines their difference. This, however, does not mean that they are always inseparable. Their principles are definitely independent. That is,while there are existentialist like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Jasper, whose existentialism does not carry a trace of phenomenology; there are other existentialist philosophers like Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau Ponty, Marcel and Ricoeur whose works make an important contribution in both phenomenology and existentialism. Mention may also be made of Husserl's

contribution in existentialism and the ethics of existentialism in his later works. Husserl's concept of life-world, temporality and inter-subjectivity carries the account of the principles of existentialism. What follows is a brief appraisal of the relation between phenomenology and existentialism taking into accounts the three prominent philosophers Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre.

As both phenomenology and existentialist begin from the Descartian ego cogito or 'I' with their respective focus, an examination of this ego cogito or the 'I' can present a concrete demonstration of the relation between phenomenology and existentialism. While Husserl's 'I' is interpreted primarily as a knowing consciousness that is concerned with the formulation of knowledge, different from the mere thinking 'I' of Descartes. For Heidegger and Sartre, the 'I' is the consciousness that acts, will and decides. That is, the experience 'I' is not related to knowing and reasoning, but an experience'I' who participates and makes a choice. That is, while the existentialist 'I' is fundamental to the nature of human freedom that addresses the questions and the nature of what it is to be a *being* or a man, the phenomenologist 'I' though it starts with the intuitive experience of the phenomena, ultimately addresses the issue of the epistemology'I.' Sartre in his major article, *Transcendence of the Ego*, (1936) launched a frontal attack on Husserl's doctrine of the pure ego. He argued that the ego was not as Husserl had maintained, the immanent source of all consciousness, but is transcendent and constituted the object. That is the 'I' according to Sartre is not part of our ordinary unreflective consciousness. Just as we are not aware of the 'I' in reading a book or listening to a music. The 'I' is constituted only in its reflective consciousness. The 'I' or me is therefore transcendent to the immanent stream of consciousness. Sartres argued that reflection simply illuminates but it does not bring its

object into being. Reflection merely uncovers or helps in discovering it. Consciousness, therefore, is not a product of reflection, it has been there all the time in pre-reflective twilight as it were. It follows that the constitution of the ego in reflection consists simply in its emergence from the background of consciousness, rather than in its formation on its outskirts. Sartres' criticism of Husserl's conception of ego does not stand beyond Husserl's first edition of the *Logical Investigation*.

Spigelberg argued in the essay 'Husserl's phenomenology and Existentialism' that Sartre took for granted the fact that Husserl's view on ego had changed between the first edition of the *Logical Investigation* of 1901 to the Ideen of 1913. [11] The pure ego of Husserl in *Ideen* is misunderstood to the transcendental ego of Kant or the Neo-kantians. Husserl's pure ego or his phenomenology of ego can be seized first hand in what he calls self-perception that is neither capable nor is in need of a special constitution. The pure ego of Husserl was infact never a constituted ego. It remains an immanent phenomenon that cannot be presented from different perspectives. Husserl further argues that the identity of the persistent ego is given only with self-evidence that differs only in its reflective modification of its various modes of appearance and not in its structure.[12] The Husserlian ego though it subscribes to the indubitableness of Descartes ego, differs from the latter as it cannot occur in abstraction from his act and vice versa. Hence, much like Sartre, Husserl treats the latter ego as a 'transcendent object' that is constituted by the transcendental consciousness with its focal ego.

Another issue at hand is the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Husserl's phenomenology definitely took a transcendental turn and came to be known as transcendental phenomenology. An examination of the Heidegger's

phenomenology will throw some light on this account. Heidegger's phenomenology is the philosophical exhibition *of showing itself* or, more precisely, *that which shows itself in itself.* Heidegger understood phenomenology in terms of the phenomenology of *Dasein* that shows itself without reflection and comes before all reflection.[13] Dasein is the discloseness of the various modes of being as it exists in the world. It is, therefore, popularly known as being-in-the-world. The being-in-the world gets itself disclose both in terms of readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. That is, the being is always directed to this or that experience that presupposes an engagement that have-to-do-with things that already involves perception. That is, pure perception according to Heidegger is a deficient mode of engaged perception. And the Heideggerian emphasizes on practical involvement in his analyses of sense-perception, though more passionate and intimate, is nevertheless a form of awareness or consciousness. Though the phenomenology of Heidegger is said to be a phenomenology of *Dasein,* different from the Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness, the point of argument is that Heidegger's phenomenology of *Dasein* ultimately is a human being that is also conscious. The authentic *Dasein* is the conscious being who can reflect upon being-in-the-world. Given the fact that Heidegger does not deny that there is such a being that has consciousness, it's phenomenology is not different from Husserl's phenomenology in the formal sense that is, letting be seen of *that which shows itself.* In other word, *back to things in themselves.* Heidegger constantly insists that one cannot separate a method from that to which it is applied. And so phenomenology ultimately cannot separate or bracket consciousness. Intentionality, the second characteristic of Husserl's phenomenology or Husserl's consciousness is not rejected by Heidegger. However, Heidegger

redefines intentionality not merely in terms of the essence of consciousness that has intentional object, but as the constitution of objects in consciousness that ontologically constitutes the *Dasein* itself.

With the limited aforesaid discussion, it may be concluded that both phenomenology and existentialism are movements of thoughts that cannot be simply displayed by a small number of official statements from some leading proponents. While the key writings in phenomenology come form *Meditations* or *Investigation* that are perpetually under examination and frequently disconnected, the central works in existentialism are not systematic works but illustrations of philosophical points in literary form. Phenomenology moreover has been carried on in investigation of psychology, aesthetic, science and every human endeavor. Existentialists too have spread widely. As it is said, a reader on phenomenology and existentialism might include selections on virtually any topic whatever. Hence, while the limits and desire on reading phenomenology and existentialism is unlimited, one can still keep the focal point on Husserl's philosophy, namely his *Ideas*[14] and *Cartesian Meditations*[15] and Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

References and Notes :

1   In his early essay "Existence and Objectivity" (1925) and in his *Metaphysical Journal* (1927) in Samuel M. Keen,"Gabriel Marcel" in Paul Edwards (ed.) *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. Macmillan Publishing Co, 1967.

2   Sartre adopted the term 'existentialism' for his own philosophy in 1940.

3   Heidegger, M. : *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* Translated by Ralph Manheim , Yale, 1986. pp. 649-50.

4   Robert C. Salomon. : *Phenomenology and Existentialism,* Rowan and Little field Publishers, New York, 2001.

5   *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* (ed) Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p.2

6   Husserl used the term phenomena as a concept of appearance that includes the twofold application of acts of intuitivepresentation, namely, the *acts of perception* and the *acts of representation,* 2016, p.13

7   Mohanty, J.N. : 'The Concept of Philosophy,' in *Phenomenology and Indian Tradition,* ed. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Indian Council of Philsophical Research, Motital , New Delhi, 1992, p.8-19.

8   Sartre, J. P. : *Existentialism Is a Humanism.* Translated by Carol Macomber, New Haven, Yale, 2007.

9   *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* (ed) Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p. 1

10   *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* (ed) Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p. 5.

11   Spigelberg, Husserl's Phenomenology and Existentialism. The Journal of Philosophy, 1960, p.72.

12   Ibid., p. 73

13   Heidegger, M.: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.* Translated by Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington &Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, Original, 1982, p. 159

14   Husserl, E.: 1913, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy — First Book : General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans., F. Kersten, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1982.

15   Husserl, E.: 1931, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. D. Cairns, Dordrecht : Kluwer, 1988.

World-World Chasm: Plato[1]

Dr Jahnabi Deka

Plato is subscribed to a dual-world metaphysics which admits a strict separation between two worlds: one is the world of concrete objects, e.g., table, and the other is the world of abstract objects, e.g., the Idea of table. The separation between these two worlds brings about an ontological dichotomy between them since according to Plato, while particular objects, the constituents of the sensible world *exist* in the spatio-temporal world; Ideas constituting the world of reason *subsist* in a non-spatial and non-temporal world. Thus Plato's metaphysical framework is a chasmic affair, i.e., it entertains a chasm between the sensible world and the world of Ideas. This chasm can therefore be conceived as a world-world chasm. This chasm may also be understood in the sense of the age-old problem of *One* and *Many*. Again, Plato, while incorporating world-world difference parallelly admits that these two worlds are related to each other by a special relation called *participation,* i.e., particulars *participate* in the Ideas. It is at this backdrop the present paper attempts to understand Platonic quest for framing a dualistic chasm on which he bases his gradational ontology.

Plato's Philosophical Sources :

To be initiated with Platonic dualistic chasm, a brief outline of Plato's philosophical sources can be put forward as a prelude to the understanding of the backdrop forces of the chasm. Plato's philosophical underpinnings got deeply stimulated and nourished not only by his master Socrates, but some Pre-Socratic thinkers also influenced him a lot. For example, Heraclitus' doctrine of flux had immense impact on Plato. From the Heraclitean remark that everything is in a state of flux, i.e., everything is in the process of becoming it follows that if everything is constantly changing, a thing cannot be said to be identical with itself. Hence Heraclitus arrived at the conclusion that change is changeless. This conclusion made him affirm the changing *many*. In keen opposition to the changing thesis of Heraclitus, Parmenides argued that permanence and not change is the ultimate reality. Moreover Parmenides says that there must be some *permanent essence* which is bereft of all changes. Reality, for Parmenides, must be one, single, permanent and unchanging. The basic argument that Parmenides had in favour of his thesis is that if a thing gets changed, how would it be possible to catch up the real nature of that thing or how would it be possible to define it? Plato said:

> What exists fully [i. e., unchangingly] can be known fully; what does not exist [unchangingly] cannot be known.[2]

In their ontology both Heraclitus and Parmenides went for supposing one or the other, flux or fixity to be the only reality. Again, Plato's disbelief in the world of sense is due to the

Heraclitean doctrine of flux and also due to the Parmenidean rejection of the senses. These two views made Plato to believe that the commonsense world is unreal or deficient in reality in the sense reality is understood as real. Again, for Parmenides there are two different ontological worlds: one, Absolute Being and the other Absolute Non-Being. But Parmenides left them completely unrelated to each other. That is, Parmenides did not attempt to bridge the gap between these worlds. Plato was not happy with Parmenidean decision, and therefore he proceeded to construct a dualistically designed metaphysics where dualism is meant to refer to a *hierarchy* of levels of reality. This hierarchy, Plato believed, would be able to bridge the Parmenidean dichotomy between 'Absolute Being' and 'Absolute non-Being'. Runciman calls such ontological hierarchy as *gradational ontology* in which *some things could exist more than others.*[3] Plato's chasm between two worlds thus can be seen in the sense of gradational ontology: the world of Ideas is ontologically graded higher than that of the world of senses.

Gradational Ontology :

Plato while talking about gradational ontology argues that there are two sources of human experience: sense-perception and reason. In order to comprehend Plato's gradational ontology these two kinds of experience are to be distinguished at the outset. But before making any discussion regarding the issue of gradational ontology, the meaning of the word 'Idea' is to be comprehended first. Plato's Ideas are not to be understood in the sense of mental idea. Hence Idea in Plato's philosophy has a unique import. As against the general understanding of the term idea, Plato used the

word *Idea* in the sense of essences. Let us take an example to understand this unique sense of Idea. A table in order to be understood as a table one has to know the essence of the table. By saying this, Plato means that what makes a table a table is its essence, i.e., table-ness. What distinguishes a table from any other particular objects in this world is its essence called table-ness. This essence is present in all tables found in the sensible world. Idea, thus, for Plato, is the *common* element which is shared by many particulars belonging to that particular class. Since this common element is universally present in all particular tables in the sensible world, this Idea may be designated as the general structure or general feature of all tables. For Plato, the world of Ideas is the only reality. The reason behind such ascription of reality only to Ideas is due to his presupposition that reality is something permanent. Plato applied this logic to Ideas and says that since Ideas are permanent and imperishable, they are real. They are not subject to changes as they are eternal. In contrast to this eternal world of Ideas, objects of everyday world keep on changing and therefore they perish. That the Ideas are real is intimately associated with Plato's ontological presupposition that reality is absolutely perfect. This absolute perfectness is uniquely possessed by Ideas only. In Plato's philosophy perfectness is weighed so much so that, according to Plato, no circle drawn on this earth can be absolutely perfect. The perfect circle is housed not in this world, but in a transcendental world in the sense that the perfect world transcends the sensible world and consequently the abode of these two worlds differs. That is, Ideas reside atemporally and aspatially, while world of sense reside within

space and time. Though Plato possesses two different worlds, he sought to bridge the gap between them by way of introducing the word *participation*. Plato says that this or that particular table is only an *instantiation* of the Idea of table, because the particular table participates in its Idea called table. Again he says that Ideas are mind independent abstract objects of which particular objects are said to be copies. Plato furthers the argument to the extent that he calls Ideas to be models of which particular objects are copies. Thus Platonic usage of such words like *participation, model* and *copy* to showcase the link between two different worlds is actually a bridging link between transcendental world and the sensible world. Although Plato's Ideas are to be understood in keen contrast to the objects of everyday world, and Ideas alone are allowed to enjoy the status of reality in his graded ontology, yet his adherence to the concept of participation nevertheless gives us a bipartite picture of graded reality, i.e., Ideas are graded higher than the world of senses. This again means that the worlds of senses, being the copies of Ideas are placed lower than the Ideas.

When Plato says that Ideas are ontologically prior to the sensible world, he made an objective claim regarding the status of the Ideas. That is, for Plato, Ideas have their own independent world. This world is independent of any mind for their existence. Since Ideas are not dependent on any mind, they are said to be non-mental. That is, Ideas are neither physical nor mental, they are transcendental in nature. By saying Ideas to be transcendental, Plato emphasizes the point of ontological self-dependence and self-sufficiency of real world. This point of Platonic emphasis on ontological independence of Ideas makes Plato a realist (realism

admits a mind independent reality). However Platonic realism is not to be understood in the sense realism is understood as opposed to idealism. Platonic realism is a realism regarding Ideas, not with regard to the objects of everyday world. An idea is written therefore in Plato's philosophy in capitalized form, i.e., *Idea* to stress that unique character of Ideas. Moreover Plato considers Ideas to be objects, though they are not objects of ordinary world. Here one can be reminded of Pythagorean influence on Plato. Pythagoras, being a mathematician subscribes to the view that reality is objective. And Plato by virtue of being an ardent lover of mathematics endorsed Pythagorean view of objective nature of reality.

Plato, at the beginning of book VII of the *Republic* by means of a parable explains his two-world philosophy. This parable is explained in a dialogical form held between Socrates and his disciple Glaucon. Socrates asked Glaucon to imagine a cave where some prisoners were kept in a way so that the prisoners couldnot see anything except the wall they had in front of them. Behind the prisoners a fire burnt, and between the fire and the prisoners there was a raised way and on this way a low wall was built. Along the raised way some people carried statues, wooden carvings of animals. The shadow of these things was cast on the wall which was in front of the prisoners, and the prisoners could see only the shadow. That is, the prisoners were not allowed to see the real objects which were carried by the people at the prisoners' backs. One of the prisoners escaped from the prison and he went out of the cave. He saw the light of the sun and the real objects (not shadow), and became aware about the huge gap between two

worlds, the world inside the cave and the world outside the cave. The light of the sun means Ideas, the real objects; and the shadow is compared to the objects of everyday world. But to say that in Plato's philosophy only Ideas are real does not mean that the sensual world is unreal. This unreality has to be understood in the sense of quasi-reality as Plato distinguishes between the really existent intelligibles (ontos on)[4] and the quasi-real (pos on)[5] status of the sensible world.

Critique of Gradational Ontology :

Plato himself was aware about the shortcoming of the inter-relationship between Ideas and individuals, i.e., the relation of participation not being able to do sufficient justice to the relation itself. Plato's participating relation makes sufficient room for raising many questions. For example, if each Idea is unique and indivisible, how come it happens that the Idea gets divided into many? That is, if the Idea of table is present in each individual table in the sensible world, this means that the indivisible Idea of table has been divided into parts, and that the thesis about the indivisibility of Idea is proved wrong on that count. Aristotle, while disagreeing with Plato laid down an argument called Third Man Argument (TMA). Aristotle took the example of a man and hence the name of the argument came to be known TMA. Plato says that a man A is a man because he participates in the Idea of man, say B. But Plato also says that the Idea of man, B itself is a man, a perfect man. This means that we got to postulate a third man C to explain what is common to A and B. This process will infinitely lead us on to a regress which may be said to be both infinite and vicious. Plato's critique is also found in the writings

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of Bertrand Russell. Russell, being an analytic philosopher, addresses the problem from the linguistic point of view.[6] Russell, highlighting Plato's lack of understanding regarding philosophical syntax, says that Plato fails to realize the huge gap existing between universals and particulars. Russell, by citing few Platonic examples, says that Plato thinks that when someone says 'Socrates is human', 'Plato is human' and so on, he/she may assume that the word 'human' has the same meaning in all the cases. Russell furthers the argument and says that whatever the word 'human' means, this is something which is not of the same kind as Socrates or Plato or rest of the individuals who compose the human race. This is not so because 'human' is an adjective and it would be non-sense to say 'human is human'. Plato wrongly thinks that beauty is beautiful or man is the name of a pattern created by God, of whom actual men are imperfect. It is evident from the forgoing discussion in this article that Plato himself threw critical eyes about his own mistake.

Conclusion :

Bertrand Russell, in his *History of Western Philosophy* proclaims:

Plato and Aristotle were the most influential of all philosophers, ancient, medieval, or modern; and of the two, it was Plato who had the greater effect upon subsequent ages. I say this for two reasons: first, that Aristotle himself is an outcome of Plato; second, that Christian theology and philosophy, at any rate until the thirteen century, was much more Platonic than Aristotelian.[7]

The above quote can be said to have justice ably placed philosopher Plato in the history of whole philosophical enterprise.

Ideas or Forms, being the greatest *discovery*[8] of Plato, addresses one significant question about the common element of different particular instances thereby opens the issue of the relation between particulars and universals. The issue whether universals are primary or particulars are, receives serious attention even in the contemporary philosophical scenario. The division between two worlds presupposes Plato's methodological approach set against the scientific approach. Science bases it enquiries on observation which means that science relies on sense-experience, but Plato's method presupposes his conviction that the world of Ideas is the only reality. Plato says that the sensible world is subject to changes. He therefore allowed only Ideas to be considered as real which is devoid of all changes. Plato by crossing the world of senses transcended space and time, and considered the world beyond this spatio-temporal world to be *more real* than the world of senses. This point is inseparably related to his disbelief in the sensible world because Plato was convinced by the point that transitory nature of the everyday world, cannot be qualified to be called real. Though Plato is adhered to Ideas as the only reality, Plato cannot however deny the sensible world, because according to him sensible world derive relative reality only from the Ideas. Hence by focusing on the quasi-real nature of the sensible world (as he uses the word pos on) Plato did not allow himself to ignore the sensible aspect of human reality. Thus Platonic world-world chasm can be understood as a distinction between the world of contingency and that of necessity. The world of Ideas is a world of necessity, but the world of sensibility is a world of contingency. Again, Plato's acceptance of quasi-reality of the sensible world is

categorically important for the comprehension of his world-world chasm, because it inspired him not to leave two worlds unrelated to each other. This chasm is another way of understanding a chasm between what appears, i.e., appearance and that which is real, i.e., reality. It is an *ontologically graded* chasm in that Ideas are given Absolute reality while the particular instances are ascribed relative reality. However, the point of participation made Plato get readied for critical attacks. It is undeniably true that Plato's attempt to synthesize being and non-being by way of participation cannot be subscribed fully because of its logical flaws, but Plato's dualistic scheme cannot simply be dethroned at one stroke since he pinned a new dimension to the universal-particular debate. It also exhibits one important point, i.e., even though Plato underlined the primacy of human intellect, he did not negate the worth of human senses. His chief point of focus here is that reality is graspable only by reason and not by senses. Platonic world-world chasm, besides being metaphysical, can also be seen as an epistemic chasm between senses and reason as well.

References and Notes :

1   Plato is not his original name, it was a nickname given to him. According to Alexander of Miletus quoted by Diogenes Laertius   in his 'Lives and Doctrines of Eminent Philosophers'(Book III, Life of Plato), chapter 4 Plato's original name was **Aristocles,** son of Ariston.
2   Plato : *Republic,* Trans. Desmond Lee, Penguin Group, 2007, p. 477

3 Ruchiman, W. G. : *Plato's Later Epistemology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1962, pp. 21, 66

4,5 For further discussion, see F. E. Peters' *Greek Philosophical Terms : A Historical Lexicon,* published by Newyork University Press, New York, 1970

6   Russell says that Plato's doctrine of Ideas is partly logical and partly metaphysical. To quote Russell: "The logical part has to do with the meaning of general words. There are many individual animals of whom we can truly say "this is cat." What do we mean by the word "cat"? Obviously something different from each particular cat. An animal is a cat, it would seem, because it participates in a general nature common to all cats...something which is not this or that cat, but some kind of universal cattiness. This is not born when a particular cat is born, and does not die when it dies. In fact, it has no position in space or time; it is "eternal". This is the logical part of the doctrine" (Russell, 2002, p.137). Again explicating the metaphysical part of the doctrine Russell says: "The word "cat" means a certain cat, "*the* cat," created by God, and unique. Particular cats partake of the nature of the cat, but more or less imperfectly; it is only owing to this imperfection that there can be many of them. The cat is real; particular cats are only apparent" (Russell, 2002, p.137).

7   Plato's Ideas cannot be invented; they can only be discovered because while the word invention is to mean to create somethinganew, discovery is not to be understood in this sense of creating something anew. To discover is to explore. That which is explored now in case of discovery was already *present.*

But in case of invention the invented event was previously *absent*. Since Ideas are eternally present in the transcendental world, they are discoverable and not inventible.

8   Russell, B.: *History of Western Philosophy,* Routledge, London & New York, 2002, p.122.

The Value of Compassion as the Ideal of Bodhisattva through its Humanistic Approach

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Compassion is one of the basic characteristics of Mahayana Buddhism. Mahayana or great vehicle of Buddhist philosophy represents a great transformation of Buddhist thinking and practice. It is a path or vehicle, as it offers a coherent structure for the traversing mind. The basic tenet of Mahayana lies in its spirit of selfless service to humanity through its ethical ideal 'Bodhisattva' or 'Being-for-enlightenment'. He is the person who is in his essential being is motivated by the desire to triumph for enlightenment to become a Buddha. He wants to make every being like Sakyamuni. However he required lavishly to distribute the bliss of enlightenment in order to remove all the barriers that were supposed to lie between Buddhahood and common humanity. It refers that he not only needs enlightenment for himself but also gives an approach to all sentient beings.

A Bodhisattva in order to become a Buddha may enhance through compassion. It is a moral value that a Bodhisattva may acquire in his way to Buddhahood. Generally compassion means wanting other to be free from suffering. A Bodhisattva aims at

complete Buddhahood, existence as perfect being. All beings are identical with the Buddha and Bodhi has to be realized by the spiritual discipline. So he tries to help every being to attain Enlightenment that may be fulfilled through the value of compassion. The human life is full of sufferings and to come out from these sufferings one needs salvation. And that salvation is possible through Enlightenment, according to Buddhism.

In this paper I would try to present how a Budhisattva can help people to obtain enlightenment through the moral value of compassion and how it is related to humanism.

Buddhism is one of the humanistic religions in the present world. It particularly deals with the human problems that they defy in this world. Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism refused his kingdom, his wife and only son Rahula for penetrating the truth that can eradicate the sorrows and sufferings of human life. He was the only heir of *Sakya* kindom but when he reflected on the vanities of life and upon the tragedy of death, disease and old age that bothered mankind he became upset and decided to dedicate his life for the humanity.

After the passing away of Gautama Buddha, Buddhism has been divided into two sects– *Hinayana* or smaller vehicle and *Mahayana* or greater vehicle. Both these sects have specific characteristics but Mahayana Buddhism is more moral and humanistic than Hinayana. I can discuss here the moral values of compassion of the ideal of Mahayana i.e. Budhisattva through its approach to humanity.

In the present world scenery philosophical values are the ideals that direct and control the human conduct as well as

degradation of the current material world. The present paper is very significant as moral values can control the human destiny and its approach towards society. Since all the problems are related to human life and everyone knows the value of compassion, so through compassion they can help themselves as well as other selves.

The heart of Mahayana Buddhism lies in the concepts of the Buddha and the Bodhisattva along with the conception of *prajna* (Wisdom) and *karuna* (compassion). Bodhisattva is the ethical ideal of the Mahayana Buddhism. The word 'Bodhisattva' is the combination of two words 'Bodhi' means 'enlightenment' and 'sattva' means being or 'essence'. Literally Bodhisattva can be understood as a person who in his essential being is motivated by the desire to win enlightenment in order to become a Buddha. This term was first denoted by Gautam Buddha for his search of liberation. Therefore it may perhaps mean that a Buddha designate or a man destined to become a Buddha in this or in some future life. The Mahayanists sought to make every being like Sakyamuni. They want lavishly to distribute the bliss of enlightenment. They wanted to remove all the barriers that were supposed to lie between Buddhahood and common humanity.

In Mahayana Buddhism, the ultimate goal of all sentient beings is the attainment of Buddhahood for the sake of all beings. The path which leads to that goal occurs altogether with the development of great compassion. Bodhisattvas are those who follow such paths and moved by the suffering of others. They dedicate themselves for the attainment of the highest spiritual good not for the sake of their own salvation only, but in order that they may be able to benefit all sentient beings.

A Bodhisattva may said to be a future Buddha. The term 'Bodhisattva' is used in two different senses– firstly, in its broader and popular sense Bodhisattva is the name for those who take the vow to realize their ideals on the way to Buddhahood. Secondly, it is the name for those who are ever striving for the enlightenment of other sentient beings through the practice of the paramitas and four great vows. The great vows are–

1. To save all beings.
2. To destroy all evil passions.
3. To learn the truth and teach it to others.
4. To lead all beings towards Buddhahood.[1]

The famous Mahayana Sutra Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita has expressed two meanings of Bodhisattva– wider and narrower. In the narrower sense the bodhisattva is a being who strives to change his state of mind. In this sense he is only opposed to the common person or those who do not aspire to change their state of mind. Regarding Bodhisattva Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita describes three vehicles or the three main possibilities to change one's state of mind– vehicles of Sravaka Isravakayana, vehicle of Pratyekabuddha (pratyekabuddhayana) and the Mahayana or the great vehicle. The highest state of the follower of sravakayana is *Arhattva* or *Sravakattva*. Similarly the highest state of Pratyekabuddha is *Pratyekabodhi* or *Pratyekabodhatva*.

Prajnaparamita describes mahayanika bodhisattva as the fundamental type of bodhisattva. However the other two are also equally important in Buddhism. The wider meaning of Bodhisattva is that he is the person who has chosen the vehicle of

Mahayana. Again he who choose this vehicle to help all sentient beings to attain enlightenment and to eradicate their problems. When a Bodhisattva may follow the vehicle of Mahayana he becomes the *Bodhisattva Mahasattva*. The term *'Mahasattva'* is generally translated as an epithet to Bodhisattva that means great natured or great being. According to Sakyamuni, it is only a relation between common people and *Bodhisattva-Mahasattva* where the *Bodhisattva-Mahasattva* is the subject of compassion and people are objects of compassion.

In Mahayana Buddhism, a Bodhisattva may possess the resolution to help the whole humanity and to liberate them from their sufferings. But in order to fulfill this resolution he must be filled with love or compassion for all creatures and resolve to practice the paramitas and other moral values as denotes by Buddha.

In most Mahayana sutras the six paramitas are stated specifically as meant for Bodhisattvas. Paramita may mean either "reaching the other shore" or "perfection". Besides the six paramitas other four are also included within it. These are Generosity, Moral discipline, Patience, Wisdom, Energy, Meditation, Skilful means, Determination, Strength and Knowledge. According to some Mahayana sutras, a Bodhisattva is someone who is on the path of complete Buddhahood. He may choose any of three paths to help sentient beings in the process of achieving Buddhahood. They are :

1. King-like Bodhisattva – one who aspires to become Buddha as soon as possible and then help sentient beings completely;

2. Boatman-like Bodhisattva -- one who aspires to achieve Buddhahood along with other sentient beings ;

3. Shephered-like Bodhisattva -- one who aspires to delay Buddhahood until all other sentient beings achieve Buddhahood. Bodhisattvas like Avalokitesvara and Santideva are believed to fall in this category.

The lowest level is the way of the king, who primarily seeks his own benefit but who recognizes that his benefit depends crucially on that of his kingdom and his subjects. The middle level is the path of the boatman, who ferries his passengers across the river and simultaneously, of course, ferries himself as well. The highest level is that of the shepherd, who makes sure that all his sheeps arrive safely ahead of him and places their welfare above his own. Like the third level a Bodhisattva may pursue compassion for the welfare of every sentient being.

The Buddhists life is an open war on bondage, slavery and attachment of all kinds. He has got enlightenment after many years of practicing moral values and meditation. He has suggested his followers various ways of progress on the way to the enlightenment or salvation. Some of them are–

1. The way of moral life– practicing the eightfold path.
2. The way of contemplation or Meditation.
3. The way of practice that combines the disciplinary way with meditation and practices of devotion and knowledge.
4. The way of belief or faith in the grace of Buddha and his various Bodhisattvas.

A Bodhisattva refers to serve people and has been precious by following some moral actions which are known as

Brahmaviharas or divine. Compassion or *karuna* is one of them. The others are *Maitri* or loving kindness, *Mudita* or sympathetic joy and *Upeksa* or equanimity. Compassion was more highly praised by the Buddha than any other virtues since it is the root of so many other virtues. According to Mahayana Buddhism compassion is not just something that one felt for others or that they felt in the presence of Buddha. It is also the motive for much of what he said and did. The word 'compassion' has come from the Latin word '*com*' meaning 'with' and '*passio*' meaning 'suffering.' So it refers the ability to feel the distress or pain of others. Compassion also extends itself without distinction to all sentient beings as it is based on the enlightened experience of the oneness of all beings. It is the attitude conveyed by such terms as *karuna*, sympathy, pity and mercy. Its basic characteristic is sympathy for all who suffer, and it arouses a desire to relieve or remove the pain and suffering of others.

It has been found in the Mahayana sutras that all the practices of the Bodhisattva begin with the mind of loving kindness and compassion. The mind of loving kindness and compassion is always first and foremost. According to *Prajnaparamita-Sutra*, "The status of a Bodhisattva is attainable through the mind of compassion; it is not attainable by merely meritorious deeds"[2]. Love and compassion in Buddhism are two aspects in one identity. Mahayana Buddhism defines love as a strong wish that aspires to attain happiness for all sentient beings and compassion is the state of mind that wishes each being to be freed from all sufferengs or sorrows or 'making their suffering into one's own'. Great compassion is the root of wisdom. Without loving kindness

and compassion, all virtues and wisdom will not comply with the practice of a Bodhisattva. By assimilating both wisdom and compassion, the Bodhisattva continues to push forward to the remote, otherwordly goal of 'Enlightenment'. So it can be undeniably said that the great mind of loving kindness and compassion is the heart of the Bodhisattva's practice. Both are regarded as the forces that motivate for all activities of Bodhisattvas as well as the source for all their endeavours towards the human welfare.

Bodhisattva Santideva regards compassion as the soul of Mahayana Buddhism. He says that a Bodhisattva need not learn many things, but only compassion, which leads to the acquisition of all the principles and attributes of Buddhahood. Where true compassion is absent, a Bodhisattva would be indifferent to the world; as such it constitutes both as essential mark of Bodhisattvas frame of mind and important element of his spiritual practice. 'Mahavairocana Sutra,' says :

"The cultivation of compassion is primarily and necessarily a contemplative discipline, together with the notion that perfect altruism is only possible through the healing influence of the compassionate mind. It is the prime motive behind the accumulation of merits and liberation of other living beings is their primary concerns"[3]. It refers that the altruistic mind of enlightenment or Bodhicitta is the higher form of love and compassion in the Mahayana teaching. This mind can be cultivated through two principle methods as explained in most of the Mahayana sutras. One is the precept which is called the "Sevenfold Cause and Effect Precept" and the other is the system

transmitted known as "Equalizing and switching of self and other." In the method of the Sevenfold cause and effect precept, 'to think for living beings just like a mother'. The feeling of motherliness is the ultimate counter agent to think of all beings as mothers remembering their kindness, being aware of and repaying their kindness, whose effect is friendliness and respect. As a result there is loving-kindness in the sentient being's love, – it is like a mother who does to her only child. This leads to Compassion. Thus the true compassion arises only after long and difficult process of spiritual training or cultivation.

The second means of cultivation of compassion and Bodhicitta is the method of realizing the equality of oneself and others and also practicing the substitution of others for oneself. When a Bodhisattva cultivates the habit of regarding others as equal to oneself, one learns to feel the joys and sorrows of other like his own. Thus the Mahayana elevated compassion as concerns for the welfare of living beings and willingness to sacrifice the self interest.

As a religion, Buddhism recommends highest esteem of morality. The Buddhists moral code springs from compassion and it touches each and every form of existence. The flow of compassion is not to be confined to human beings alone and has to be extended to all creatures. Buddhist morality has to be a global vision and a universal realization for the universe as a whole. The realization for universal happiness requires propagation and practice of global morality. As a result morality has to be revealed as spiritualistic, aiming at universal well-being based on the enlightened principle of self-sameness of all existence. In modern turbulent times the Buddhists morality calls for a new

value schema which 'cares for all and tends all.' In Mahayana Buddhism, compassion is analyzed as sympathetic understanding universally. As stated above compassion means 'to share others' sufferings. When a Bodhisattva becomes compassionate towards them he shares the same suffering and he comes to suffer greately. And this suffereng miraculously proves to be the supreme bliss, happiness or joy for a bodhisattva. The reason for this transformation of suffering into joy is basically not due to the Bodhisattva's awakening to the reality (sunyata) of things, but actually through his producing happiness in others, he makes himself happy. He helps others to overcome their distress, cultivate courage and embark upon emancipator's enterprise that does not amount to making them lazy, coward, incompetent, parasitic or taking advantage of their situation exploiting their dignity etc. It is the essential feature of a Bodhisattva's compassion that it is 'great' i.e. boundless and that it makes no distinctions. It is the selfless desires to make others happy. But compassion cannot stand on its own feet, that it can not do its work without the help of wisdom. It is said that wisdom and compassion are two main pillars of Buddhism. They are like two wings of a bird or two wheels of a cart and the absence of either of them invites dishonesty in Buddhists spirituality. Both wisdom and compassion are the acme of Buddhists thought although they are apparently different in character and directly opposite in direction. It is through wisdom that the Blessed one reached the kingdom of the Truth, and through compassion he becomes the bestowed of the Truth. It is through wisdom that makes Bodhisattvas to understand other's suffering and through compassion that makes him to counteract it.

There are two aspects of compassion-loving tenderness and sympathy. Loving tenderness refers to the sharing of joy i.e. heavenly joy, meditative joy, and the joy of nirvana and sympathy refers to the removal of pain. With great loving tenderness, Bodhisattvas understand his pain. The spirit of compassion is much deeper in meaning and much more embracing in capacity. The compassion that Bodhisattvas have for sentient being can be described as a combination of the stern fatherly love and the tender motherly love that always available and willing to sacrifice them for the humanity. With great wisdom and compassion, Bodhisattva tailors their help to every human being in varying situations as they guide them to across the sea of suffering. This very ability to manifest in differing forms is, in fact, a direct result of the Bodhisattva's great and selfless compassion. So it seems to say that compassion is the foundation of the Mahayana spirit that germinates from the wisdom of selflessness, and is incredibly powerful and strong.

The goal of Buddhism is the abolition of misery from human life. For removing misery one may attain salvation or nirvana according to Buddhism. The practical aspect of nirvana is represented by karuna or compassion. Generally Buddhists may have the conviction that ordinary life is hopelessly unsatisfactory, exposed to constant pain and grief and in any case quite futile, since death swallows all so soon. The way to get hold of it is through Enlightenment. That is why the Bodhisattva wishes to triumph Enlightenment. As a result he may be really helpful to others and his helpfulness makes them closer to Enlightenment.

Conclusion :

Buddhism is the religion of man. It can be dedicated only to the problems of man. Buddhism tried to remove all the sorrows and sufferings of human life. Buddha and his followers or the Bodhisattvas may try to help people to attain enlightenment through compassion. The Buddhists doctrine of compassion calls for transvaluation of values through a paradigm shift based on an enlightened view of reality and life. It seems to say that compassion is the ideal as suggested by Buddha or the moral value that can evaluate the human conduct, his destiny and his relation to the entire world. Compassion may be said as the direct antidote to cruelty, common vice in the world today.

Now-a-days the world has become material as it is associated with scientific discoveries. As a result the values of human conduct degraded and they are connected with lots of legal or illegal action, bear many terrorist attacks, torture from militants and so on and so forth. So Buddhism may give humanity the basic solution of many problems of life and to attain enlightenment through compassion. It is compassion that prompts one to serve others selflessly, expecting nothing, not even gratitude, in return. From this standpoint Buddhism may be said as a religion of man.

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1   Mahayana Buddhism, p.61
2   Prajnaparamita-sutra, p.56
3   Treasures on the Tibetan Middle way pp.84-86

Is there any Dearth of Contextualism in Indian Philosophy?

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Understanding the richness of knowledge system and diversity of method in classical Indian philosophy has always been seen as a longing for the Indianists, the modern Indian thinkers and also other modern scholars of different Western countries. But along with the admiration, Indian philosophy has also been facing many critical evaluations. One of the common critical approaches towards Indian intellectual history, particularly to the classical Indian philosophical knowledge system is that there is a dearth of contextualism in Indian philosophy. The aim of this paper is to discuss what does 'contextualism' mean and how contextualism is applicable in the study of Indian Intellectual knowledge system. The paper is divided into four sections. In the very first section, I have introduced the concerned problem of the present work. In the second section, I have tried to give a brief outline of Austin's theory of speech-act. The third section deals with Quentin Skinner's reinterpretation of Austin's theory. And in the fourth section, an attempt is made to have a discussion on Jonardon Ganeri's view of contextualism in the study of Indian intellectual knowledge system.

I

Indian intellectual history is never been an easily approachable
subject matter because of its diversity and peculiarity of cultural-political and environmental factors. By Indian intellectual history, we may understand some literary work like – a poem, a drama, a novel or any philosophical work or also any kind of ethical, political, cultural, and religious or another such mode of wisdom. The main problem is what appropriate procedures or methodology should be adopted in understanding such intellectual historical ideas in the form of text. Here arises the controversial debate of textualism and contextualism[1]. Indian intellectual history is often criticized for being lacking in context. The attempt here is to discuss the question whether there is any dearth of contextualism particularly in Indian Philosophy, in reality, considering Jonardon Ganeri's interpretation of contextualism in the study of Indian intellectual cultures as a guideline.

The word 'contextualism' arises from the term *context*; *context* means some words or situation in which something is to be considered. Contextualism basically means a collection of views which emphasize the context in which an action, utterance, or expression occurs. According to the contextualist, some philosophically controversial actions, issues, expressions or utterance can only be understood in relation to some context. But some philosophers hold that such context dependence may lead to relativism. However, contextualism has become increasingly popular towards the end of the 20th century, particularly as responses to the controversial issues of skepticism.

Jonardon Ganeri[2] has been analysing the issue of Indian intellectual history and how do we understand the contribution of modern Indian intellectuals. The intellectual tool that Ganeri has used while interpreting contextualism in the study of Indian Intellectual Cultures is Quentin Skinner's[3] use of J.L. Austin's theory of speech act in the application of Indian philosophy. Though Ganeri has taken help from Skinner in support of his arguments, yet he has also pointed out the limitations of Skinner's theory and method in the study of classical Indian Philosophy.

II

In this section, an attempt is made to understand the original theory of speech-act formulated by J.L Austin, in order to understand its reinterpretation by Quentin Skinner, that which is the subject of thought of the following section. J.L. Austin can be called as the landmark of the philosophy of language. Austin is essentially an ordinary linguistic philosopher. His 'theory of performative utterance' and 'the doctrine of infelicities' are considered as the backbone in the analysis of rituals, linguistic and every kind of social action. According to Austin 'serious utterance'[4]is divided into- constative utterance and performative utterance. Constative utterances are those utterances by means of which we either describe some situation or state some facts. So, a constative utterance can be either true or false, they are contingently true or false, as the fact corresponding them ascribe whether it is true or false, e. g; 'It is raining', this statement can be either true or false corresponding to the fact. On the other hand, performative utterances are those utterances which indicate that in uttering the statement the speaker performs an activity or an

action. Here it is not just describing or ascribing something but we are performing some activities. It is an utterance wherein saying something we do something, e.g; 'I promise to pay your money back'. Here 'promise' is an act which is being performed while uttering it. Austin, therefore, mentions certain special vocals which are called 'performative verbs', such as- request, order, thank, suggest, command etc. These are certain verbs that describe actions carried out by the speaker. The distinction between constative utterance and performative utterance is that- constative utterances are either true or false but performative utterances are neither true nor false; these are according to Austin either happy or unhappy. Interestingly, Austin has also pointed out certain conditions of performative utterance which make them either happy or unhappy. Further, he has found that performative utterance can also be called false and constative utterance can also be called unhappy. And, later on, Austin distinguishes between performative utterance and constative utterance under Vocabulary criterion. According to Austin, there are certain established social conventional words and when such words are used in an utterance it becomes performative and not a constative utterance.

The speech act theory of Austin, which is also called speech act thing about the charge, deals with certain kinds of activities expressed through speech. According to Austin, there are basically three kinds of speech act –

1) Locutionary speech act: It is the act of simply referring or saying something. Locutionary act is again a combination of three kinds of acts- a) phonetic acts, which means

making some noise or sounds; may be with a meaning or without a meaning, e.g; Sound made by a monkey. b) Phaticact means using some words or making a grammatically correct sentence, e. g; 'Good morning' uttered by a parrot.

c) Rhetic act, the act of using some words or sentences having certain meaning or sense or reference. However, there is a subtle distinction between these three kinds of acts. In order to perform a phatic act, one must perform a phonetic act. Again while performing a rhetic act both phonetic and phatic act get involved.

2) Illocutionary speech act: It is the act that is performed in performing the locutionary act; that is in stating or saying something we are doing something, e. g; 'The door is open', in saying so, it may be an information or a hint or warning.

3) Perlocutionary speech act: It is an act that one seems to perform by performing an illocutionary speech act, e.g; 'The door is open', here the speaker is not just giving a hint or information but he also wants his listener to react to it. If the listener reacts to it and closes the door then the speaker becomes successful. Such an act is called perlocutionary act. So, the perlocutionary act is always related to some sort of consequence or effect.

But the illocutionary act is also connected with effect in three difference sense- securing uptake, producing an effect, inviting a response. A person performs an illocutionary act when the person

uses some sort of illocutionary forces; these are the theory of illocutionary forces according to Austin. The word 'force', sometimes means sense. According to different kinds of illocutionary forces, there are different kinds of utterance, generally divided into five groups- verdictives or judgments, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives.[5] Further, while explaining performative utterance instead of going into the true-false dichotomy Austin has introduced the doctrine of infelicities. Infelicities mean statements which are stated in a misplaced context or statements uttered in a different context. Austin has given five conditions of infelicities and classified them into two features- firstly, the category of misfires, in which an act is purported but it is of no use; and secondly, the category of abuse. Compared to misfires abuse are concerned with a speaker's feeling, intention, and continuous action.

III

Quentin Skinner has reinterpreted Austin's theory; that is while uttering a word we do more than merely describing or misdescribing something, which means we perform illocutionary acts with perlocutionary effect. Skinner rather holds that to produce an utterance is to make an 'intervention'. His historical method has basically two assumptions. Firstly, it is possible to recover the illocutionary force of past linguistic acts. Secondly, the illocutionary force of a past linguistic act is good evidence in figuring out what sort of thing the authors of that act was up to; that is, the nature of the author's intervention. The term 'intervention' which arises from the word 'intervene' means to appear or lie between two things or it is a process of involvement

between two things. Skinner is famous for his discussion on the debate of textualism and contextualism. For Skinner to the question what is the truth of an utterance or a text or a poem or any such mode of literature, there are two orthodox ways of interpretation-

1) A text is interpreted in a context and the socio-religious political conditions determine the text. So, a text has to be studied under certain contextualism.

2) A text is independent and we have to understand text independent to the context, then only we will be able to grasp its truth.

As the whole problem is 'what is the truth of the text', so there is the controversy between 'textualism'(that is, the truth of the text is independent of the contextualism, it is completely rooted in the text) and 'contextualism'(which means the truth of the text is dependent on contextualism). Skinner rejects both these two theories and says that both these have some inadequacies as they have certain philosophical mistakes in the assumption of the conditions they apply in understanding the text. So, he offers his own theory of interpretation. According to Skinner, only reading a text without knowing its context is not sufficient, the recovery of context is essential to understand the text. So, Skinner's historical method of contextualism criticized textualism. For Ganeri, Skinner is concerned with 'text in context'. According to Skinner, the recovery of certain context such as- biographical, social, political and literal are sufficient to understand the nature of the illocutionary intervention of any document or text. And such context also helps

to study the relationship between social and rhetorical change, as context is now understood in a relative sense.

IV

From the framework of Skinner's understanding of contextualism, Ganeri discusses the critical view regarding Classical Indian literature as not being contextual. The complicacy, according to Ganeri, is that the intellectual historian of pre-modern India would have found it difficult to use the Skinnerian framework. To explain the reaction of using Skinnerian method to understand pre-modern Indian literary work, Ganeri talks about Skinner's first short book on 'Machiavelli'[6], which can be understood not only by simply reading it but by understanding the context in which it has been written including the heridical, social, political, environmental background of Machiavelli's life. But in almost all intellectual literature in classical Sanskrit, the context is not very clear. Ganeri questions the background of Skinner's critical approach towards Indian intellectual history. According to Skinner, the pre-assumption such as authorship, geography, and circumstance of the composition of the texts, which is required to make reliable inference about illocutionary intervention is unavailable in Indian intellectual historian. This critical approach about Indian intellectual history of having no contextualism is also favoured by the Sanskrit knowledge systems on the Eve of Colonialism project.[7]

Ganeri holds that the critical approach that there is a dearth of contextualism in Indian Philosophy cannot be completely acceptable. Ganeri admits that to evaluate Indian intelletual

historian in such a background may not be appropriate. As even though Indian intellectual historians are lacking in giving the information about physical context, but they are immensely rich in 'literary context'. The principal context in which the Indian writers made an 'intervention' was rather literary or intellectual than being mere physical or socio-political. Indian literature is rich in intellectual context, in which there is a flow of ideas. In the sense that it gives a parapaksa; that is, the argument which are the already existent view opposed to the author and it also gives the siddhanta; that is, the author's own view. Pre-modern Indian writings were affiliated to the sastra or tantra; that is considered as a disciplinary intellectual system. The sastras are conceived to possess a supreme degree of diachronic stability. For the Indian writers, intellectual innovation was more about a rediscovery of the lost grammatical rules explaining linguistic change than invention.

Ganeri holds that in Indian Philosophy, such method of contextualism cannot be easily applied. Even if we try to study the individual authors to understand the text we fail to do so in many cases. For example: till date, there is a controversy regarding who is Nagarjuna, as in the history of Indian literature we find many authors with the same name. So, it is not possible to say that the text contains the intention of the author. As we do not find who is the author and we are even not be able to find the context of the text. In many cases, we cannot even find out the period of the text. Thus, the question is how to understand the truth of the text in Indian literature. Ganeri holds that, we can understand the Indian intellectual thoughts by the 'intertextual intervention' or 'intertextual speech act'. For him, Indian

intellectual history can fit Skinner's methodology if one studies the interventions of individual authors in terms of their intertextual kinds of illocutionary act. Ganeri states about two areas in which the intertextual speech-acts can be discovered, firstly in the commentaries and secondly in the nature and function of definitions. Intertextual contexts do not mean something that one could discover only by going through a text over and over. According to Ganeri, from Skinner's caution, intertextual intervention means appreciating a former written text, in a literary and hermeneutical context. We can derive the truth of the text by placing the text in the context of its previous and next text.

Another area in which intertextual speech act can be discovered is in the nature and function of definitions. We give definitions only to contested concepts, so to give a definition is an act of attempted consolidation. According to Bimal Matilal(a modern Indian thinker), laksòanòa or definition is also used ambiguously to denote an act that the philosophers perform when they utter a definition-sentence; so act of definition belong to the class of illocutionary acts.[8] Thus, it can be said that different individual define the same thing differently because of their different context of apprehending the things. Similarly, each text gives its own definition regarding a particular thing. Ganeri states that, the use of normative terms must be regarded as equally ideological in character. As such normative terms impose a particular moral vision on the workings of the social world. This shows how a moderate contextualism turns into an extreme kind of social constructivism.

Ganeri further discusses text as 'an act of intrasystemic intervention'. By intrasystemic intervention what we understand

is that there is the intervention of different texts within the very system. When an Indian writer locates himself in a scholarly practice that has both a history and future, he looks into the past and observes the great works had received commentarial attention; so he has the preconception that if his work is of any merit, it will also be commented on by future writers in the traditions. Therefore, there arises possibility for 'proleptic speech interventions' intentionally directed towards future audiences. Proleptic speech intervention refers that the author's actual intention in writing the text is that the text can be creatively interpreted by future commentators in response to critical circumstances. Ganeri holds that such an idea of an intentionally proleptic illocutionary act is overlooked by Skinner. According to Skinner, an author writes in such a way that no place is left for the analysis of what he has intended, this is called as 'Mythology of prolepsis'. 'Mythology of prolepsis' means that there is a gap between what is intended in the text and how I am interpreting it. But Ganeri while criticizing Skinner states that the author while writing a text already have in his mind the possible questions that might be asked to him, so he intentionally leave some hints for the audience to make them understand what he meant to express. Hence, according to Ganeri, there is anticipation in the text, in the form of illocutionary force for the future possible questions. Such anticipation may or may not be true.

Further Ganeri talks about the 'indexical terms'. By indexical term, we can understand a term reference of which depends on the context of utterance. Indexical terms are relatively and uncontroversially considered as context sensitive. Context sensitive expressions are that which express different propositions relative

to different contexts of use. The historian of intellectual cultures also takes some important terms to be indexical in the broad sense of cultural context. By understanding the meaning of such cultural indexical terms we can know other's culture as well as the content of our own culture better. In this sense, *sincerity* is a cultural indexical term as its content varies according to the local system of commendation while its character remains constant. So, by such a use of cultural indexical, we can avoid the problem of cultural relativism. Ganeri stated that two contexts must be taken into consideration whenever an 'indexical expression' is used; these are – the context of utterance and context of evaluation. So, there are some indexical utterances which refer out their own contexts of use, they make assertions evaluable only with respect to some other context. These two are other sorts of performative utterance which can be called indexical illocution. The Proleptic illocutionary acts are really just a special case of indexical illocution; the case in which the indexical points to the future.

Conclusion :

The question arises how far Ganeri's attempt is successful to understand Indian hermeneutical stance through the thoughtful use of the Skinnerian method. Ganeri holds that Skinner's conception of 'context' in order to understand Indian knowledge system is 'both too rich and too poor'. Too rich as in understanding India's knowledge system we cannot access to the minute detail as described by Skinner; it is also too poor because Indian knowledge system has broader contexts of intellectual intervention compared to Skinner's understanding of context. According to Ganeri if we attempt to apply Skinnerian methods in Indian

philosophy, those become irrelevant. Therefore, the prime question of this paper; that is, "Is there any Dearth of Contextualism in Indian Philosophy?" can be answered in negation in accordance with Ganeri's reflection on classical Indian philosophy. Ganeri from one point of view can be criticized, as he lacks in giving a deep analysis on the subject matter he was supposed to discuss; that is, 'Indian intellectual cultures'. Again it can also be said that understanding traditional Indian intellectual history from a western background of contextualism is not an uncontroversial task. A.K. Ramanujan in this regard opined that there is a type-difference between Indian and Western modes of reason. But Ganeri has introduced a contradiction to such an opinion. According to Ganeri, "Forms of rationality are, I maintain, interculturally available even if they are not always interculturally instantiated....The point is to discover new forms of rationality and applications of the concept of reason, and so to enrich a common philosophical vocabulary. We become in this way aware of possibilities for reason we had forgotten or had not yet seen."[9] Ganeri holds that in analyzing the philosophical literature of classical India, his approach was neither comparative nor historical. Instead of this, he has a critical and analytical approach towards the conceptual paradigms in the Classical Indian theories. For him, philosophy is not history, and unlike history, philosophy does not study ideas in context, rather philosophy tries to free an idea from its context. Ganeri claims that the aim of a philosopher should be to decontextualise; that is, to separate the idea from its context, which is called parochialism. It can be rightly mentioned that Ganeri's reinterpretation of Indian

Intellectual history intents to patch new philosophical standards in the global knowledge system.

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Reflecting on the relation between Ontology, Place and Ethics : An Enquiry in Ecophenomenology

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Introduction:

Across different academic disciplines, there has been a growing concern for our degrading natural environment. We live not just in an age of environmental crisis but also an age of increasing global environmental awareness. However, as pointed out by contemporary environmental phenomenologist Ted Toadvine, in our race to solve environmental problems we have lost sight of the philosophical dimension of our relationship with nature. He writes that our myopic focus on solving 'environmental problems' distracts us from asking the most fundamental questions at stake and to lose sight of the assumptions that have first set the terms of such problems.[1] This paper will seek to address such issues and to draw our attention to an important yet neglected concept at the heart of the philosophical enquiry into the nature of human- nature relation i.e. the concept of place.

Environmental Philosophy:

Since the 1970s, in view of the increasing environmental problems there has been a rapid growth of interest in the field of

environmental philosophy. The philosophical works that developed during this time explored the extent to which existing ethical theories could be expanded to include the natural environment. There has been a proliferation of principles and strategies that have seen the rise of different groups like the biocentric ethicists, deep ecologists, ecofeminists and others who all arrive at different conclusions and there are a lot of disagreements too within these various schools.

A critical phase is now seen to be developing which discusses the limits of environmental philosophy, assesses environmentalists claims to knowledge and often finds them lacking. It is true that environmental ethicists have grappled hard with determining humans' right attitude towards nature. However such ethics is based on certain presuppositions regarding the meaning of human and nature and the relationship that holds between them.

At this juncture, what is needed is to re-examine our metaphysical understanding of nature because much of how we deal with nature is greatly influenced by how we perceive it.

Different approaches in the field of environmental ethics are based on certain kinds of foundational beliefs or philosophical justifications such as the mystical wilderness in Thoreau or the deep ecological tradition of Arne Naess. These ontological and philosophical justifications provide an axiological basis for our dealings with nature in the form of moral prescriptions as to how should we act. Brown & Toadvine states,

> *If philosophy is to make a contribution towards resolving the environmental crisis, it will likely begin with a steady and insightful clarification of our ethical and metaphysical assumptions about ourselves and the world around us.*

These basic assumptions— about the relation between humans and nature, human nature, the nature of nature, and the nature of the Good—underlie all of our current behavior, both individually and culturally. But the assumptions that have guided our past behavior reveal their limitations as we think about, imagine, and live through the events and consequences of what we call the environmental crisis.[2]

Such contemporary environmental thinkers argue that the different approaches in traditional environmental philosophy share a common flaw in that they are rooted in the modern dualistic conception of nature which correlates nature with unintelligent matter, setting it up as an independent sphere apart from humanity. This modern conception of nature, they argue, is severely flawed, since humanity belongs to nature and is part of nature. Hence, there is a need for a new 'nonmodern' conception of nature that takes full account of our belongingness to nature. An ethical relation with nature requires a change in our attitude towards nature which can only come about with a change in our understanding of the concept of nature. Therefore, the theoretical foundation of an environmental ethics must be addressed.

A Dualistic Ontology :

The reductionist ontology referred to above is the modern distinction between the thinking minds and material world of objects initiated by Descartes in the 16th century. Such a distinction led to the dominant worldview in which we have learnt to perceive man as a rational conscious self in opposition to nature as the inert other. Such a view accords a superior place to humans as

sole possessor of conscious minds and devalues the natural world as inert, lifeless and purposeless. As per this view material reality is a strictly mechanical realm and our subjective experiences add nothing to it. Cartesian dualism uprooted humans and rendered them homeless in a world perceived as radically 'other', essentially alien and meaningless. In contrast to this the human mind or soul is held to be of paramount importance. Everything outside this human essence –even the human body thus seemed to require ruthless subjugation and control.

Overcoming the Dualistic Ontology:

Descartes laid the foundation for the construction of the objective sciences which have yielded a lot of knowledge and brought about the technological gifts that make our lives easier.[3] Yet as David Abram notes, these sciences overlook our ordinary, everyday experience of the world around us. Our direct experiences are necessarily subjective and the world we experience is not an inert mechanical object but a living field. The objective sciences have developed in us the attitude of taking the world for granted. As we are used to viewing the world in a particular way, it no longer astonishes us. As a result we have become indifferent, nothing surprises us anymore. As Gaarder writes, "We need to once again see the world as if for the very first time."[4] In other words we need to restore the faculty of awe and wonder. This is precisely what inspired phenomenologists like Merleau Ponty who believed in the enigmatic nature of the world around us.

So far environmental ethics has been based on a traditional dualistic ontology that has acted like a fuel to the present

environmental crisis. This has led us to view nature as a series of problems which needs to be fixed. As has often been noted by now, this ontology involves a host of hierarchical, binary oppositions such as: mind/body, reason/emotion, reality/ appearance, culture/nature, subject/object, human/non-human, activity/passivity, form/matter, being/non-being, and man/woman. In each case, the first term is exalted and the second term is devalued.

Ecophenomenology:

Ecophenomenology emerged in the last few years as a fresh philosophical approach to environmental issues trying to highlight the fundamental questions that lie at the heart of the environmental crisis. Going beyond the confines of traditional enquiries in environmental philosophy, ecophenomenology explores the questions that address the roots of the environmental crises. This involves questions of ontology, epistemology, and aesthetics; rethinking our very concepts of nature, self, and human nature relation. By overcoming the traditional dualistic ontology ecophenomenologists seek towards the ethical subject who would act in environmentally sensitive ways. It is here that the present paper tries to show that this transition from a new ontology to an ethical subject is not possible without taking into account the significance of place. Indeed the terms *being, place* and *ethics* are incomplete without one another and they actually mean the same. They draw in particular from Heidegger's notion of Dwelling and Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body-subject in their attempts to return the human subject to its essential nature i.e. the human experiencer as an essentially embodied and embedded subject.

Heidegger raised anew the question of the meaning of Being. His understanding of being reveals that *Dasein* is not merely the solipsistic subjectivity but rather is always being-in-the-world.In his work *Being and Time*, Heidegger argued that consciousness was not separate from the world and human existence. He called for an existential correction to Husserl that would interpret essential structures as basic categories of human experience rather than as pure, cerebral consciousness.According to Heidegger we are always already in an environing world which he calls 'umwelt'.

This embeddedness in our lived world is a basic determination of Dasein's existence and the presupposition for being able to comprehend anything at all. In the words of later Heidegger, "the way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth,is...dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell."[5] The loss of dwelling is one of the principle symptoms of modernity's sickness in his view. Jullian Young in her Book *Heidegger's Philosophy* writes that to dwell is, first, to be cared for, ultimately 'safe' in the dwelling place, and second, to care-for the things of the dwelling place, to be their guardian.[6] Heidegger makes a connection between dwelling and guardianship. Heidegger's philosophy suggests a primordial belonging together of humans and place, of ontology and implacement. Thus, Edward Casey in his work *Getting Back into Place* proposes that a placeless ontology is meaningless. That to be is to be in place. There is no being except being in place. In his words, "To be a sentient, bodily being at all is to be place bound, bound to be in a place, bonded and bound therein."[7]

In his work *Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau Ponty broadened Heidegger's correction to include the active role

of the body in human experience. Merleau Ponty sought to reinterpret the division between body and mind common to most conventional Western philosophy and psychology. As a philosophical tradition, therefore, phenomenology has changed considerably since it's founding by Husserl, moving from cerebral structures to lived experience.(Seamon, 2000) The chief concern of his work is to establish the primitive openness of human consciousness towards the world through the intermediary of body by characterizing the existential structure of human being as 'being-in-the-world'.[8]

Merleau Ponty writes in his *Phenomenology of Perception,*

> *Our civilised distrust of the senses and of the body engenders a metaphysical detachment from the sensible world, fosters the illusion that we ourselves are not part of the world we study, that we can objectively stand apart from that world, as spectators, and can thus determine its workings from outside. A renewed attentiveness to bodily experience, however, enables us to recognize and affirm our inevitable involvement in that which we observe, our corporeal immersion in the depths of a body much larger than our own.[9]*

The whole idea behind Merleau Ponty's philosophical project is that we have been conditioned to perceive the world in fixed ways. However, according to him, the world around us is dynamic and a collective field of experience lived through from many different angles. He regarded the body as the central locus of all life, all knowledge and thus of all science and philosophy. This turn of putting the body to the forefront of philosophy is Merleau-Ponty's major achievement. Merleau Ponty identifies the experiencing subject with the bodily organism. It is with the help

of the body that we see, touch, smell and enter into relations with other presences. The living, attentive body that Merleau Ponty talks about is different from the anatomized and mechanical body.

Merleau Ponty gave an account of our experience of others in our bodily being in the world. He made a fresh approach to the problem of other minds by characterizing a person or a subject of experience as a bodily being. According to him we encounter others not just as minds but as fellow flesh and blood creatures with whom we share a common material world. In Merleau Ponty's philosophy we find that the problem of self and other completely dissolves. He presents us with a renewed understanding of self and other in which there is no hierarchical relationship. Both self and other are bodily beings and subjects of experience. They coexist as bodily beings in a shared world. In this shared meaningful world, bodies interact with bodies and not with minds. Minds do not exert power over immaterial objects. Such understanding of the relation of self and the other is extended to the self and its natural surrounding by contemporary environmentalists. In this context David Abram in his popular work, *The Spell of the Sensuous* quotes Merleau Ponty that the natural objects are equally sensitive and responsive to the beings around it and to us. The reversibility of subject and object extends to every object that we experience.[10]

Ponty believes that perceptual experience of the world is ontologically basic rather than the secondary world presented to us by scientific realism. For Ponty the world or the other is not that which I 'think' but which manifests itself in perceptual experience in accordance with our bodily structure and skills. Things manifest before us in relation to our ways of inhabiting

the world which is always bodily in nature. What he wanted to establish is that we do not exist here as pure detached consciousness locked in the inner sphere but are always given to the world in which things are given to us in relation to our bodily abilities and we get a grip on the things we encounter.[11]

The Importance of Place :

There has been a recent wave of interest in the concept of place in various disciplines like Geography, Archaeology, Philosophy and Phenomenology.This interest is inspired by the works of a group of scholars who belong to the school of *humanistic geography* such as David Ley, Edward Relph, Marwyn Samuels, and Yi-Fu Tuan. Their primary aim was to understand the lived relationship between people and the geographical world in which they find themselves. How and why, for example, are places important in human life, what are they experientially, and how do environmental qualities contribute to their constitution? What does it mean to be emplaced humanly in a world that always includes geographical dimensions such as space, distance, nearness, mobility, materiality, landscape, region, and nature. Some significant works are Edward Relph's *Place and Placelessness* (1976) and Yi Fu Tuan's *Space and Place* (1976). What is distinctive of these works is that they emphasize the experiential features of place in terms of its subjective or lived aspects. This has led to the convergence of their method with that of the philosophical method called phenomenology.

Another such thinker, J.E. Malpas in his work Place and Experience writes that it is something of a truism to say that which is closest and most familiar to us is often that which is most easily overlooked and forgotten.[12] This forgetting has its conceptual roots

in regarding scientific knowledge as supreme. While the 'sense of place' is a familiar theme in poetry and art, philosophers have generally given little or no attention to place and the human relation to place.

Edward Casey, in his works on place like *Getting Back into Place* (1993) and *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (1997) argues against the temporocentrism that has characterized much of the history of philosophy, and is especially characteristic of modernity. Instead, according to Casey's descriptive analyses, place is primary, and should not be confused with, or subordinated to, space or time. These texts, with their systematic and wide-ranging discussions of place, embodiment, built and natural environments, dwelling and journeying, the history of philosophy, representations of place, etc. have indeed played an important role in opening 'a renewed understanding of place.' Casey's approach to understanding place is phenomenological. He gives phenomenological descriptions of the varied ways of being in place. His descriptions are relevant for anyone seeking to understand embodiment and place. He talks about how place is formed by cultural, social and political forces, how place is permeated by time and history and the importance of edges, boundaries and other places and collocations of places in understanding any singular place.

Since the last few decades, scholars from various disciplines have explored the concept of place. Some of the key features of such studies have been place attachment, place identity, sense of place, emotional relationships to place, place dependence.

The environmental crisis can be examined in this light according to many thinkers in the continental tradition of philosophy. The fact

that we have lost sense of meaning and value in relation to our natural surroundings owes largely to the modernist outlook whereby we have remained confined to our scientific understanding of space and time. Under such a framework, 'place' is a forgotten or neglected realm.

However recently there has been a sincere effort to distinguish the scientific understanding of space from place which has historical, cultural, ethical dimensions to it.

Distinguishing Space from Place :

Chawla writes that our places of origin shape who we are whether we like it or not.[13] Place comes into existence when people give meaning to a part of the larger, undifferentiated space in which they live. Whilst abstract knowledge about a place can be developed in a relatively short space of time, the 'feel' of a place takes longer to acquire, growing out of a large number of routine activities and everyday experiences, as well as more significant life events. Long-term residence therefore strengthens place identity, facilitating local social ties, providing the time to invest places with personal meanings, and linking significant life events to place, although the quality and intensity of experiences are usually more important than simple duration.[14]

Place exists at different scales, ranging from a particular part of the house or garden in which a person lives, through the streets, shops and other facilities and landmarks of the local neighbourhood or town in which they grow up, out to the wider countryside, region and nation of residence (or origin). When people talk about where they 'feel at home', they might be referring to any or all of these levels, capturing the special meaning of different places for the individual, typically based on the

experiences and memories associated with them, rather than their physical properties.[15]

Place attachment is normally understood to be part of a person's overall identity, consisting of the memories, feelings, beliefs and meanings associated with their physical surroundings. Places imbued with personal, social and cultural meaning therefore provide a framework within which personal identity is constructed.

While the notion of 'space' represents a three-dimensional, measurable extension of elements grouped together, at a more experiential level, place itself would include the 'character' of the space, which one can loosely term as the social and culturally defined space. According to Casey, the power of a place is not merely determined by its location on a map, but includes the relationships of the elements within it. He writes,

"The power of a place such as a mere room possesses not only where I am in the limited sense of cartographic location but how I am together with others (i.e., how I comingle and communicate with them) and even who we shall become together."[16]

Edward Casey notes that both geography and phenomenology have come to focus on place as experienced by human beings, in contrast to space whose abstractions discourage experiential explorations.

Place and Ethics:

As the environmental thinker, Val Plumwood, points out sensitivity to place plays an important role in developing ethical dispositions towards the natural world.[17] In fact phenomenological reflection on place lies mid way between overcoming ontological

dualism and developing ethical dispositions. Writing on the inseparable connection between ontology and place, Robert Mugeraur in his thoughtful book, Interpretations on Behalf of Place[18] writes that to be necessarily located somewhere means to exist within a particular set of norms and beliefs within a received history and language; in so far as we are living we strive for meaning and value.

Conclusion :

Thus, we have seen that as a result of our dualistic worldview and the impact of science and technology on our lives, we are so distanced from and have lost touch with our natural surroundings that it becomes more and more challenging to motivate people to adopt environmentally sustainable ways. This has led to loss of meaning and significance in human lives leading to feelings of hopelessness and loss of sense of identity. A return to place can help us in renewing our sensitivity to our place of belonging. In our shared concern towards our degrading natural environment we are convinced that an ethical relation with the environment is the need of the hour. But in order to determine an ethical relation with nature we need to identify a common motivating factor for our concern that underlies all our dealings with nature. This motivating factor towards a healthy relationship with nature is, I believe, related to our conception of nature, humanity and the nature of being.

By engaging in a phenomenological approach, this new worldview is sought through by taking account of our direct experiences in our day to day lives experiences in order to understand what it means to be a part of nature. Thus, Ecophenomenology explores human relation to nature by

specifically looking at how the human subject experiences the natural environment. Based on the theoretical frameworks set by phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau Ponty, ecophenomenologists explore newer horizons that may lead towards renewed sensitivity to our natural surroundings.The starting point towards such sensitivity is our understanding that humans are essentially embodied and embedded in this world.

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J. Krishnamurti : Human Freedom and Flowering of Individual

Dr Sucharita Dey

In oneself lies the whole world, and if you know how to look and learn then the door is there and the key is in your hand. Nobody on earth can give either that key or the door to open except yourself --Jiddu Krishnamurti

Introduction

Jiddu Krishnamurti is the most radical thinker of the contemporary Indian domain. He took a stand outside the Indian system of Vedanta philosophy and fashioned his own language to communicate the thought that: "Truth is a pathless land". According to him perfect freedom will not be achieved by means of given dictations, observations and analysis of other thinkers. We must achieve 'freedom from the known'. This is the most striking and fundamental recommendation that he made to the audience at large of the contemporary society. He advised the people both at the national and international platforms that we must achieve freedom from our conventional thoughts and sentiments, freedom from our intellectual understanding of inner and outer reality. Krishnamurti understands freedom not as a

revolt or reaction, either of collective or personal, freedom is only effortless achievement. Krishnamurti analyzed very thoroughly the concept of freedom in a unique way and states that the desire and effort to be free is a hindrance to freedom. Freedom is possible only when we can transcend the state of consciousness. This analysis of transcending the state of consciousness allows a revolution in human psychology or a change in human psychic. He called it a 'psychological revolution'.

The concept of freedom is an age old problem not only in the moral context but a very burning problem in real life situation. We find analysis on this pertinent issue of freedom in the words of Socrates and down the lane in the philosophy of Dr. Radhakrishnan and many others. In this context prominent thinkers like Samkara, Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo and many others in the East and thinkers like Jean Paul Sartre, Strawson and the like in the West have made thorough analysis on the concept of freedom related with human existence. Let us see what the dictionary meaning of the word freedom refers to in the noun form and as such it reveals that: 'the power or right to act, speak or think as one wants'; i.e. "we do have some freedom of choice". Hence in philosophy and religion, it is associated with having free will and being without undue or unjust constraints, or enslavement, and is an idea closely related to the concept of liberty.[1] In Krishnamurti's philosophy we too find expression of "freedom of choice" when he explains 'what is freedom'? But it is not exactly what the dictionary meaning refers to while referring to "freedom of choice".

Choiceless Awareness : Human Freedom

Here Krishnamurti allows the individual to act as a mirror in which one has to look at oneself. To act in silence is freedom. This is what Krishnamurti talks of "Choiceless awareness" and this is freedom. Choiceless action makes an individual to enjoy freedom because such awareness can be considered as an indirect way to transcend both the negation and affirmation of Truth. In choiceless action the mind is silent because there is no choice, resistance and effort. According to him, there is a distinction between action of will and action of understanding. Action of will is not an action of understanding or intelligence because in it involves resistance and effort.Silence of mind is absent where there is action of will. Therefore it is only action of understanding which is time-less and immediate and is based on love. He asserts that choiceless awareness can allow true action. Thus freedom can be discovered only when the mind is quite. A mind enclosed with ideas, formulas or spiritual training is a dead mind and such a mind has no freedom to make any choiceless awareness. An enclosed mind with past thoughts lacks its creativity in the discovery of freedom and thus such a mind is dead in the discovery of Truth. An individual who never stands entirely and wholly alone, can never enjoy freedom and thus is never quite.

Stillness of mind is not isolation but complete understanding of the whole process of relationship. He makes a careful observation on facts and not on ideas of understanding of life. This makes him to stand socially as an orator as well as a critic on sufferings of humanity. Deep speculation on human crisis and predicaments made him an exponent of a mission to set man

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'absolutely and unconditionally free'. When asked by the listeners, 'On the Stillness of the Mind', Krishnamurti replied that: "The mind is quite when it sees the truth ... Only then, when the mind is free from my conditioning, do I understand. When I see the truth of that, then the mind is quiet".[2] According to him stillness of mind allows freedom in human life because when the mind is quite only then there is no process of isolation through accumulation of any old ideas. When the mind is new then there is complete understanding of the whole process of relationship. He steadfastly concludes that a mind which is active and not agitated by any thought allows a complete understanding of the whole process of the 'me'. The still mind is very active because "Otherwise, stillness has no meaning. Only in that stillness, which is not a result, is the eternal discovered, which is beyond time"[3]

As a pragmatic teacher, he tried effortlessly for a 'society of equals'. He ceaselessly worked for right education and the total development of the human possibilities. According to him such development in human possibilities is possible only when there is flowering of the individual or the development of the human faculties. He explored the unconditional truth of human capacities when he puts before the world audience citing the unique experience of a sociologistic skill that the 'fullest capacity of the gardener is the same as the fullest capacity of the scientist or a teacher or a prime minister when there is no comparison and competition'. Thus we find Krishnamurti to be above the concept of Socialism as herein we see that political and economic theory of social organization which advocate that the 'means of production, distribution, and exchange should be owned or

regulated by the community as a whole'.But Krishnamurti wanted to make a communion with the real ground situation of human existence and Humanity as a whole, avoiding all fragmentations of social order. Therefore he writes in Individual and Society: "The Problem That confronts most of us is whether the individual is mere the instrument of society or the end of society. Are you and I as individual to be used....... That is the problem that is confronting most of us. That is the problem of the world; whether the individual is a mere instrument of society,...... or whether society exists for the individual.[4]This is his philosophy of 'The Art of Seeing'—To see, not partially but totally. "The act of seeing is the only truth". Of the vast mind only a fragment is used. The fragmentary influence of culture, tradition. "Living in a little corner of a distorted field." "You cannot understand through a fragment". Freedom from 'the little corner".......[5] Thus in this philosophy of pragmatism, pragmatic values of human life touches the bottom line of human existence because here both function and status loose its thread of envy and there assures progress in human dignity. Intelligence is the capacity to deal with life as a whole and it is the antidote to all anti-social problems related with different kind of human activities and conduct. This is freedom from the known. This is true living and true love.

We can therefore behold the fact that Krishnamurti vehemently opposed the mechanical thought process of human mind, representing a powerful machine while creating and processing only concepts, beliefs and traditional conventions. He called that mind to be dead and non-functioning in the capacity of creation which always determines human capacities by some

established ideas and concepts. We find Krishnamurti to be so original in his own way of giving a philosophy which is free from all conventional values of life and thus says: "Therefore the more knowledge a mind is burdened with, the less capable it is of understanding". [6] This is what he calls as 'psychological revolution' not of mere thoughts but of the whole mind. Interestingly enough while doing a thought provoking and humble rethinking on the deep speculation of Krishnamurti's arduous investigation for a mission to set man 'absolutely and unconditionally free', we often refer to 'Krishnamurti's philosophy', but he has strictly pointed out that this will make his massage : 'Truth is a pathless land' most insignificant. Nevertheless we take our liberty in use of such a practice as 'Krishnamurti's philosophy', to pen down his philosophy for the greater interest of the interesting readers. Truly observed globally as one of the greatest thinkers, a renowned writer, humanistic philosopher, a socio-psychological revolutionist, travelling the whole world to set man free from the duality of the 'me' and the 'not-me' and who encouraged the mind ceaselessly to become quiet because in that 'quietness there is a creative state and this is the factor which brings about a transformation',[7] never propagated any formal or system building philosophy.

Conclusion :

Deep speculation on human crises and predicaments made

J. Krishnamurti, a prophet to investigate human mind beyond time, and as such became the direct preceptor of the laws of life which can make life free from various conditionings like sorrows, fear, love, loneliness, hate, problems of relationships etc. He makes

a hard stroke on the inquiry in the proper conditioning and pursuit of learning the truth of life. According to him learning is not mere cultivation of memory or simply accumulation of knowledge. While speaking on the capacity of learning we find in his book the 'Life Ahead' that learning is a capacity to think clearly and sanely without illusion, to start from facts and not from beliefs and ideals. In that book itself we find his advices to both educators and students that none of them should engage themselves in mere accumulation of information or knowledge. This process of learning encourages on comparison and frustration in life. He allows us to practice that 'learning' which implies 'the love of understanding and the love of doing a thing for itself. Learning is possible only when there is no coercion of any kind. This learning will allow freedom in human living and perhaps anchoring on it we can understand Krishnamurti's mission: 'to set man absolutely and unconditionally free'.

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Vivekananda's Concept of Ultimate Reality

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Introduction :

The concept of Ultimate Reality is one of the most important issues in Philosophical enquiry and as such many theories have emerged like monism, dualism, and pluralism. Here in this paper an enquiry is made in the concept of Ultimate Reality from Vivekananda's point of view. Vivekananda being a neo-vedantin, believes in monistic philosophy and thus for him Ultimate Reality is one without second. Like an Advaitin, he also uses the term 'Brahman' for Ultimate Reality which is a Sanskrit term for the English word God. Thus he has used the words 'God' and 'Brahman' in the same sense. But Vivekananda sometimes used the word God for Ishvara as well.

Thus in this paper Ultimate Reality or Brahman is described in two ways viz. Nirguna and Saguna. Nirguna Brahman is transcendent and Saguna Brahman on the other hand is immanent as a principle underlying everywhere in the universe in the form of Ishvara as the relative aspect of Brahman itself. But question may arise that whether there are two realities corresponding to

two terms i.e Nirguna Brahman and Saguna Brahman. The answer given by Vivekananda is that there are not two realities but it is the same– Sat-chit-ananda who is impersonal as well as personal[1]. It is to be said that Brahman is too much abstract to be loved thus the relative aspect is chosen for bhakti which is Ishvara. Brahman is the substance out of which is the multiplicity of the universe can be articulated and it is Ishvara is the highest manifestation of that Absolute Reality.

According to Vivekananda, Ultimate Reality is expressed as Brahman is spirit[2]. This spirit is further described as infinite. It is infinite which has neither beginning nor an end because it is uncreated. From its nature of being 'uncreated' again follows that it is self-existent. Further what is uncreated or not caused cannot be destroyed and therefore Vivekananda has declared it to be eternal. The concept of eternity further implies unchangeableness; thus Brahman being eternal must be changeless. From the nature of Brahman being spirit, according to Vivekananda, follows its nature of being pure as he holds that spirit in its own nature is always pure[3]. Vivekananda also holds that the individuals are manifestations of this infinite spirit[4]. As the individuals share the same essence with the infinite spirit, which in a way implies that the infinite spirit is everywhere. Thus follows Brahman's character of being omnipresent. Brahman is neuter because He is the spirit and spirit is sexless. The ideas of male and female only belongs to the body and not to the soul

Brahman cannot be called a knowing being because knowledge belongs to the human mind. He cannot be called as a thinking and reasoning being because these are processes of the

weak only[5]. The Absolute or Brahman is neither known nor unknown. Brahman cannot the known through our sense experience because in that case Brahman will be limited by human mind. Thus the Absolute is not limited but infinite. Again, It is not unknown, being the very self of man, It is the most known to man. The Mundaka Upanishad also recognises the Brahman as the self of all beings.

Brahman is devoid of name thus It cannot be named. It is devoid of form so It is formless and immaterial. All material things have certain forms. According to Vivekananda, Brahman is beyond space and time. He asserts that space and time must be within Brahman or the Absolute but It cannot be within space and time because anything within space and time is limited and temporary, but Brahman being boundless cannot be again limited. Brahman being boundless cannot be again within space and time. As there is only one Ultimate Reality so nothing can remain outside of it. Vivekananda also says that as Brahman or Ultimate Reality is a spirit and not mind, so It cannot think, thus being thoughtless It cannot be within time. As there is no external change in Brahman so the Ultimate Reality is also beyond space. Again, as the Ultimate Reality is one, this means that It is beyond causation because Brahman cannot have any cause. As Brahman is boundless so it is free and exists by itself or is self-existent thus cannot be caused by anything. "The idea of time cannot be there, seeing that there is no mind, no thought. The idea of space cannot be there, seeing that there is no external change. What you call motion and causation cannot exist where there is only One."[6]

As Brahman is devoid of all qualities that means He is

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attributeless. Here Vivekananda's explanation of Brahman is seen to be similar like the Upanishadic explanation of Brahman which is called 'neti neti'. Regarding the descrption of Brahman, Vivekananda says that in truth Brahman cannot be attributed with predicates. However, the three terms which are used as ways of understanding Brahman : Sat, Chit, Ananda, that is, existence, knowledge and bliss are the best possible ways available to man for grasping the Ultimate Reality. According to Vivekananda, these terms do not designate attributes but essence of the Ultimate Reality– Sat, Chit, Ananda cannot be referred to as attributes because attributes limit objects. Hence Vivekananda conceives that Brahman is unlimited. So Sat, Chit, Ananda cannot be referred as attributes of the Ultimate Reality. The essence of the Absolute existence makes the universe exist therefore consciousness prevails and there is love in the world. Unlike Smakara and Brihad-aranyaka Upanisad where ananda is bliss, however, in Vivekananda, bliss means love. For him, it is in pure love where bliss remains.

But the negative explanation of the Brahman or Brahman as 'neti neti' is not a complete description of the Ultimate Reality. Rather, Vivekananda explains Brahman in a positive way. " To understand Brahman, he says, ' we have to go through the negation; and then the positive side will begin...'[7]". Thus he says that God is everywhere in everything. Like the Upanishad, Vivekananda also holds that everything is to be covered with the Lord. "He is in all that moves; He is in all that is pure; He fills the univers; He is in the sacrifice; He is the guest in the house; He is in all that is pure; He fills the universe; He is the Great

One."[8] Thus there is only one reality pervading everywhere in the universe in the form of existing being. This concept of Brahman is called the Virat which is all-prevading including man, animal and every existent being and this is the positive way to get the Ultimare Reality as Brahman.

Moreover, Vivekananda says if Brahman exists then Its existence must be realised. But this perception is not sense-perception at all; it is supersensuous; superconscious.[9] Thus, for Vivekananda, Brahman is a realisable principle. Vivekananda also admits that when one realises Brahman, he becomes one with Him or becomes Brahman. Here lies the practical aspect of his metaphysics : that he not only says that there is God but he adds that if He is, He must be seen and realised. In this regard the Savikalpa and Nirviklpa Samadhi can be related. So far as there is Savikalpa Samadhi, the duality remains between the subject and the object that is the realisation of Personal aspect of Brahman. But in the Nirvikalpa Samadhi, when this distinction between the subject and the object disappears then the realisation of the Impersonal Brahman is possible. Thus, realisation of the Personal God is the proceeding step towards the Impersonal Brahman.

Now the relative or the personal aspect of Brahman is analysed from the empirical standpoint. He asserts that the Absolute Brahman appears from the earthly or empirical plane as Trinity. He explain that at the empirical level Sat is the creating principle, Chit is the guiding principle and Ananda is the realising principle. This view of Vivekananda is quite akin to the Christian concept of Trinity. He says : "When we return to earth and see the Absolute as relative, we see Sachchidananda as Trinity – Father,

Son, Holy Ghost. Sat-the creating principle; Chit – the guiding principle; Ananda – the realising principle, which joins us again to the One. No one can know "Existence" (Sat) except through "Knowledge" (Chit), and hence the force of the saying of Jesus, No man can see the Father save through the Son."[10] Thus the Impersonal Brahman which is 'Sachchidananda' when looked at from the empirical level it appears as the Personal God who creates, guides and who is realisable through the way of ananda or love. Vivekananda says that it is through this principle of Personal that man can proceed towards the Impersonal aspect of Sachchidananda as through the son, the Father can be realised in Christanity.

Thus the same reality 'Sachchidananda' appears as satyam-shivam-sundaram i.e. truth, goodness, and beauty in the empirical level. The reality reveals in the form of truth, beauty, and goodness when it is seeked with love and veneration. It is the flow of life towards which men are proceeding towards perfection because men are not satisfied only with the existence or satyam but they need goodness or shivam and beauty or sundaram in their lives.

It is the qualified Brahman which is the highest goal of man because He is the perfection. He is perfect in the sense that there is no other higher entity than God, that means there is nothing beyond God. Man cannot be satisfied only with sense-enjoyments like brute animals. Vivekananda says, "And the lower the man also, the more delight he finds in the sense. As he gets higher, the goal becomes reason and love,"[11] Thus God is love. Love, for Vivekananda, is life i.e. expansion. God is love but love here does not mean the ordinary selfish love but it is the perfect unselfish love which is difficult to attain.

Vivekananda also describes Qualified Brahman as eternal, eternally pure, eternally awake, the almighty, the all-knowing, the all-merciful, the omnipresent, the omnipotent, the partless. He also says that Brahman creates this universe. These descriptions refer to the relative aspect of Brahman which are applicable from the phenomenal standpoint or empirical plane. It is also admitted by Vivekananda that Brahman cannot be called a creating being in the absolute sense of the term as creation is only an apparent phenomenon. Moreover, He cannot be called a creating being because nothing is created except in bondage. But He is free therefore not bound. Brahman in order to be objectified covers Himself with a veil of Maya, because Maya is the mother of the Universe, and thus creates the universe.

Thus this relative aspect of Brahman or God is regarded as the centre of existence, from whom all beings are projected, in whom all move on, and to whom all return. The Upanishads also describe Brahman as the source from which everything emanates but Vivekananda in addition to that also says that in Brahman all move on and finally returns. Vivekananda also talked about love, intelligence and freedom as the centre of existence. In this sense, Brahman or God is also love, universal intelligence or Infinite cosmic intelligence[12] and freedom. "Wherever there is life, there is this search for freedom and that freedom is the same as God."[13] The Brihad-aranyaka Upanishad also describes Brahman as freedom.

Question may arise regarding the creation of a finite and impure world by the pure and Infinite God. Vivekananda answers this by saying that "Our answer is: just as I am a soul and have a body, and in a sense, this body is not different from me, yet I, the

real I, in fact, am not the body."[14] Vivekananda explains this with the help of a figure :

      (a) The Absolute

      (b) Time, Space, Causation

      (c) The Universe

In the above figure Vivekananda shows that how the Absolute Brahman being Infinite in itself, maifests Himself in the form of finite and limited universe. It is the space, time and causation which act like a mediator between the Absolute and the universe. When the Absolute is seen through the space-time-causation, It appears as universe. This space-time and causation are nothing but Maya. Thus, for Vivekananda, the ultimate reality is both change and changeless. This element of change is possible in case of its manifestations. From the relative standpoint, when the Reality is perceived it seems changing but from the Absolute standpoint there is no change.

Brahman beyond space-time is inactive. But Brahman acts when He is seen as Personal God or Ishvara from the relative standpoint. It is the same energy when acts, appears in the form of creator, preserver and destroyer God. Vivekananda might have taken the idea from his Guru Ramakrishna Paramhansa. Ramakrishna explains the Personal God as Sakti. For him Brahman and Sakti are same. Ramakrishna states that, "Wherever you see actions, like creation, preservation, and dissolution, there is the manifestation of Sakti. Water is water whether it is calm or full of waves and bubbles. The Absolute alone is the Primordial Energy, which creates, preserves and destroys. Thus it is the same 'Captain', whether he remains inactive or performs his worship or pays a visit to the Governor

General. Only we designate him by different names at different times."[15] Following his master Vivekananda also holds that, " The sea in calm is the Absolute; the same sea in waves is Divine Mother."[16]

The Brahman is the highest generalisation which is beyond all limitations and the Personal God is the highest manifestation of the Impersonal Brahman. It is like a whole within which everything subsists starting from the minutes particle to the Creator, Ruler and Destroyer Personal God.[17] The Personal God is that very Impersonal God but this concept of Personal God remains till the world of Maya remains. In the absolute sense, God is Impersonal and in the relative sense He is Personal, and the Impersonal is nirguna but the Personal is Saguna. The Personal God is the Brahman seen through Maya. Though the Impersonal Brahman cannot be known by the limited human mind, the Personal God is the highest idea which human mind can have. By the word 'Personal' Vivekananda does not mean that God has a body, sits on a throne somewhere, and rules this world, but it means Saguna, with qualities.[18]

Personal God or Ishvara is the soul which is behind the universe as its creator, ruler, governor and destroyer. Vivekananda asserts that Personal God is a matter of faith and so long as there is death and weakness in the world, the faith in Personal God or Ishvara remains. He is the creative energy which is eternally active. As it is maintained in the Gita by Lord Krishna, "If I remain at rest for one moment, this universe will be destroyed."[19]

Though apparently Personal and Impersonal Brahman are seen to be different, Vivekananda admits that Personal God is a

person only apparently, but really He is the Impersonal Being.[20] Just as the waves are seen to be different from the ocean due to the difference in name and form, but in reality waves have no independent existence apart from the ocean. Vivekananda says that human being has tried to define God out of his own image and it is only in the differences of the level of perception that the concept of Personal God or Ishvara and Impersonal God or Brahman arises.

Conclusion :

Thus it can be said that Vivekananda explains the concept of Ultimate Reality both from the personal and impersonal aspects. First he explains the impersonal aspect of Brahman without qualities. Then he refers the personal aspect of God with qualities which is the jiva or atman. He concludes that from the absolute standpoint, the Personal and Impersonal Brahman are the same. But from the relative standpoint, when the Impersonal Brahman who is without name and form, seen through the veil of Maya, it appears as Ishvara or Personal God with name and form.

It is observed that in Vivekananda's concept of Ultimate Reality, there is no sharp demarcation between the two terms Brahman and God. Vivekananda uses both the terms interchangeably. G. Ranjit Sharma also remarks, "He did not always make a clear-cut distinction between the two concepts. Often he used the word 'God' in place of 'Brahman', and vice versa."[21] But there are times when he also uses the term God to signify the relative aspect of the Ultimate Reality which is the Personal God or Ishvara. It can be said that though Vivekananda explains differently the Personal and Impersonal God, but for

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him, these two are not different. It is an optical illusion in perception in the different levels that the difference between the two appears. Thus it can be said that both Personal and Impersonal Brahman are same but when the Impersonal Brahman is thought of, it comes in the form of a Personal God. This is just a process from the lower truth to the higher truth and not from error to truth. Thus he puts forward a broad outlook of the Ultimate Reality. Vivekananda observes that we must not confine Him within piece of images but establish Its presence everywhere in the world and specially in every man which will help in establishing universal harmony and ultimately paves the way to freedom.

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Existentialism in *Waiting for Godot*

Dr Pranati Devi

Introduction

Most of the literature, developed against the backdrop of world-wars I and II encompasses the contents related to various dimensions of human existence, particularly to human conditions and his problems in this world. Existentialism evolved as a post-war movement especially in philosophy and literature. It penetrates through different strata of individual existence and his subjectivity. It reveals its characteristic marks through the philosophical writings, literary expressions (novels, plays, etc.) and ethical and religious views. No doubt that philosophers, novelists, and dramatists of this period have a common concern; but some of the most important writings of existentialism are in the form of literature rather than that of pure philosophy. The existential views of the writers of that period percolated into their literary writings.

The starting point of existentialist literature can be traced back to the Russian novelist, Fyodor Dostoyevsky in the nineteenth century. The writings of Franz kafka, a German writer have long

been associated with twentieth century existentialism. Kafka sometimes writes in Kierkegaardian language as "...I felt no certainty about anything, demanding from every single moment a new confirmation of my existence......in truth, a disinherited son."[1] This confession of the momentariness of human existence echoes Kierkegaard's analysis of the first stage of human existence, i.e. the aesthetic stage. Albert Camus represents the absurd and the isolated nature of human existence through his works,like *The Outsider, The Myth of Sisyphus, The Plague* etc.Jean Paul Sartre, a French existentialist thinker of twentieth century, in his work,*The Nausea*[2] tells the story of a dejected historian who becomes aware of the intense singularity of his existence.

Waiting for Godot

Samuel Beckett, a great innovator of contemporary theatre exhibits the temporality of human existence, directionless of human living and situation of life in his most well-known play,*Waiting for Godot*.It is a two-act play presenting two evenings where the second act is a repetition of the first with slight variations, dramatizing the act of waiting.Vladimir and Estragon are the two main characters of the play who wait near a tree for the arrival of someone named Godot who never arrives. Godot's identity is in serious doubt. In the course of the play, he is perceived in various ways: saviour, god, a vindicative tyrant, a rich employer,...immediate future.[3]Actually Godot represents an absence, an emptiness, a vacuum or void, the void which Beckett perceives at the root of human life when it is cut off from its socio-historical context. The two main characters, Vladimir and Estragon involve themselves in conversation while they are waiting

for Godot. Pozzo, the character from the other couple, meets Estragon and Vladimir on his way to the market to sell his slave; Lucky. Later, a boy arrives, purporting to be a messenger from Godot and tells Vladimir that Godot will not be coming that night, but he will certainly come the next day. After the departure of the boy, Estragon proposes that they should leave, but Vladimir reminds him that they cannot leave as they must wait for Godot. The next day, Pozzo and Lucky again meet Estragon and Vladimir but Pozzo does not remember that he met the two men the day before. Pozzo appears in the nest scene as blind and Lucky as dumb. While Vladimir and Estragon continue to wait for Godot, Pozzo and Lucky leave the place; immediately, a messenger boy, like the previous day comes and tells Vladimir that Godot would not come that day. At the end, Vladimir and Estragon contemplate to commit suicide, but they postpone it till the next day. They also suggest that they should leave but neither of them initiates the move.

Beckett wrote the play in two acts, where Act Two is a repetition of Act One. Ruby Cohn observes, 'The entire play is 'woven with repetition'.[4] Each act is offered basically the same sequence: the tramps reunite, wait, encounter Pozzo and Lucky, receive Godot's disappointing message, contemplate suicide, decide to leave and do not move. Some variations, particularly in regard of the tree and the physical condition of the wayfaring couple do occur, but they do not detract from our perception of the essential sameness of the situation. The presentation of the entire sequence twice and the repetitive character of the verbal and gestural activities within the play imply an endless and

unchanging process-repetition *ad infinitum.* Besides, this process becomes mechanical and meaningless- repetition *ad absurdum.*

Existential Thoughts in the Play

The play has enormous scope for different interpretations from existential perspective.The socio-political condition of the post-world war period is the basis for Beckett's treatment of existential thought. It was a time rife with the after effects of the nuclear holocaust. It is indeed the passionate side of man's existence which cannot be confined to the realm of theorization. As a result, the uncertainty of human life seems to emerge at personal level.

The play explores different existential moods with the aim of focussing on the very theme of meaninglessness of human existence and the directionless of human life in the post war world, a world where the value of human existence was totally nullified. The play reflects different dimensions of human existence viz. nothingness, futility, identity crisis, weakness, loneliness, suffering, struggle, conflict, alienation, distress, insecurity, anxiety, hope, despair and even death. For the existentialist thinkers, this is the 'Angst of life'.

The play is constructed primarily on two sets of binaries. It has a symmetrical structure like a mathematical formula in which one part balances the other. It employs two sets of characters and each set is a pair. The relationship *between* and *within* these pairs is not always one of identity and harmony but also one of contradiction and tension. Each of the two central couples in the play is conceived so indivisibly that it functions as a single agential unit. While Pozzo and lucky are physically tied up to each other,

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Vladimir and Estragon are unable to part company despite their frequently expressed wish. The two units are sharply in contrast to each other. The binary opposition that underlies the play and organizes all the other oppositions into a unified experience of absolute ambivalence is that between hope and despair. One relation is of master and slave (Lucky and Pozzo) while the other is the relation of understanding. Vladimir and Estragon represent on the one hand man in general and on the other hand a concrete unique individual self as Vladimir represents the intellect and Estragon represents the body, both of which cannot exist without the other.The play's shape seems to be based on Backett's favourite quotation from St. Augustine : 'Do not despair, one of the thieves was saved; do not presume, one of the thieves was damned.'[5] Besides, dialogues, like '...Tomorrow everything will be better'(Vladimir), 'No, nothing is certain'(Estragon) etc. also express the opposition between hope and despair in human life.

On the other hand, the pattern of 'waiting' portrayed in the play metaphorically represents the utter hopelessness and meaninglessness of human existence. The feelingof void and nothingness arising from unknown causes always disturbs man, which can be described as existential suffering.In the play, the feeling of hopelessness of life is also reflected in man's daily struggle for existence. But this struggle is futile in a world where there is complete deterioration of human values.Even the plot, characters, dramatic speech, and setting of the play are formulated in such a way that there is a certain emptiness at places where one would conventionally look for meaning. The cognitive emphasis moves from the immediate dramatic interest to some

ultimate philosophical horizon.The absolute barrenness of the stage-space in the play drives home the point that everything is surrounded by nothingness. In one dialogue of the play Backett writes,

> "Vladimir: (looking around) It's indescribable. It's like nothing. There's nothing. There's a tree." [6]

Vldimir and Estragon are tied to this nothingness. They have nowhere to go. It is precisely expressed by the tramps when they say, 'let's go' and do not move at the end of each act.

In the modern technological era of confusion and conflict, everyone is constantly struggling to prove his existence and it is portrayed in the play by the fact that none of the characters can retain their physical and mental identities in the play. The tramps who wait for Godot as well as the wayfaring couple whom they encounter have no fixed individual identities, barring a few biological, temperamental and situational traits. They are perceived 'at this place, at this moment of time'. Thus, identity crisis is explored in the play. During the course of the play, certain questions are raised: Who is Godot?, Where do we come from?, Who is responsible for our suffering? In behavioural pattern also, identity crisis is seen in the boy's failure to remember Vladimir and Estragon. Vladimir expects that the boy will remember them on the next day, but he cannot.

Of the other two characters, Pozzo becomes blind and Lucky dumb on the next day. Even the physical object, namely the tree comes to have a few leaves in the next day. It seems that all the characters of the play appear as if they are thrown into the world as expressed by the German existentialist Martin Heidegger. Margaret Chatterjee writes, "Backett's characters are 'thrown'

and 'abandoned' no less than Heideggerian man.[7] Further, in the play, everything seems to be in doubt, and nothing is conclusively resolved.

In the play, a great deal of physical, mental and emotional suffering is also depicted. The play begins with the dialogue, 'Nothing to be done' (Estragon) and it is reiterated several times in Act I. They do nothing with the exception of simply existing and being. No hurriedness is observed here. They complain about the slow passage of time. All of it imply that everything is meaningless, their lives as well as the arrival of Godot.We do not know our past as well as our future. Present is the reality. So what we can do is hope even if it is an elusive one. The two tramps are only 'waiting'expecting Godot to arrive at any time.

In our normal human experience, space and time constitute a continuum. But in the play, time and space appear to be the main sources of the existential experience of hope and despair. Time seems to be virtually meaningless and non-existent for the tramps who are space-bound. They exist in a static, perpetual present. Estragon says, "They all change. Only we can't." [8] It reflects man's experience of despair. On the other hand, here time seems to be the source of hope as they are waiting for Godot with the hope that he may arrive at any moment. From another perspective, 'the endless waiting' indicates that hours are very long under such conditions for the tramps which seems to be the cause and the source of their anxiety and tension. Their only certainty as Vladimir says, "...is that hours are long, under these conditions, and constrain us to beguile them with proceedings which...may at first sight seem reasonable, until they become a habit."[9] Here, waiting becomes a deadening habit and this habit

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prevents them from seeing the full reality of being. They have been waiting out of irrational habit.

In the play, the phenomenon of 'anxiety' seems to be reflected in another form. It is an anguish of insecurity that arises from the absence of Godot. When Estragon encounters the messenger boy, instead of Godot himself, he asks the boy, with a feeling of frustration, 'Tell us the truth'. The boy replies, 'But it is the truth, sir!' It is a situation of distress for Estragon which he expresses through the moods of anguish and insecurity due toGodot's absence.

The act of 'waiting' for Godot might have been initially a chosen act. But it soon becomes a choice conferred upon them.

Estragon says, 'Let's go.

Vladimir: We can't.

Estragon: Why not?

Vladimir: We're waiting for Godot.[10]

It also expresses that they are incapable of exercising their freedom. Man's existence is not pre-determined. French existentialist Jean Paul Sartre says that man first exists by entering space and time and afterwards he defines himself. What is peculiar about human existence is its open-endedness. He *becomes* rather than *is*. Life is a project. Man is always in the process of realising his existence by exercising his freedom of choice. This kind of thought is not evident in this play; the two tramps are simply struggling for their existence. Neither absolute nor moderate freedom is exercised, as described by existentialist thinkers. Instead, the two tramps are incapable of exercising their freedom. No responsibility is shown by them for realising their authentic existence. The tramps are compelled to a futile and perpetual

waiting and are imprisoned as it were in space. Pozzo and Lucky, on the other hand, are committed to an equally futile and perpetual wandering, and are confined within a temporal prison.Thereby it comes in focus that they are alienated from the genuineness of their existence. The notion of 'Dasein' (Being there) of Heidegger indicates the form of alienation. The dichotomy of being-for-itself and being-in-itself is the key to Sartre's explication of the concept of alienation. For Sartre, alienation is a condition of the self becoming other, other than what it currently is, through self-transcendence. Thus, the crisis of human thoughts and ideas, inner conflict,and the dilemma which the post-war man faced about what to do and what not to do is poignantly expressedin this play.

The futility of human existence and his relationship with his fellow beings are depicted not only by the fact of 'waiting' but also by referring to the passage of time. In *Waiting for Godot*, 'time' moves in two directions- at the everyday level, second, minutes, hours pass draggingly especially when one does not have any significant thing to do. At another level, life as a whole moves fast through the process of decay and death.Pozzo says, "...They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more."[11] The passage of time leads to the conclusion that nothing in the world is permanent; everything is temporary. Things have no intrinsic value particularly during the time of war.The momentariness of life is reflected through sudden physical deterioration of Pozzo and Lucky. Not only that, the tree developing leaves in Act II also indicates the passageof time. Vladimir says, "Look at the tree". Estragon replies, "It's never the same pus from one second to the next."[12] In one dialogue

Vladimir says, "But yesterday evening it was all black and bare. And now it's covered with leaves."[13]

The play reflects how man tries to avoid his or her loneliness and dread.German existentialist thinker, Heidegger describes how dread can be distinguished from fear. Dread arises out of nothing while fear has an object as its cause. Dread is an existential mood that can neither be shared nor be comprehended but can be subjectively realised. In Waiting for Godot the two tramps involve themselves in conversations while they are waiting not only to pass time but to avoid their lonelinessand silence.

Estragon says, "...I was asleep ! (Despairingly) Why will you never let me sleep? Then Vladimir says, "I felt lonely."[14] In another dialogue Estragon says, "In the meantime let's try and converse calmly, since we're incapable of keeping silent."[15] They are forlorn and without support. Besides, the stage is adornedin such a way that there is nothing, but only a tree which indicates that loneliness is an existential feeling that man cannot get rid of in his life.

Towards the end of the play the audience gets the idea that the two tramps will stay in that spot forever, waiting for an unseen figure named Godot who will never come. Vladimir says, "Well? shall we go?" Estragon replies, "Yes, lets go".[16] But they do not move. They end up doing nothing. The ending of the play is a state of incompletion, a still-waiting.

Conclusion

The play only depicts the situation of life. Neither any message nor any problem solving attitude is observed. The play also establishes that life in essence is meaningless and it is led in an ontological prison house i.e. in the prison of finite existence. But

the existentialist thinkers not only talk about the situation, problems, and the ways how man faces them, but also how the problems can be overcome and how one can win mastering over his problems. This optimistic aspect of man's life is not emphasized in this play. Only problems, struggle, crisis, loneliness, insecurity, despair and the situation of life are focussed.According to Kierkegaard, it is the religious stage of human existence where man solves all his existential problemsof life. It is possible only through faith in God. In Kierkegaardian language, it is 'Leap of Faith'. French existentialist Jean Paul Sartre who stands at the forefront of atheistic existentialism refers to man's freedom for overcoming the problems of life. Such kind of positive alternative does not emerge in *Waiting for Godot.* Everything seems to be in doubt and confusion. The main characters of the play are imprisoned in a closed situation.Ofcourse,a will to live is reflected through the play that if they wait, they have nothing to lose; but if we don't wait, then they may lose. Further, Godot is an absence but an absence implies presence. He, like God, seems to or may have been present somewhere at sometime in the distant past. There is somekind of awarenessof his existence though none of the details of his nature are certain.The play can be interpreted both from theistic and atheistic perspectives. The play is presented in such a way that *Godot's* existence seems to be ineffectual for the audience. On the other hand, a close observation reveals that the boy representing himself as the messenger of Godot echoes Jaspers' concept of 'cipher'. However,the ending of the play is a state of incompletion, a still waiting. It is a play of uncertainty dealing with problems and situations of human life.

References and Notes :

1. Chatterjee, M. : *The Existentialist Outlook,* Orient Longman, 1968, p.148

2. Nausea: (Nausea: French La Nausea), is a philosophical novel by the existentialist philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, published in 1938. It is Sartre's first novel and his opinion, one of his best works. It is one of the canonical works of existentialism. The novel is concerned with a dejected historian, who becomes convinced that inanimate objects and situations encroach on his ability to define himself, on his intellectual and spiritual freedom, evoking in the protagonist a sense of nausea.

3. Beckett, S.: *Waiting for Godot,* Introduction and notes by Javed Malick, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.16

4. *Ibid.,* p.18

5. Beckett, S.: *Waiting for Godot,* Introduction and notes by Javed Malick, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.18

6. *Ibid.,* 117

7. Chatterjee, M.: *The Existentialist Outlook, Orient Longman,*1968, p.158

8. Beckett, S.: *Waiting for Godot,* Introduction and notes by Javed Malick, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.78

9. *Ibid.,* p. 110

10. *Ibid.,* p. 44

11. *Ibid.,* p. 119

12. *Ibid.,* p. 90

13. *Ibid.,* p. 96

14. *Ibid.,* p. 45

15. *Ibid.,* p. 92

16. *Ibid.,* p. 124

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